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1 
Permeable Boundaries: 
Literature and Science in America 
ROBERT j. SCHOLNICK 
Reaching back to the Puritan poet Edward Taylor and forward to the 
contemporary novelist Thomas Pynchon, this collection of original essays 
explores the relationship in American culture between literature and 
science. These two ways of knowing are often thought to be unrelated, if 
not actually antagonistic. Through analyses of the ways that such writers 
as Franklin, Jefferson, Poe, Emerson, Thoreau, Twain, Hart Crane, Dos 
Passos, and Charles Olson have understood the sciences and explored 
them in their work as essential and powerful methods of knowing and 
changing the world, these essays seek to comprehend how literature and 
science have evolved together in American culture. 
Over the more than three and a half centuries of American literature 
the modes of investigation that we now include under the heading "sci-
ence" have changed radically, as has "literature." Up through the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, literature and science were understood as 
parts of a unitary endeavor, but by mid-century they had diverged. Science 
became the province of the professional, while concurrently poets, novel-
ists, and other imaginative writers asserted the autonomy of their art. 
Despite moving in different directions, science and literature have con-
tinued to speak with one another in ways that have helped to shape each. 
Focusing on the languages that writers have used to explore the inter-
penetrating realms of science and literature, this collection seeks to open 
for wider analysis a neglected dimension of American culture. 
We undertake this inquiry at a time when the familiar understanding 
of science as an objective, systematic, progressive, and transcultural means 
of investigating reality has come under increasing attack from several 
quarters. Historians have learned to approach science as only one among 
other social constructs, and so the subject has been opened to the sort of 
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critical analysis directed at any form of cultural expression. As Clifford 
Geertz observes in "A Lab of One's Own," a recent essay on feminist 
approaches to science, "If, like everything else cultural-art, ideology, 
religion, common sense-science is something hammered together in 
some place to some purpose by partisans and devotees, it is, like everything 
else cultural, subject to questioning why it has been built in the way that it 
has. If knowledge is made, its making can be looked into." 1 In the final 
essay in this collection, N. Katherine Hayles looks into the making of 
several new sciences, including chaos theory, fractal geometry, and fluid 
dynamics, as a means of opening "passages between literature, science, 
and culture in which the influence is construed as a turbulent complexity, 
not a one-way street." Because American writers themselves have explored 
the meanings of science and its offshoot technology, literature offers us 
multiple new perspectives on science as a cultural expression, even as 
science offers new perspectives on literature. 
Certain of the principles of twentieth-century physics have served to 
undermine from within the perception of science as an objective mode of 
knowing that exists apart from the human investigator. Heisenberg's 
famous uncertainty principle, for instance, holds that we can precisely 
measure the position of a subatomic particle or its motion, but not both at 
once. Consequently, in the words of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, 
investigators are forced "to decide which measurement we are going to 
perform and which question our experiments will ask the system," and so 
there exists "an irreducible multiplicity of representations for a system, 
each connected with a determined set of operators." In short, the "post-
Einsteinian" physics has placed new attention on the agency of the 
investigator-interpreter. And since the human investigator frames his or 
her questions in language, the codes of science touch those ofliterature in 
unsuspected ways. Prigogine and Stengers draw the conclusion that on one 
level both literature and science can be understood as "fictions" or con-
ceptualizations of reality: "One of the reasons for the opposition between 
the 'two cultures' [C.P. Snow's famous division between the culture of 
science and that of the 'humanities'] may have been the belief that 
literature corresponds to a conceptualization of reality, to 'fiction,' while 
science seems to express objective 'reality.' Quantum mechanics teaches us 
that the situation is not so simple. On all levels reality implies an essential 
element of conceptualization." 2 
Neither is literature immune to such fundamental questioning. The 
work of Terry Eagleton and other Marxist critics, for instance, has brought 
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into question the very existence of the category of writing we refer to as 
"literature." They have argued that "literature" is a term used by dominant 
social groups to privilege certain kinds of writing for purposes of social 
hegemony. 3 Modes of investigation, conceptualization, and expression 
within culture, both literature and science are also instruments for the 
exercise of power. This is not to ignore the very real differences between 
literature and science as ways of knowing, but to suggest the grounds for an 
investigation of their interaction within a single culture. 
The authors of these essays focus on the particular historical situations 
of the writers, asking how the writer came to understand science on its own 
terms and in its relationship to literature. Hence, the essays work together 
to define the changes in literature and science over the course of American 
history. Beyond a common attention to the specificity of historical cir-
cumstance, no one synthesis unites them. Given the writers' very different 
situations, such critical eclecticism is to be expected. However, by provid-
ing a historical grounding for discussions of literature and science as related 
modes of discourse within the context of a single culture, this volume seeks 
to establish the essential framework for that possible synthesis and to 
stimulate the new scholarship that will make it possible. 
Given our epistemological uncertainties, however, such a critical 
synthesis may well be out of reach. As Josue V. Harrari and David F. Bell 
have written in their introduction to Michel Serres's Hennes: Uterature, 
Science, and Philosophy, literary texts "are born of spaces of communication 
among several domains. Legend, myth, history, philosophy, and science 
share common boundaries. . . . The domains of myth, science, and 
literature oscillate frantically back and forth into one another, so that 
the idea of ever distinguishing between them becomes more and more 
chimerical." 4 While ultimate distinctions among the terms may be impos-
sible, historical understanding of the interaction of these ways of knowing 
is not. 
This collection identifies two closely related aspects of the interaction 
between literature and science over the course of American history. To use 
a metaphor from electricity, the first is one of resistance. Writers have 
opposed those destructive and controlling powers made possible by science 
and technology. The second is one of conduction. Writers also have drawn 
images and vocabularies from science and technology as powerful expres-
sions of new ideas for their work, even as their autonomous investigations 
have enabled them to express ideas that have a parallel or complementary 
relationship to those of science. 
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The aspect of resistance is to be found as early as Benjamin Franklin's 
warning against the potential for mass destruction of bombardment from 
the newly invented balloon, a subject that A. Owen Aldridge treats here 
in "Benjamin Franklin: The Fusion of Science and Letters." And Mark 
Twain, in the late nineteenth century, as H. Bruce Franklin shows in 
"Traveling in Time with Mark Twain," symbolically "explodes" the dan~ 
gers of a technological military machine, the product of industrial cap~ 
italism, by converting its powerful energies into the sort of destructive heat 
and electrical explosions that we witness in the apocalyptic "Sand Belt" 
chapter of A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. Similarly, David 
Porush argues that what he calls "cybernetic fiction" "is an expression of 
literature's need to contest cybernetics' claims for an ultimate description 
of human communication and thought." But, as Porush demonstrates, 
even as cybernetics and the fiction that makes use of its methods contest 
the question of "who does the better job of describing how humans think 
and communicate?" they collaborate "in a larger postmodern mission: 
defining from opposite sides that gap where humanity remains inexpressi~ 
ble in mechanical terms." 
H. Bruce Franklin argues that the American belief in an ever~ 
improving future is closely tied to a faith in science and technology as the 
essential vehicles for realizing that future. However, in creating memorable 
images of the destruction that they have made possible, writers have 
exposed fundamental contradictions within the culture. For instance, 
Nathaniel Hawthorne's extensive gallery of mad scientists grew out of his 
"fascination," Taylor Stoehr has asserted, with a culture that "displayed a 
remarkable popular interest in science and technology, even among cit~ 
izens who had little notion of the actual methods and aims of the labora~ 
tory." 5 At least from the times of Franklin and Jefferson, American writers 
have critically examined the complex of contradictory expectations sur~ 
rounding those central terms, "science," "technology," and now "high 
technology," and have found languages and artistic methods to resist their 
potentially dangerous uses. This tradition is essential, for in the words of 
the historian Robert V. Bruce, "Science and technology are the prime 
instruments of irreversible change in the thought and life of mankind, and 
for much of our own century the United States had led in wielding them." 6 
Yet, as the examples in this collection illustrate, for the most part 
American writers have not found science and technology to be destructive 
per se. Their concern has been with the way human beings have used them 
as instruments of power and control within the industrial capitalism of the 
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United States. To return to the metaphor of electricity, we can say that 
even while resisting the destructive potential of science and technology, 
American writers have at the same time developed ways of conducting 
certain of their methods, languages, and discoveries across the shifting 
boundaries that now separate them. 
Many of these essays focus on what precisely happens at the point of 
contact, when the languages or codes of the sciences touch those of art. 
The writer may seek a way to co,opt the scientist by demonstrating a gain 
when a scientific idea is amplified through an examination of its meta, 
phorical meanings in the realm of art. Joseph W. Slade shows that John 
Dos Passos and Hart Crane sought both to "assimilate and reshape" the 
new sciences and technologies in their respective literary structures. On 
the other hand, little sense of rivalry between poet and scientist emerges 
from Steven Carter's analysis of the ways that Charles Olson used ideas 
from the physics of Heisenberg and Bohr to help structure The Maximus 
Poems. Carter quotes Bohr's famous assertion that "when it comes to 
atoms, the language that must be used is the language of poetry" to show 
that energy may be conducted both ways, from science to literature and 
from literature to science and without struggle for precedence. 
Further, as autonomous investigators, writers may independently for, 
mulate in literary terms ideas that also find expression in the sciences, a 
point which we can approach through Bohr's principle of complemen, 
tarity. An "extension of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations," Prigogine and 
Stengers explain, this principle is based on the recognition that "various 
possible languages and points of view about the system may be complemen, 
tary. They all deal with the same reality, but it is impossible to reduce them 
to one single description. The irreducible plurality of perspectives on the 
same reality expresses the impossibility of a divine point of view from 
which the whole of reality is visible." From this perspective, we can see 
that multiple languages may be needed to investigate the "wealth of reality, 
which overflows any single language, any single logical structure." 7 Liter, 
ature and science independently investigate a "reality" that exceeds any 
single system of explanation, any one language. 
This principle is reflected in the poetry of Robert Frost. As Guy 
Rotella observes, Frost "was writing poems that can be described by the 
terms indeterminacy, correspondence, and complementarity long before 
he became aware of those concepts in science." 8 We may approach Frost's 
work and that of other writers as a place of exploration, a kind of experi, 
mental chamber, where the similarities and differences between conflict, 
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ing conceptualizations of reality, between science and art, subjectivity and 
objectivity, and power and contemplation, are played out through the 
medium of language. 
This collection has been organized to enable the reader to explore the 
interaction between literature and science over the entire course of Amer~ 
ican literary history. The essays on Taylor, Franklin, and Jefferson treat the 
relationship between literature and science when it was possible to pursue 
both as part of a unitary endeavor. The essays on three major writers from 
the first part of the nineteenth century, Poe, Emerson, and Thoreau, 
consider their responses to the growing separation between science and 
literature and the underlying search for new and deeper ways of relating 
them. The final essays, analyzing the relationship after science and liter~ 
ature moved apart at mid~century, treat the growing gap between popular 
understanding and the increasingly complex sciences. The essays also 
examine the attempts by writers to develop languages that are responsive to 
the new scientific complexities and the ever~increasing importance of 
science and technology as agents of change. 
We begin at the outset of the Scientific Revolution with Catherine 
Rainwater's essay on Edward Taylor. Rainwater shows how the great Pu~ 
ritan poet~physician~minister was able typologically to integrate recent 
medical concepts with his orthodox Puritan theology. "Taylor's Paracel~ 
sian poems," she writes, "demonstrate his vision of himself as an instru~ 
ment in the healing and redemptive process; his conception of himself as 
poet (user of words) and as reader~interpreter (of the Word) is synonymous 
with his sense of himself as physician, as reader~ interpreter of the Book of 
Nature who looks for the earthly signifiers of spiritual conditions and 
cures." As Rainwater and other scholars have demonstrated, Taylor de~ 
veloped a hermeneutic system that could respond to the latest scientific 
intelligence from many fields, including Copernican astronomy. Her 
exploration of Taylor's immediate situation adds to what we know about 
the reception and dissemination of science at the time. But Rainwater also 
looks forward, identifying Taylor as the first in a tradition of physician~ 
writers in America, which includes Oliver Wendell Homes, William 
Carlos Williams, Walker Percy, Oliver Sacks, and Richard Selzer. Such 
writers, Rainwater writes, remind us "of the sacramental dimension of 
healing that is also a dimension of the writer's art. Such resonance suggests 
that despite the persistent efforts of empirical science to abandon the 
metaphysical territories that science once occupied, some central mystery 
of speech and existence prevents any such absolute separation." 
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Nor did the coming of the Newtonian scientific revolution bring with 
it such a separation between science and the other dimensions of one's 
being. In his essay on Benjamin Franklin, A. Owen Aldridge explains 
precisely why "Newton demanded the muse." Neither in America nor 
England was it a mechanical universe empty of meaning and purpose that 
the expositors of Newton described. On the contrary, the "Enlightened 
theory of science," as Perry Miller has remarked, "coming to these shores 
with incalculable prestige, taught Americans to conceive of it as consisting 
in an aesthetic contemplation of a perfected universe and then to salute the 
comprehension of this universe (mainly through the grasp of Newton's 
system) as providing an entrance into the cosmopolitan culture of the 
West. "9 Aldri<;lge's essay on Franklin-and Joseph W. Slade's on Jefferson 
enable us to understand just how it was possible in the eighteenth century 
to integrate science and letters. 
Aldridge begins by reviewing the five definitions of "science" in 
Johnson's dictionary. He demonstrates that only one of these definitions, 
"certainty grounded on demonstration," with its emphasis on method, 
"approaches the modem conception." The others refer to science as 
knowledge in a generic sense and include such definitions as "art attained 
by precepts" and "any art or species of knowledge." Similarly, in writing 
about Thomas Jefferson as both scientist and writer, Slade points out that 
Franklin's "17 4 3 charter for the American Philosophical Society, which 
Jefferson served as president for seventeen years, gave equal weight to 
science and literature, as if a fluent pen were the natural extension of a 
curious mind. Indeed, the terms literary and scientific were virtually inter, 
changeable as descriptions of the society's activities." The terms that were 
used to refer to the activities now encompassed by the sciences-"natural 
history" and "natural philosophy"-are themselves highly suggestive, for 
they specify the connection between the study of the natural world and 
fundamental philosophical questions. 
Aldridge's analysis of Franklin's balanced approach to science gives us 
a new appreciation of his genius. In many ways Franklin's characteristic 
pragmatism, his suspicion of linking metaphysical speculation with scien, 
tific investigations, and his strong interest in experimentation helped to 
compensate for his limitations, particularly in mathematics. Aldridge 
contrasts Franklin in this regard with the theoretical Newton. At the same 
time, he shows that Franklin's scientific interests were remarkably similar 
to those of Voltaire. Perhaps the key to Franklin's achievement, Aldridge 
concludes, was his ability to balance his experimentalism with a wide, 
ranging imagination, which enabled him, for instance, to envision the 
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possibility of space travel. He perfectly "fused" letters and science and 
performed experimental research that was both theoretical and applied, 
thereby claiming a place in international science. 
By way of contrast, Slade, in reviewing the work of Thomas Jefferson 
as scientist, promoter of science, and writer, finds no such balance or 
"fusion" of writing and scientific investigation. He relates this imbalance 
to Jefferson's complex engagement with America. Even though Jefferson 
worked tirelessly to promote the development of science in America, his 
resistance to the growing specialization that came as a consequence limited 
his own achievements as scientific investigator. Convinced that there 
remained a need in a democracy for a common vocabulary that would 
enable the people at large to comprehend essential scientific intelligence, 
he resisted the increasingly specialized vocabularies that were another 
consequence of the maturation of the sciences he himself promoted. 
Slade, reversing Jefferson's own perception of his achievement, argues for 
his greatness not as a scientist but as a writer. For especially in Notes on the 
State of Virginia Jefferson registers the "crack in his Newtonian universe" 
represented by the presence of slavery in the American Republic: "When 
. . . he confronts the institution made peculiar by democratic principles 
that he himself had derived from a scientific reading of the cosmos, the 
schism shakes his world." The Notes, which Slade treats as "seminal for 
many sciences in America," responds to Count Buffon's "patronizing pro, 
nouncements" about the supposedly inferior forms of life on the American 
continent. In writing carefully and precisely about the natural world, Jef, 
ferson created a new literary form, the "first example of an American genre 
of naturalism as substratum for opinions and imagination that runs through 
Thoreau, Burroughs, and Muir to Annie Dillard and John McPhee in the 
present." 
Increasingly during the eighteenth century, Newtonian science was 
responsible for a new attention to the natural world as a source of value. 
Now the "text" of the much revered American landscape was open to the 
same sort of reading and interpretation as were Holy Scripture and other 
writings. The art historian Barbara Novak has used the phrase "Trinity" to 
describe the way that in the first half of the nineteenth century, science, 
art, and religion came to be associated as parallel, mutually reinforcing 
modes of exploration: "Nature's truths as revealed by art, could be further 
validated by the disclosures of science, which revealed God's purposes and 
aided the reading of His natural text. At mid,century, landscape attitudes 
were firmly based on this unity of faith, art, and science." And she remarks 
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that "so strong was the belief in the powers of science that there was no 
difficulty in aligning its aims with those of art." 10 Ironically, even as art, 
science, and belief seemed to find a common ground, underlying changes 
in all three realms would fracture this hypothetical unity by mid~century. 
The essays on Poe, Emerson, and Thoreau explore how these Amer~ 
ican writers participated, if belatedly, in the quest of Romanticism to 
integrate science and imagination. Through developing new approaches to 
such sciences as biology, chemistry, and electricity, the Romantics sought 
to bridge the gap between the self and the external world, between the Me 
and the Not Me. The weight of recent scholarship on the Romantics has 
served to document not only the importance of the sciences for Romantic 
writers but also the lasting value of Romantic approaches and contribu~ 
tions to the sciences themselves. 11 
William}. Scheick, in "An Intrinsic Luminosity: Poe's Use of Platonic 
and Newtonian Optics," shows how Poe went beyond Newton's rather 
mechanical theory of vision to develop a theory of seeing that sought to 
account as well for the shaping of perception by the imagination. After 
analyzing Poe's wide knowledge of the sciences (and pseudo~sciences) of 
his time, Scheick focuses on the complex subject of Poe's ability to bring 
together in his work two contrasting theories of vision, the Platonic 
(vision results from the emanation of light from the eye outward) and the 
Newtonian (sight results from the reflection of light from an external 
source on the eye). Aware that the Platonic theory had no basis in fact, Poe 
still drew from it in creating characters with such active imaginations that 
the mind creates "images that are literally perceived by the retina. In this 
sense the imagination generates something like an interior luminosity 
behind the eyeball, and so Poe depicts the highly imaginative person as 
someone who evinces this interior light in large luminous eyes, eyes that 
therefore seem to emanate light from within." Such behaviors were in fact 
just then being described in the scientific literature, and so in drawing 
from the Platonic system for metaphors, Poe was able imaginatively to 
encompass an interior dimension of seeing absent from the Newtonian 
theory. Scheick's demonstration of the ways that Poe brought together 
these two dimensions of perception gives us a new perspective from which 
to understand a central point in his thinking: his "firm belief" in the 
essential similarities of the creative methods employed by the scientist and 
the artist. Poe came to realize, Scheick concludes, that "only a complete 
perception by means of both the light of imagination and the light of 
nature can bridge the gap between viewer (subject) and viewed (object), 
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the gap otherwise manifest in the behavior of the human eye. . . . [T]his 
complete perception from within as well as from without, so apparent in a 
true scientist like Kepler or a visionary artist like Usher, suggests in 
microcosm something macrocosmic: Poe's belief finally in an essential 
Unity (an intrinsically luminous cosmic imagination, as it were) behind 
the phenomenological fragmentation that is the natural universe." 
The central figure in exploring the complex of meanings of art, sci-
ence, and religion in the nineteenth century was Emerson, who as David 
M. Robinson remarks, began his career when science and literature had 
not yet separated. However, Emerson in living until1881 experienced their 
divorce in ways that Poe, who died in 1849, could not have known. At 
once adding to what we know about Emerson's lifelong study of the 
sciences and pointing to areas in need of further research, Robinson shows 
that Emerson's engagement with the sciences was central to his life's work. 
Starting from Emerson's early idealism, which in connecting nature to 
spirit provided a strong impetus for scientific exploration, Robinson docu-
ments the changes in Emerson's thought as he incorporated newer scien-
tific ideas, particularly the dynamic ideas of metamorphosis, which came 
both from Romantic biology and from the Laplacian astronomy of John 
Pringle Nichol. He came to feel that "the concept of the evolutionary 
development of nature was itself a profound theological statement, giving 
powerful support to the conception of the creation as a field of dynamic 
energy. That energy reflected the dynamism of the soul." But the ever-
increasing scientific specialization, which brought narrowly denotative 
languages, moved Emerson to complain that "science was false by being 
unpoetical." He glimpsed the alienating side of some of the newer scien-
tific ideas as well. And so Emerson never was able to bring his speculations 
on science and the imagination together in a coherent formulation. But in 
praising "the example of his intellectual project that integrated scientific 
knowledge with metaphysical curiosity," Robinson concludes by empha-
sizing the scope of Emerson's undertaking, which required that he think 
beyond the sort of restrictive categories that still hamper us: "He turned to 
science because he needed its facts and its vision, and he was unafraid of 
any truth he might discover there." 
Emerson's complaint about the "unpoetical" language of science re-
flects his distaste for the growing professionalization and specialization 
within the sciences during what the historian of science in America 
George H. Daniels calls "the emergent period, 1830-60." Daniels asserts 
that "by the middle of the century, the earlier pattern of gentlemanly 
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scientific activity was rapidly becoming obsolete. The amateur was in the 
process of being replaced by the trained specialist-the professional who 
had a single-minded dedicatiol"l: to the interests of science. The emergence 
of a community of such professionals was the most significant development 
in nineteenth-century American science." 12 These societies explicitly 
excluded amateurs, who in any event found themselves being left behind 
by the extraordinary increases in mathematical rigor, highly technical 
vocabularies, and specialization now required if one were to contribute to a 
particular field of science. Consequently, during the 1840s both in Eng-
land and America the word "scientist" came into use, Gillian Beer re-
marks, as a word that "begins to privilege and demarcate a particular 
method of coming to know and allows summary description of an enclosed 
professional group." 13 
At the same time, however, literature was asserting its autonomy as a 
way of knowing. Writers may not have been able to establish restrictive 
professional organizations, as did scientists, and it remained difficult at 
best to earn a living in the emerging literary marketplace, which gave a 
new status to the writer as a professional. Still, writers increasingly felt the 
need to assert the autonomy and power of the artistic imagination. Emer-
son described "The Poet," and by extension any creative artist, as "a 
sovereign, [who] stands on the centre. For the world is not painted, or 
adorned, but is from the beginning beautiful; and God has not made some 
beautiful things, but Beauty is the creator of the universe. Therefore the 
poet is not any permissive potentate, but is emperor in his own right." 14 
If beauty creates the universe, who better than the imaginative writer to 
explore its originating power through language? The two greatest Amer-
ican poets of the century, Whitman and Emily Dickinson, followed 
Emerson in asserting the power and autonomy of the literary imagination. 
Perhaps more than al).y other investigator, Henry David Thoreau, both 
as Transcendentalist writer and as practicing scientist, confronted the 
growing separation of the two modes of knowing. In "Thoreau and Sci-
ence" Robert D. Richardson, Jr., precisely charts Thoreau's changing 
understandings of, and commitments to, both science and writing over the 
course of his career. At the outset, in the 1840s, drawing upon the heritage 
of such thinkers as Emerson and Goethe, Thoreau had a "bright and 
uncomplicated" attitude toward science, and confidently pursued "the 
connection between the natural and moral worlds." But increasingly 
during the early 1850s, as its languages became more specialized, Thoreau 
came to assert that science "actually gets in the way of our understanding 
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how the world relates to us." And as science became institutionalized, he 
came to think that "the kind of writing he [was] interested in and the kind 
of work he [understood] as science [were] fundamentally opposed." Yet 
Thoreau could give up neither science nor ~riting, and there is high drama 
in Richardson's account of Thoreau's valiant struggle during the last 
decade of his life to find a way to bring these essential entities into 
harmony. Thoreau continued to grow as a scientist, as his "The Succession 
of Forest Trees" demonstrates. And so Richardson concludes by speculat, 
ing that Thoreau's "late projects [tried], once again, to bridge the chasm 
between scientist and Transcendentalist, for Thoreau's methods [paid] 
attention to observation and detail, while his aim [was] nothing less than 
comprehensive: to describe the natural world, in a typical cross section 
called Concord. It is a world in which everything is interrelated, a world of 
change and process, a world that is above all and in all respects, alive." 
Thoreau was an early reader of Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), and 
Richardson offers evidence that he incorporated Darwinian ideas in his 
late writings. One cannot resist speculating how, if he had lived, Thoreau, 
as a brilliant writer who was also a brilliant naturalist, would have re, 
sponded to the full implications of Darwin's thought. 
We can now see that, more than anything else, the evolutionary 
biology of Darwin served to undermine the usefulness of science for the 
traditional purpose of confirming God's wise design of the universe. As 
Barbara Novak has written, "Pre,Darwinian science ... accommodated 
discovery to design. Each new revelation was quickly enlisted as a proof of 
providential creation." 15 But if, as Darwin seemed to imply, humankind is 
a product of chance and contingency, then the enterprise of science could 
no longer contribute to the traditional search for underlying principles of 
metaphysical order and cosmic harmony. The concluding essays in this 
collection address from a variety of perspectives several related problems: 
the widening gap between the sciences and the scientific comprehension 
of the general public in the post, Darwinian world, the increasing power of 
science and technology to transform life and possibly destroy it, and the 
consequent challenges for the writer to find languages and structures 
capable of encompassing the complex new sciences. 
One way to comprehend the public's attitude toward science, Judith 
Yaross Lee's "(Pseudo,) Scientific Humor" suggests, is to look at its com, 
edy. Although the scope of her essay does not permit a full "scientific" 
sample, she does find that the dominant tradition of popular humor in 
America is antiscientific. Among the few exceptions to this tradition are 
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the contemporary novelists Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo and the 
two forgotten nineteenth-century "Phunny Phellows" who are the subjects 
of her essay, George Horatio Derby and William Wright. Lee shows us how 
to "read" the language of a comedy that is both knowledgeable and 
appreciative of scientific understanding. 
It may be that a full reading of antiscientific humor would enable us to 
chart a growing schism in American life betwen the complexities of the 
new sciences and popular understanding and reveal as well a deep unease 
with the destructive potential of those sciences. Henry Adams's famous 
warning from 1862 continues to strike a responsive chord: "Man has 
mounted science, and is now run away with. I firmly believe that before 
many centuries more, science will be the master of man. The engines he 
will have invented will be beyond his strength to control. Some day 
science may have the existence of mankind in its power, and the human 
race commit suicide, by blowing up the world." 16 
H. Bruce Franklin treats Mark Twain's A Connecticut Yankee in King 
Arthur's Court as projecting just such a vision of destruction as that 
suggested by Adams. At the novel's conclusion the "apocalyptic weapons" 
created by Twain's protagonist, the Yankee Hank Morgan, whose tech-
nological genius is the driving force behind the attempt to transform sixth-
century Britain into nineteenth-century America, are used to destroy 
"everything that the nineteenth century has anachronistically introduced 
into the dark ages. But this resolution itself is paradoxical. The science 
and technology that mark progress, that distinguish forward from back-
ward in time, become the means to annihilate all that humanity has 
created." Franklin argues that our basic understanding of the future in 
America has been made possible by the capacity of science and technology 
to transform life, so that history itself comes to have a "scientific design." 
Twain reveals the unsuspected destructive potential of a future with a 
"made in America" design. 
Joseph W. Slade shows how Hart Crane and John Dos Passos recog-
nized, as did Twain, that science and technology were critical elements in 
shaping American life and hence essential subjects for the writer. But 
"what made their assessments unique," Slade tells us, "was the assumption 
that science was not merely an essential ingredient in national life but part 
of what it meant to be human and American." Both understood the 
considerable diversity in purpose and methods among the sciences. And 
most importantly, each writer-Dos Passos drawing particularly from 
biology and Crane from physics-found in the sciences extraordinary 
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resources for new literary languages and forms. Slade writes that "to poets 
like Crane, William Carlos Williams, and Wallace Stevens, the paradoxes 
of Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr restored a sense of mystery if not to 
the world then at least to language. Late-nineteenth-century positivists 
like Poincare, Mach, and Pearson had tried to purge language of metaphor; 
the Principles of Complementarity and Indeterminacy affirmed the indis-
pensability of metaphor." Focusing on The Bridge, Slade shows how Crane 
"conceptualized energy as language" and created a poem in which "tech-
nology serves as a demotic plane where art and science can meet, a 
vernacular where spirituality can converge with everyday secular life, a 
non-Latinate version of the Mass." Dos Passos, starting with biology, 
developed the fictional techniques that make the U.S. A trilogy "perhaps 
the first novel of the information age," a world (and here Dos Passos 
anticipates the novelists discussed by David Porush in "Cybernetic Fic-
tion") where the total environment is defined by the volume of nodes of 
information that redefine it each moment. In complex ways, then, Crane 
and Dos Passos treated the new sciences and technologies both as subjects 
and, through metaphor, as a source for new artistic structures that could 
convey "the vast quantities of information that were characteristic of every 
sector of American endeavor." 
Similarly, Steven Carter shows how in The Maximus Poems Charles 
Olson explores from the perspective of quantum mechanics some of the 
ways that the realms of space, time, and consciousness interact across a 
"quantum field" in which meaning is defined through comprehending 
complex, shifting relationships. In mastering the principles of the new 
physics and in using them to structure his poetic universe, a universe that 
twists like a Moebius strip around his Gloucester, Massachusetts, Olson 
finds new ways to bring together the realms of science and art, investiga-
tion and imagination. In its poetic reading of the universe, Olson's art, 
Carter suggests, is also a kind of interpretive science. 
In his reading the cybernetic fiction of John Barth, Kurt Vonnegut, 
William Burroughs, and especially Thomas Pynchon, David Porush 
identifies an interpretive realm where postmodern literature and post-
Einsteinian physics and other sciences come together. The cybernetic 
paradigm holds that "everything in the knowable universe can be modeled in 
a logico-mathematical (formal) system of quantifiable information, from the 
phase shifts of subatomic particles to the poet's selection of a word in a 
poem, to the rent in the fabric of spacetime created by a black hole, to the 
evanescent images flickering through the brain of a preverbal infant." In 
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structuring their fictions around the very principles of cybernetic control 
that they seek to resist, the writers open closed codes to human control. 
And through constructing codes and deploying metaphors these authors 
find a common ground with certain contemporary sciences as cybernetics, 
quantum physics, and certain branches of mathematics. Porush refers to 
these sciences as "postmodern" because of their self-conscious concern 
with the structure of codes and their need to account for the presence of 
the observer. They are extremely self-conscious of their own status as 
models of reality, they view the reality described by their models as essen-
tially plastic, and they must account for the role of the human observer-
manipulator in their descriptions of phenomena. In short, these sciences 
no longer view themselves as directly involved with the stuff of nature so 
much as with descriptions of that stuff. We can, then, connect Porush's 
analysis with the comment of Prigogine and Stengers that to the extent 
science is a conceptualization of reality, it is a kind of fiction. 
And this brings us back to the ways that literature and science interact 
within a common cultural field, the subject of N. Katherine Hayles's 
concluding essay. In challenging the usual way of understanding the 
question of influence in studies of literature in science-from science to 
literature-Hayles asserts that "influence is a construction to be explored 
rather than a premise to be embraced." Treating from a feminist perspec-
tive the development of such fields as fractal geometry and chaos science, 
she shows how underlying codes of perception and representation are 
transmitted through "coupling mechanisms" across the culture. These new 
sciences signal "a change in the ground of representation itself. The same 
kind of shift is apparent in many other disciplines besides physics and 
mathematics. It is so wide-ranging, in fact, that in my view the only 
adequate explanation for it is to assume that it has been authorized by 
reconfigurations in the cultural matrix." Hayles's essay, in challenging us to 
develop new and more complex ways to envision the "turbulent flow" of 
influence from and to literature and science, implicitly challenges us as 
well to envision the shape of a full history of science and literature in 
America, one that fully responds to the complex and multidirectional 
flows of meaning. 
Because of lack of space, subjects have not been included here that 
clearly would figure prominently in that full history. More should be done 
with the Colonial period. From the nineteenth century, the tough-minded 
Hawthorne, Whitman, Dickinson, Adams, and Dreiser must be included. 
Marianne Moore, Robert Frost, William Carlos Williams, and Don DeLil-
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lo are some omissions that come immediately to mind from the twentieth 
century. Nor has the scientific essay, which in our time flourishes in the 
work of Lewis Thomas and Stephen Jay Gould, been adequately explored. 
Close analyses of the work of such women writers as Dickinson and Moore 
would make it possible for us to inquire into possible gender differences in 
the literary approaches to the scientific realm. This collection must stand, 
then, as both a beginning and as an invitation to others to continue the 
scholarly and critical investigations that will make possible a full history of 
science and literature in America. 
We have seen how science and literature, once fused, later separated 
and how they continued to speak with one another across the boundaries. 
For the writer, language itself is the most powerful of exploratory instru, 
ments, one capable of expressing ideas and relationships that, as the essays 
in this book testify, come to have deep and unsuspected connections with 
the sciences. The writers considered here provide essential perspectives on 
science within the context of the larger culture of which it is an integral 
part. Of course, no simple account of the writer's reading or use of 
particular sources fully accounts for the complex interaction between 
literature and science within culture. Knowledge of the external world 
comes to the writer, as to all of us, from a variety of sources, and his or her 
treatment of such basic modes of perceiving as time, spatial relations, 
distance, and the like may be understood as expressing in literary terms 
concepts that may also have an expression in the language of science. The 
"loop" of perception is constant and moves in several directions at once; 
the texts that are the products of this process reflect its multi,layered 
complexity. However specialized, remote and removed the actual work of 
science may be, science is the "property" of all of us, as William Ellery 
Channing recognized a century and a half ago. 17 In their searching and 
critical explorations of science as part of culture, the writers surveyed here 
provide us with examples of responses to a challenge that has never been 
more compelling: "to live responsibly," as Helen Vendler has said about 
the poet A. R. Ammons, "within natural fact, scientific imagination, and 
ethical discovery." 18 
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"This Brazen Serpent 
Is a Doctors Shop": 
Edward Taylor's Medical Vision 
CATHERINE RAINWATER 
"A physitian cureth not only the body but the mind in some manner," 
writes Nicholas Culpeper in 1654; his statement reflects the neo~Platonic 
and alchemical assumptions underlying Renaissance medical theory.l 
Such holistic views of medicine prevailed in Edward Taylor's era (c. 
1641~1729), despite the fact that the late seventeenth century was rapidly 
shifting away from an animistic cosmology, which stressed vital connec~ 
tions between matter and spirit, toward a Cartesian and mechanistic view, 
which posed few links between matter and spirit. Culpeper's and other 
hermetically based herbals were the primary sources of medical informa~ 
tion during Taylor's lifetime, but the trend was increasingly to abandon 
the mystical underpinnings of the medical theory and to emphasize the 
practical, curative effects of the remedies upon the corporal "machine." 
Indeed, most branches of "natural philosophy" were discounting their 
metaphysical dimensions and becoming modem empirical sciences. The 
abandoned metaphysical territories eventually became the exclusive prov~ 
inces of religion. 
Taylor lived during an age of numerous mind~boggling challenges to 
the scientific status quo; the new science often generated bitter disputes, 
not only between science and religion, but frequently among the pro~ 
ponents of the new science themselves. Many of these controversies de~ 
rived from arguments over factual detail, such as, in astronomy, whether 
the moon emitted or reflected light. But generally, controversy centered 
around the relative acceptance or rejection of the medieval "vitalist" 
cosmology. Vitalism posited an animate universe of "correspondences" 
between macro~ and microcosm, spirit and matter, nature and humanity. 
Edward Taylor's Medical Vision 19 
During the late seventeenth century, the Cartesian mechanical model of 
the universe augured eighteenth-century rationalism and began to make 
inroads into vitalist theories. Consequently, many scientific theories were 
constructed upon a shifting epistemological ground; proponents of these 
theories attempted to retain part of the religious and mystical foundations 
of knowledge, and yet to develop inductive, empirical sciences. 
These and other intellectual disputes of the era received much atten· 
tion at Harvard College in America, where Taylor matriculated in 1668. 
Indeed, Samuel Eliot Morison has shown that Harvard students, far more 
than their British counterparts, were encouraged to acquire the most 
current scientific information, which they favored over the ancient, au· 
thoritative views. 2 For example, when the tutor of Taylor's class of 1671 
required his students to read Physiologiae Peripateticae (1610), Johannes 
Magirus's outdated cosmological treatise, their response was to lock him 
into a closet. 3 Infused by the new scientific spirit of the late Renaissance, 
the students complained that Magirus's work held no information "about 
the universe that Dante didn't know. "4 Indeed, as historian of science 
Herbert Butterfield has observed, the new science had challenged much 
more than ideas about the arrangement of the heavens; it had also 
"changed the character of men's habitual mental operations even in the 
conduct of the non-material sciences, while transforming the whole dia· 
gram of the physical universe and the very texture of life itself." 5 
Taylor later deplored his part in the little insurrection of his class, but 
he did so less because he accepted Magirus's views than because, as a con· 
servative Puritan, he regretted the disrespect for authority the students had 
shown. Beyond this respect for authority, Taylor maintained a nostalgic 
fondness for the old, aesthetically appealing ideas of order that Magirus's 
text represented, even though the text was no longer valid. Thus, despite 
Taylor's up-to-date knowledge, poems in the Preparatory Meditations often 
depend for their internal structure upon medieval concepts of macro· and 
microcosmic design. Other poems, however, especially in the Second 
Series of the Meditations, reveal Taylor's intellectual predisposition toward 
the new science that was fostered in Harvard's free academic environ· 
ment, 6 and that over the years he came to see as likewise aesthetically 
appealing. Apparently, the new scientific data posed no significant threat 
to Taylor, as it did to many others, for Taylor was always able, eventually, to 
accommodate the new information to Puritan theology. Unlike some other 
religious poets of his era (such as John Donne in England, who complained 
that the new science had "disproportion[ed]" the "pure forme" of the 
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universe7), Taylor never railed against the systematic destruction of the old 
cosmic diagram. Instead, his works often display a spirit rallying to the new 
scientific challenge to the design of the universe. Though a modest 
colonial physician and minister spending most of his life in the remote 
frontier settlement of Westfield, Massachusetts, Taylor nevertheless shows 
a progressive attitude toward change resembling that of the great inno~ 
vators of his era. Announcing the advent of the "Great lnstauration," one 
such innovator-Sir Francis Bacon-remarked early in the seventeenth 
century: "I am certain of my way but not certain of my position." 8 Taylor 
displays Baconian confidence in the new scientific method even if, like 
Bacon, he is uncertain where such methodology might take him. Taylor's 
conservative Puritan vision repeatedly accommodates the revisions of 
heaven and earth that are now known collectively as the Scientific Revolu~ 
tion. 9 
Taylor came of age during this revolutionary time of scientific ferment 
and confusion. In some fields, such as astronomy, thinkers employed 
modem empirical methods; other fields, including medicine, remained 
medieval. In medicine, disputes arose between older theorists, inheritors 
of Galen, who believed in the humors, and the Paracelsians and post~ 
Paracelsians, who applied new, but still not empirical, methods. These 
Paracelsians understood disease as the invasion of the body by foreign 
substances rather than as a result of humoral imbalances, and they advo~ 
cated chemical cures, but they still insisted upon "spiritual" or "metaphys~ 
ical" dimensions of the healing arts. This tradition proved stimulating for 
Edward Taylor as preacher~poet~physician, for as physician he interprets 
the physical signs of illness as spiritual signs. These signs are "read" by the 
physician just as biblical texts and poems are read. In his three~part role as 
poet~physician~minister, Taylor is always primarily an interpreter, who 
imitates the tripartite role of Christ as ultimate Physician, Embodiment of 
the Word, and Interpreter. Thus, language becomes one of the poet~ 
minister~physician's essential tools. Taylor had a holistic understanding of 
illness and a holistic understanding of his three~in~one roles. In playing 
these roles, he wrote a poetry full of multiple meanings and complex puns. 
In fact, it is in light of the several roles that we can understand the nature 
of his verse forms, style, and underlying poetics, a poetics that always 
reveals Taylor's need to synthesize and reconcile disparate information. 
Perhaps ironically, it is owing to the uncertainties of Taylor's age that 
he was compelled so carefully to systematize and account for his own cer~ 
tainties. 
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If uncertainty characterized the age, so did philosophical and epis-
temological inconsistency. Butterfield remarks that "even the greatest 
geniuses who broke through the ancient views in some special field of 
study . . . would remain stranded in a species of medievalism when they 
went outside that chosen field." 10 Taylor's scientific understanding mir-
rors the inconsistencies of the day. His era was one in which more advances 
had been made in astronomy and mechanics than in any other field. 
Consequently, while Taylor sometimes reveals in his works a Copernican 
view of the universe, he also displays a variety of medieval views of other 
sciences, such as optics and chemistry, for example, which lagged behind 
in their development. 
Another such scientific discipline late to modernize was medicine. 
Though some historians of science argue that, at least in the biological 
sciences if not in actual medical practice, a "revolution" occurred through 
the "chemical philosophy" of Paracelsus (Theophrastus Bombastus von 
Hohenheim, 1493-1541), the anatomical studies of Andreas Vesalius 
(1514-1564), and the physiological discoveries of William Harvey (1578-
1657), Michel Foucault demonstrates in his study of the history of medical 
perception that modem medicine with its intense "rationality" and "em-
pirical vigilance" has "fixed its own date of birth ... in the last years of the 
eighteenth century." 11 Foucault also investigates the differences in medi-
cal discourse before and after the period of modernization and suggests 
some of the ways in which pre- and post-eighteenth-century medical 
vision derives from separate hermeneutical systems. Premodern medical 
vision grew out of the physician's assumption of a metaphysical relation 
between visible symptoms and invisible conditions (hence Culpeper's 
statement cited earlier: "a physitian cureth not only the body but the 
mind"); the modem vision, according to Foucault, stresses the accuracy of 
the trained physician's eye in reading the phenomenal signs-signs that 
are not of the disease, but that are themselves the disease. Although as 
early as the first half of the sixteenth century, Paracelsus and other 
physicians proposed "ontological" or nonmetaphysical theories of the 
sources of some diseases, Foucault reasonably concludes that only after the 
eighteenth century, as a general consensus, is there "no longer a patholog-
ical essence beyond the systems." 12 
For Taylor, as physician and minister, such a "pathological essence 
beyond the symptoms" was always an assumed part of disease, which the 
physician-minister treated as a phenomenon of the spirit as well as of the 
flesh. Taylor died in 1729, several years before the "birth" of modem 
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medicine as Foucault identifies it. However, he certainly witnessed the 
numerous controversies in medical science that some historians regard as 
"revolutionary" moments that, according to Foucault, culminated in its 
modernization in the later eighteenth century. Though medical develop~ 
ments in general ran far behind those in astronomy and mechanics, 
medical science in Taylor's day was no static or complacently medieval 
discipline. Sanctus Sanctorius (1561~ 1636) had drawn insights from me~ 
chanical science and invented devices for studying temperature and respi~ 
ration and for measuring pulse rate; William Harvey applied to cardiology a 
variety of mechanical principles; Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608~1679) 
employed mechanistic theory in his study of muscular movement; and 
Robert Boyle (1627~1691), whose ideas were highly regarded by the Math~ 
ers, had incorporated mechanistic concepts into his corpuscular theory of 
the universe. During Taylor's era, subjects of continual debate concerned 
the validity of Galenic and scholastic medical theories as opposed to the 
"new medicine" or "iatrochemical" studies ofParacelsians, as well as to the 
ideas of those such as Boyle, who advocated a relatively empirical study of 
chemistry divorced from its alchemical background.13 
In short, medical science, like the other sciences, was struggling with 
the impending epistemological shift to rational empiricism. Thus, Taylor 
was heir to myriad and radically disjunctive influences in all areas of 
scientific inquiry, both between and within the disciplines. Sometimes 
only incipient, and sometimes overtly present in all these disputes was the 
tendency for what Foucault calls the invisible "essences" to disappear from 
the scientist's purview. Despite Taylor's scientifically progressive attitude 
(and perhaps encouraged by the Cambridge Platonists who probably 
influenced him while he studied in England14), he maintains a unifying 
vision in his works in constant resistance to the "new scientific" tendency 
to divorce matter and spirit. Apparently, Taylor did not accept the need for 
divorcing matter and spirit, for when he reconciled the new data with 
Puritan theology, such data only reinforced Taylor's sense of the coherence 
of God's design. 
Such a state of affairs could reasonably have led Taylor to produce a 
body of literary works marred by confusion, and, indeed, some of Taylor's 
critics see only inconsistency and incoherence in his art. However, other 
scholars have discovered significant unities in Taylor's thought and art~ 
istry. 15 I intend to showhow Taylor's overarching typological hermeneutic 
enables him to reckon with the confusion of his age; more specifically, I 
will demonstrate, through an analysis of Taylor's medical vision, how he 
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developed a hermeneutic system that allowed him to employ the most 
recent medical concepts within the orthodox theology reflected in his 
poetry. 
The identification of medical and ministerial roles had long antece-
dents, both historical and religious. Moreover, Taylor's dual role of minis-
ter and physician was by necessity a quite common one in early America. 
During this time, hardly anyone in the colonies had formal training in 
medicine, so ministers and magistrates frequently served as "physician, 
surgeon, and apothecary." 16 Benjamin Tompson's "A Funeral Tribute" 
(1676) to John Winthrop, Jr., suggests how deeply ingrained in the colo-
nial imagination was this combined function of physician with magistrate 
or minister. Tompson depicts the colonies as bleeding patients aware of the 
loss of their Christian physician. II 
Like his colonial contemporaries, Taylor lacked formal training in 
medicine, but he probably began to gather much knowledge while growing 
up in England on a farm in Sketchley, Leicestershire. Not much is known 
about Taylor's early life, but rural people of the time usually were their own 
physicians, and so knew quite well the medicinal properties of plants. One 
reason so few colonists had formal training is that in seventeenth-century 
England, medicine was not an established part of any university curricu-
lum. Harvard College had no medical curriculum either, for the efforts of 
President Henry Dunster in 164 7, and later of Jonathan Mitchell in the 
1660s, to acquire medical faculty and materials for the school failed. 18 
Thus we know that Taylor could not have studied medicine at Cambridge 
or at Harvard. Whatever he knew from common experience, however, he 
clearly augmented by independent study and reading throughout his life. 
The books in his library included a number of medical volumes: John 
Woodall's The Surgeons Mate (1617), Joseph Galeanus's Epistola Medica 
(1648), and Nicholas Culpeper's London Dispensatory (1649), among oth-
ers. Moreover, Taylor's friendships with men such as Samuel Lee and 
Increase and Cotton Mather provided a channel for the exchange of 
current scientific information as well as opportunities to borrow books, 
from which Taylor often copied long passages.19 
Taylor read widely in all the sciences and tried always to resolve 
intellectual conflicts between science and theology without distorting 
science or Puritan doctrine. 20 Taylor seemed nearly compulsive in his 
drive toward a unifying typological vision, unlike his contemporary and 
friend, Cotton Mather, for example; Mather apparently accepted a greater 
divergence between secular and religious life and seemed less preoccupied 
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than Taylor with the dualisms of his era. 21 Consequently, such works as 
the Magnalia Christi Americana (1702) sometimes propose a theory of 
earthly experience controlled by a constantly intervening Calvinistic 
God, and at other times exhibit a rationalistic stance heralding an 
eighteenth-century mechanistic view of the universe.22 For Taylor, how-
ever, all significant experience eventually came to fit into the Puritan 
typological scheme. At first it seems curious that conservative Puritan 
typology could accommodate new scientific information, which frequently 
contradicted theological paradigms. Indeed, Taylor's typological herme-
neutic was drawn from the most conservative of exegetical writers, es-
pecially Samuel Mather (The Figures or Types of the Old Testament, 1683) 
and Thomas Taylor (Christ Revealed, 1635).23 But the great number of 
typological poems in the Second Series of the Preparatory Meditations 
reveals Taylor's steady development of just such an accommodating vision; 
over the years, Taylor more and more confidently interprets the new and 
strange phenomena of a revised Book of Nature as signifiers in a system 
circumscribed by a constant Book of God. Taylor's medical knowledge 
affords him one of many opportunities to read the signs of nature, and his 
unified vision prevails despite the "bewildering spectrum of medical . . . 
views" of his era. 24 
At the center of this "bewildering spectrum" of views lies an epis-
temological conflict: are the body and its ailments the mere outward signs 
of a spiritual condition, or are diseases mere malfunctions of the corporal 
mechanism that houses but does not "correspond" to the soul? In the 
medical disputes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we see the 
gradual demise of notions of correspondence between spirit and matter, an. 
epistemological shift that Marjorie Hope Nicolson calls "the breaking of 
the circle." 25 Proponents of the ancient views of Galen, Hippocrates, 
scholasticism, and medieval alchemy found themselves at odds with the 
new views of Paracelsians, post-Paracelsians, anatomists, and chemists, 
who were rapidly transforming medicine into a science based on empirical 
observation and analysis rather than upon scholastic paradigms that posi-
ted knowledge of matter based on metaphysical assumptions. 
The new medical theories were available to Edward Taylor from a wide 
variety of sources. Among these were medical compendia compiled by 
Daniel Sennert, Charles Morton, Nicholas Culpeper, and others. Books 
by Jean Baptiste Van Helmont (1577-1644), Robert Boyle, and William 
Harvey were also generally accessible. Taylor's notebooks contain passages 
from other well-known sources, such as William Salmon's Pharmacopoeia 
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Londinensis (1685), Lazare Riviere's The Practice of Physick (1672), and 
Nicholas Culpeper's Dispensatory (1654). Taylor's "Meditation 1.4" reveals 
his knowledge of yet another herbal that he neither owned nor apparently 
copied-Gracia D'Orta's Coloquious dos simples e drogas e sonsas medicinas 
da India (1653 ). 26 Like Culpeper's and other pharmacopoeia, D'Orta's 
herbal emphasizes the practical effects of remedies. Indeed, D'Orta repudi, 
ates ancient authority in the Paracelsian manner and declares, "I am only 
going to say what I know to be true." 27 D'Orta's attitude follows the 
example set by the authors of medical compendia and by the London 
College of Physicians, who in 1589 had advocated compromise in the 
disputes between ancient and modem medical theories. 28 
Taylor likewise seems to think in a synthetic, eclectic fashion. His 
works are replete with Galenic terminology, and they suggest that he knew 
the difference between Galen's and Harvey's notions about circulation; his 
works especially evince Paracelsian alchemical concepts. Although this 
slough of nomenclature could cause confusion, careful scrutiny of Taylor's 
work reveals that he maintains primarily a Paracelsian vision, which 
harmonizes well with Puritan typology. 
The foremost harmony between Paracelsian philosophy and Puritan 
theology lies in their mutual acceptance of the "two book" universe: ra, 
tional, careful observation of the Book of Nature, subordinated to proper 
insights derived from the Bible, leads to truth. Paracelsus himself was 
driven by motives as much or more religious than scientific, though he was 
an early advocate of the scientific method of empirical observation. His 
seventeenth,century followers were even more rigorously scientific in their 
approaches, though they too shared significant, if diverse, religious mo, 
tives. The seventeenth,century Paracelsians included Culpeper, Van Hel, 
mont, Robert Fludd, John Webster, and John Woodall, among those who 
directly and indirectly informed Taylor. Besides the Culpeper texts, Taylor 
owned Webster's Metallographia: An History of Metals (1641), and the 1617 
edition of Woodall's The Surgeons Mate, a widely circulated work that was 
expanded and reprinted twice before Taylor's death in 1729. 29 Fortified by 
the many scientific developments of the late sixteenth and early seven, 
teenth centuries, these Paracelsians surpassed Paracelsus in their knowl, 
edge of chemical properties of plants and metals, and they conjoined this 
knowledge with the older, Christian alchemical notions about the meta, 
physical "essences" of these substances. 30 
Though authorities on Paracelsian alchemy trace its origins in Pla, 
tonic, Aristotelian, and Gnostic philosophy, the Christian tradition cen, 
26 American Literature and Science 
tral to Paracelsian thought seems more particularly Augustinian; this 
feature of Paracelsianism largely accounts for its easy reconciliation with 
Puritan theology.31 The Augustinian notion ofhow God's Being pervades 
nature accounts for why the Paracelsians cannot properly be termed pan, 
theists, even though they sometimes appear to be so. Though seventeenth, 
century Paracelsians were not a philosophically or theologically unified 
group, they variously defended "natural magic," while they denied pan, 
theism for reasons that Van Helmont explains throughout his works. His 
argument follows Augustinian lines in proclaiming that, although there 
is no gap between the corporal and the spiritual, nature is not divinely 
immanent. Instead, it contains something approximating a receptivity to, 
or even a yearning toward, the "Life Spirit," which comes from God. 
Paracelsus himself had referred to the "archei" within the incipient forms 
of nature that are responsible for transforming "prime matter" (God's force) 
into "ultimate matter" (particular forms). These "archei" constitute that 
part of matter that retains a divine origin. Van Helmont later revised 
Paracelsus's notion of "archei" in a manner that precluded all arguments for 
a pantheistic universe. 32 An Augustinian concept of divine presence that 
is not immanence underlies Puritan theology as well, and Edward Taylor's 
thought in particular. 33 Taylor, who is no pantheist, declares in "Medita, 
tion 2.17" that "Being Being gave to all that be." That is, deistic "Being" 
permeates nature-nature partakes of the order of grace, but nature is not 
divine. Moreover, when Taylor repeatedly refers in his poems to the "aqua 
vitae" that flows from God throughout all nature, he likewise refers to 
God's love (for St. Augustine, synonymous with Being) and recalls the 
alchemical fascination with water as the element pervading all matter. 34 
Considering this common thread of Augustinian philosophy uniting 
both Paracelsian and Puritan traditions, one can more clearly appreciate 
Taylor's ease in assimilating Paracelsian medicine into a Puritan typo, 
logical scheme; his understanding of God's grace dispensed throughout 
nature comports with the Paracelsian notion of a non,pantheistic natural 
magic. As Taylor explains in the seventh sermon in the Christographia, 
"The Influences that flow from Christ are Nature's disposing influences. 
He Wealds nature as he pleaseth. . . . All the influences in naturall things 
come forth from him as to their flowrishing and glory. So all those In, 
fluences that actuate Nature Preternaturally, or not in a naturall way, are 
from him, Whether they are Contranatural [or] Supernatural." 35 
Always maintaining this notion of the unity of matter and spirit, 
Taylor in his poems depicts the source of physical illness as spiritual 
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malady, despite whatever immediate material causes seem apparent. Such 
illnesses yield to the pharmacopoeian remedies because these remedies are 
the vehicles of Christ's "disposing influences." That is, they are ordained 
channels for spiritual healing through grace. 
Despite some ostensibly Galenic terminology, "Meditation 2.67B" 
exhibits Taylor's Paracelsian medical vision at work within this larger, 
encompassing theological view. As usual, illness stems from spiritual 
sickness: "Consumptions, Fevers, Head pains: Turns./ ... Lythargy ... 
Apoplectick Strokes: I ... Surdity, I Ill Tongue, Mouth Ulcers, Frog, the 
Quinsie Throate" and a gallery of other diseases result from "Ill humors" of 
the spirit. The speaker in "2.67B" several times refers to "humors": "0! 
Sun of Righteousness Thy Beams bright, Hot I Rafter a Doctors, and a 
Surgeons Shop. I . . . So rout Ill Humors: And thy purges bring." Though 
these references to "humors" at first recall Galen's theory, one must 
remember that Taylor owned a copy of Woodall's The Surgeons Mate, in 
which the author paraphrases and otherwise reports on the ideas of French 
Paracelsian Joseph Duchesne, who revised humoral theory within a Para, 
celsian context. 36 Instead of an inconsistent use of Galenic and Paracel, 
sian ideas in "2.678," Taylor's lines demonstrate his familiarity with 
contemporary medical texts, some of which synthesized old and new 
concepts. 
Thus, we see that in this poem, as in all of Taylor's poems concerning 
medicine, disease is a postlapsarian condition responsive to "purges," 
which Paracelsians, in contrast to Galenists, prescribe for ridding the body 
of invasive impurities and poisons. This notion of disease as the overt 
presence of foreign substances in the body rather than as internal humoral 
imbalance is the primary distinguishing feature between Galenic and 
Paracelsian theory. Paracelsus himself, in fact, like such Puritans as Taylor, 
equated the primary separation of nature and divinity-the Fall-with 
the "separation" of the body from health that is caused by an intrusive 
substance and that calls for purgation. 
For Taylor, illness is spiritual in origin, and a true cure is a purging or 
clearing of the channels of divine grace between God and nature; grace 
flows through Christ (the ultimate Physician) to the human patient. In 
"The Reflexion," for example, the speaker requests "Med'cine" to help 
clear a passage for grace to his soul: "Had not my Soule's thy Conduit, Pipes 
stopt bin I With mud, what Ravishment woulds't thou Convay?" Likewise, 
in "Meditation 2.68B," the poet asks for a "heavenly Alkahest"-probably 
Van Helmont's coinage for the universal solvent in alchemy-to cure his 
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maladies by filling him with grace. In "2.149," the alchemical remedy 
reconciles spirit and matter: the womb of the Bride in the song of Solomon 
and the altar of the Church (type and antitype) are "basons" in which 
"Spirits Chymistrie" occurs. 
In Taylor's poems, healing not only cures the patient but also allows for 
the glorification of God. As the speaker says in "2. 67B": "When with these 
Wings thou does mee medicine I I'st weare the Cure, thou th' glory of this 
Shine." Christ the Healer's refining fire descends and cures, and then 
reflects back to glorify its source. Once again Taylor conjoins Augustinian 
and Paracelsian notions: Augustinian tradition anticipates the spiritualiza, 
tion of nature and humanity when the reception of grace brings compte, 
tion to all that remains incomplete (cut off from its origins) in fallen 
nature; Paracelsian alchemy similarly looks forward to the gradual refining 
of the universe through alchemical transformation of matter. 
"Meditation 2.67B" draws together Puritan theology and Paracelsian 
medicine in yet another way which demonstrates Taylor's synthesizing 
vision as well as his impressive verbal dexterity: 
Doe Fables say, the Rising Sun doth Dance 
On Easter Day for joy, thou didst ascende. 
0 Sun of Righteousness; tho't be a glance 
Of Falshoods Spectacles on Rome's nose end? 
And shall not I, furled in thy glorious beams 
Ev'n jump for joy, Enjoying such sweet gleams? 
What doth the rising Sun with its Curld Locks 
And golden wings soon make the Chilly world 
Shook with an Ague Fit by night shade drops, 
Revive, grow brisk, Suns Eyebright on it hurld? 
How should my Soule then sick of th' Scurvy spring 
When thy sweet medicating rayes come in? 
Alas! Sweet Sun of Righteousness, Dost shine 
Upon such Dunghills, as I am? Methinks 
My Soule sends out such putrid sents, and rhimes 
That with thy beams would Choke the aire with Stincks. 
And Nasty vapors ery where, whereby 
Thy rayes should venom'd be that from thee fly. 
The fiery Darts of Satan stob my heart. 
His Punyards Thrusts are deep, and venom'd too. 
His Arrows wound my thoughts, Words, Works, each part 
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They all a bleeding ly by th' Stobs, and rue. 
His Aire I breath in, poison doth my Lungs. 
Hence come Consumptions, Fevers, Head pains: Turns. 
Yea, Lythargy, the Apoplectick Stroke: 
The Catochee, Soul Blindness, Surdity, 
Ill Tongue, Mouth Ulcers, Frog, the Quinsie Throate 
The Palate Fallen, Wheezings, Pleurisy. 
Heart Ach, the Syncopee, bad stomach tricks 
Gaul Tumors, Liver grown; spleen evills Cricks. 
The Kidny toucht, The Iliak, Colick Griefe 
The Ricats, Dropsy, Gout, the Scurvy, Sore 
The Miserere Mei. 0 Reliefe 
I want and would, and beg it at thy doore. 
0! Sun of Righteousness Thy Beams bright, Hot 
Rafter a Doctors, and a Surgeons Shop. 
I ope my Case to thee, my Lord: mee in 
Thy glorious Bath, of Sun Shine, Bathe, and Sweate. 
So rout Ill Humors: And thy purges bring. 
Administer in Sunbeame Light, and Heate. 
Pound some for Cordiall powders very small 
To Cure my Kidnies, Spleen, My Liver, Gaul. 
And with the same refresh my Heart, and Lungs 
From Wasts, and Weakness. Free from Pleurisy 
Bad Stomach, Iliak, Colick Fever, turns, 
From Scurvy, Dropsy, Gout, and Leprosy 
From Itch, Botch Scab. And purify my Blood 
From all Ill Humors: So make all things good. 
Weave, Lord, these golden Locks into a web 
Of Spiritual Taffity; make of the same 
A sweet perfumed Rheum-Cap for my head 
To free from Lythargy, the Tum, and Pain, 
From Waking-Sleep, Sin-Falling MaHady 
From Whimsy, Melancholy Frenzy-dy. 
Thy Curled Rayes, Lord, make mine Eare Picker 
To Cure my Deafeness: Light, Ophthalmicks pure 
To heate my Eyes and make the Sight the Quicker. 
That I may use Sins Spectacles no more. 
0 still some Beams. And with the Spirits fresh 
My Palate Ulcerd Mouth, and Ill Tongue dress. 
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And ply my wounds with Pledgets dipt therein. 
And wash therewith my Scabs and Boils so sore, 
And all my Stobs, and Arrow wounds come, bring 
And syrrindge with the Same. It will them Cure. 
With tents made of these Beams well tent them all. 
They Fistula'es and Gangrenes Conquour shall. 
Lord plaster mee herewith to bring soon down 
My Swellings. Stick a Feather of thy Wing 
Within my Cap to Cure my Aching Crown. 
And with these beams Heale mee of all my Sin. 
When with these Wings thou dost mee medicine 
l'st weare the Cure, thou the glory of this Shine. 
The poem corroborates Thomas Taylor's notion about illness as expressed 
in Christ Revealed, and through a pun on the word "Turns," introduces 
Edward Taylor's unique interpretation of the Paracelsian doctrine of "sig, 
natures"-the theory that the best remedy for an illness is the one that, in 
essence or in literal physical form, most resembles the affected bodily part 
or the offending material agent of the disease. Thus, eyebright cures 
optical problems; orchid cures maladies of the male genitalia; liverwort 
cures hepatic ailments, etc. 37 (This idea about the similarity between 
ailment and cure, incidentally, contrasts directly with the Galenic notion 
that a disease demands a cure made from a substance opposite in character 
to the malady.) Thomas Taylor's theory of illness is essentially a "like, 
cures, like" proposition: physical illness adumbrates spiritual affliction and 
offers the best opportunity for spiritual healing. Here Taylor recalls the 
generally held Puritan notion that one cannot be fully healed by Christ 
without first becoming very sick. Disease of the body leads in some cases to 
death and redemption or to conversion and salvation, both cures for all 
sickness. 
In "Meditation 2.67B," one of the many diseases that plagues the 
speaker is "Turns," a brain disease causing dizziness. Given the Puritan 
concept of physical disease as possibly leading to spiritual salvation, one 
can see that Taylor's punctuation ofline twenty,four and his placement of 
the word "turns" therein suggests that all diseases lead up to "Turns": 
"Consumptions, Fevers, Head pains: Turns." That is, all diseases, with 
their spiritual origins, amount to "dizziness" or postlapsarian disorienta, 
tion. But they might also lead to "turns" of the heart, the most significant 
step in the Puritan conversion process. Disease thus provides an opportu, 
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nity for salvation, as suggested in Christ Revealed; one "tum" cures another, 
just as in the Paracelsian tradition, an adeptly administqed poison heals 
the sickness caused by that poison. God, the ultimate Adept, administers 
physical "Turns" that produce "turns of the heart." 
Some of Taylor's most fascinating poems in the Preparatory Meditations 
are those in which he draws together biblical types and Paracelsian 
medicine. His Rose of Sharon poems provide examples ("Meditation 1.4" 
and "The Reflexion," particularly), 38 as does "Meditation 2.61," a poem in 
which the central emblem or conceit is at once the hermetical symbol of 
the physician-the caduceus-the brazen serpent staff of Moses in Num, 
bers, the crucifix upon which Christ-suffered, and the seventeenth,century 
place of physical healing, the surgery or "Doctors Shop." 
My Mights too mean, lend your Angelick might 
Ye mighty Angells, brightly to define. 
A piece of bumisht brass, formd Serpent like 
To Countermand all poison Serpentine. 
No Remedie could cure the Serpents Bite 
But One: to wit, The brazen Serpent's Sight. 
Shall brass the bosoms poison in't Contain 
A Counter poison, better than what beds 
In Creatures bosoms? Nay, But its vertue came 
Through that brass Shapt from God that healing sheds. 
Its Vertue rode in th' golden Coach of th' eyes 
Into the Soule, and Serpents Sting defies. 
So that a Sight of the brazen Serpent hung 
Up in the Banner Standard of the Camp 
Was made a Charet wherein rode and run 
A Healing vertue to the Serpents Cramp. 
But that's not all. Christ in this Snake shapt brass 
Raist on the Standard, Crucified was. 
As in this Serpent lay the only Cure 
Unto the fiery Serpents burning bite, 
Not by its Physick Vertue, (that is sure) 
But by a Beam Divine of Grace's might 
Whose Vertue onely is the plaster 'plide 
Unto the Wound, by Faith in Christs blood di'de. 
A Sight of th' Artificiall Serpent heales 
The venom wound the naturall Serpent made. 
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A Spirituall Sight of Christ, from Christ down steals. 
A Cure against the Hellish Serpents trade. 
Not that the Springhead of the Cure was found 
In Christs humanity with sharp thorns Crownd. 
This Brazen Serpent is a Doctors Shop. 
On ev'ry Shelfe's a Sovereign remedy. 
The Serpents Flesh the Sovereign Salve is got 
Against the Serpents bite, gaind by the eye. 
The Eyebeames agents are that forth do bring 
The Sovereign Counter poison, and let't in. 
I by the fiery Serpent bitt be here. 
Be thou my brazen Serpent me to Cure. 
My Sight, Lord, make thy golden Charet cleare 
To bring thy remedy unto my Sore. 
If this thou dost I shall be heald: My wound 
Shall sing thy praises: and thy glory sound. 
Taylor bases "Meditation 2.61" on the story of Moses who, in Numbers 
21:6,8, must deal with his ungrateful charges in the desert. They have 
complained of having only manna to eat, and their lack of faith and 
gratitude has brought upon them a pestilence of stinging insects. God 
instructs Moses to raise a brazen serpent upon a wooden pole. This 
serpent, looked upon with the eye of faith, is the only cure for the painful 
stings, which are the earthly manifestations of the original "sting" of 
Satan. Both Samuel Mather in The Figures or Types and Thomas Taylor in 
Christ Revealed devote considerable space to an exegesis of this brazen 
serpent type, and Edward Taylor's poem is clearly predicated upon their 
interpretation, especially Thomas Taylor's. 
In stanza one, Taylor refers to the brass of which the brazen serpent is 
made, and begins to suggest a Paracelsian remedy for affliction that is also 
the scriptural prescription. The cure for the bite of Satan, the real serpent, 
is the sight of the brass serpent coiled around the wooden pole. Thus one 
serpent heals the ailment caused by another; moreover, this Old Testament 
brazen serpent, in addition to being the type for Christ who hangs upon 
the wooden cross to "cure" sin, is a version of the caduceus, the hermetical 
sign of the physician. 
Taylor's next four stanzas account for how the cure works. The poem 
equates brass, a strong alloy of tin and copper, with Christ, God's stronger 
alloy of divinity and humanity. Brass in itself contains no "Counter 
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poison, better than what beds I In Creatures bosoms" (grace is the counter 
poison in the heart, which can tum toward God); neither does Christ in 
his human form contain any such remedy: "Not that the Springhead of the 
Cure was found I In Christs humanity with sharp thorns Crownd." More, 
over, just as Christ is free of sin, the "Artificiall Serpent" is likewise free of 
the real serpent's venom. Both Christ and the brazen serpent are conduits 
of God's grace. God chooses to send "vertue" or healing power through 
brass rather than gold, and through his Son incarnate rather than through 
a purely divine being, because "lowly" instruments prevent idolatry; they 
focus human attention properly upon the source of grace. (Emphasizing 
this same notion in "Meditation 1.39," Taylor refers to Christ as "Nails 
made of heavenly Steel," an alloy "more Choice than gold.") God's 
"vertues" are Paracelsian, for they are remedies made of the same substance 
as that which causes the disease: one serpent cures the ills caused by 
another, and Christ's assuming a lowly human form redeems humanity 
from its fallen state. God's cure is also the "Sovereign remedy," for it 
ministers at once to body and soul. The "brass shapt from God" is the 
brazen serpent that healed Moses' charges in the desert and also is Christ, 
the "Sovereign" healer of all humanity. 
Through a pun on the word "Beam" in the fourth stanza, Taylor yokes 
Old Testament, New Testament, and Paracelsian references. The "Beam 
Divine" is grace, the wooden pole on which the brazen serpent hangs and 
the wooden cross on which Christ hangs. Just as conventional seventeen, 
century religious poets often depict God's grace as descending upon 
"beams" from heaven, Paracelsians likewise regard the rays and beams of 
light from stars and heavenly bodies as bearing God's "breath," 39 or 
healing power. In the sixth stanza, this grace flows through the "eye beams" 
into the physician,poet and his "Doctors Shop." Here Taylor breaks the 
closed hermeneutic circle of conservative typology to suggest that, alle, 
gorically at least, earthly phenomena fulfill the typal foreshadowings in 
the Bible: "This Brazen Serpent is a Doctors Shop."40 That is to say, the 
"beams" of grace descending through Christ, and figuratively through the 
caduceus that signifies the "Doctors Shop," can heal the physician,poet's 
"wound" and reflect back to glorify their sources in the ultimate Physician. 
Thus is the microcosmic earthly realm uplifted and transformed through a 
heavenly alchemy. 
Taylor's Paracelsian poems show us how his medical and theological 
visions coalesce. Moreover, they demonstrate his vision of himself as an 
instrument in the healing and redemptive process; his conception of 
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himself as poet (user of words) and as reader,interpreter (of the Word) is 
synonymous with his sense of himself as physician, as reader,interpreter of 
the Book of Nature who looks for the earthly signifiers of spiritual condi, 
tions and cures. For Taylor, all signifiers (words and phenomena of nature) 
are contained within the Logos, which is Christ, who is both the ultimate 
Physician and the ultimate Interpreter. 4l Consequently, language be, 
comes one of the poet,physician's essential tools, since it can be another 
conduit of grace. Doubtless following Samuel Mather's advice to biblical 
exegetes to seek "Spiritual Wisdom to accommodate and apply Things 
rationally and spiritually,"42 Taylor begins "Meditation 2.61" with are, 
quest that the "mighty Angells" help him "brightly to define" the type of 
the brazen serpent. The speaker considers his "Mights too mean," that is, 
inferior; however, he also makes a pun here on the word "mean." He asks 
help "to mean," that is, to define, to signify properly, in the manner that 
Mather advocates. One effect of the cure the speaker seeks is the brighten, 
ing of his poetic powers, for according to Puritan convention, the language 
of sermons and religious meditation can at any time be "Wealded" to bear 
Christ's "disposing Influences. "43 Poet, physician, and minister, Taylor 
intends his words to act as conduits for the Word as healing grace. 
"Meditation 1. 7," another of Taylor's Paracelsian poems, even more 
emphatically stresses the connection between Logos and medicine. Here 
Taylor depicts Christ as a distillery of "Heavenly Choice drugs" and 
requests grace and redemption from fallen speech to flow to him from 
Christ's Word: 
Thy Speech the Liquor in thy Vessel stands, 
Well ting'd with Grace a blessed Tincture, Loe, 
Thy Words distilld, Grace in thy Lips pourd, and, 
Give Graces Tinctur in them where they go. 
Thy words in graces tincture stilld, Lord, may 
The Tincture of thy Grace in me Convay. 
In the final stanza, the physician,poet depicts himself as a medicine 
"bottle" to hold the heavenly remedy for postlapsarian speech. Moreover, 
he asks God to effect the final alchemical transformation by filling him 
with "Liquid Gold": 
And Dub with Gold dug out of Graces mine 
That they [the poet's words] thine Image might have in them foild. 
Grace in thy Lips pourd out's as Liquid Gold. 
Thy Bottle make my Soule, Lord, it to hold. 
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Though he is probably the last in the Paracelsian tradition, Taylor is 
one of the first of American literary figures who is also a physician. After 
Taylor and his writer~physician contemporaries such as John Winthrop, Jr., 
and Cotton Mather, among others, there are in the eighteenth century 
Benjamin Rush and two Connecticut Wits, Mason Fitch Cogswell and 
Lemuel Hopkins; in the nineteenth century, physician~writers include 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and James Gates Percival (obscure now, but 
honored in the 1820s as America's chief poet);44 and in the twentieth 
century, the number of writers who are also medical doctors is even greater: 
William Carlos Williams, Walker Percy, Lewis Thomas, Oliver Sacks, 
Richard Selzer, and Gerald Weismann. Poet Robinson Jeffers attended 
medical school. Of all these personalities, Richard Selzer perhaps most 
eloquently expressed the affinities between writing and healing. He speaks 
of the "rich, alliterative language of medicine" and remarks upon the 
similarities between surgery and writing, both delicate searches for what is 
- elusive and ineffable. He sees the surgeon as a kind of "reader" of the "self~ 
absorbed" and "revelatory" language of the body, and he believes, like the 
holistic physicians of the Renaissance, in something resembling an "es~ 
sence" beyond the symptoms. For the physician~as~reader, "comprehen~ 
sion [of this essence] is instantaneous, despite the absence of what we call 
words to clarify it." For the "reader" of the body, the body's language 
becomes "a detonation in the mind until the reader feels" what the other 
feels.45 
Though separated by hundreds of years and different scientific tradi~ 
tions, both Selzer's essays and Taylor's poems share a mutual sense of the 
sacramental dimension of healing that is also a dimension of the writer's 
art. Such resonance suggests that despite the persistent efforts of empirical 
science to abandon the metaphysical territories that science once oc~ 
cupied, some central mystery of speech and existence prevents any such 
absolute separation. Exploring some of the overlapping concerns of relig~ 
ion, science, and art, well~known literary critic and theologian Walter J. 
Ong declares that all three of these disciplines attempt to" 'open up,' or to 
'open out,' to explicate and unfold" this central mystery. 46 The tradition of 
writer~physicians who variously perceive this metaphysical link corrobo~ 
rates Ong's insight and suggests that despite the positivist and empiricist 
heritage of the twentieth century, "a physitian cureth not only the body 
but the mind in some manner." 
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Benjamin Franklin: The Fusion 
of Science and Letters 
A. OWEN ALDRIDGE 
The eighteenth-century mind made very little distinction between science 
and the imagination. This is the reason that one may find every scientific 
theory of importance in the Enlightenment described somewhere or other 
in verse. Well-known mathematician Edmund Halley, the same who 
charted the famous comet, contributed a poetic preface to Newton's 
Principia, and Richard Glover, who was to become author of the most 
important British epic of the century, Leonidas, introduced a popular book 
with an elegant "Poem on Sir Isaac Newton," containing a well-known 
phrase, "NEWTON demands the muse." This book by Henry Pemberton, 
entitled View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, which explains Newton's 
theories for the layman, was one of the most prestigious publications of the 
eighteenth century. Its subscription list included the poets Christopher 
Anstey, John Byrom, John Gay, Lord Hervey, Alexander Pope, and Edward 
Young. In keeping with this interdisciplinary spirit, the minor English 
poet Mark Akenside, in a "Hymn to Science," called upon memory, fancy, 
and reason to join in exploring "great Nature's scenes." Ezra Stiles of Yale 
even joined literature and science together as representing a common in-
tellectual endeavor. In 1762 while enlisting Franklin's aid in proposing the 
mathematician John Winthrop for membership in the Royal Society, Stiles 
wrote that a service such as this would contribute not a little to transmit· 
ting Franklin's own name "with honor to distant Posterity, as a Patron of 
Literature and instrumental in deriving Rewards to learned Merit." 1 
Relatively speaking, the word science itself was rarely used in the 
eighteenth century to refer to the objective study of natural phenomena. 
The most common expression for this activity was "natural philosophy" in 
contrast to "moral philosophy." Pemberton's title, for example, refers to 
"Newton's Philosophy," not to his science. 
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Johnson's Dictionary gives five different definitions of science: 
"1) knowledge; 2) certainty grounded on demonstration; 3) art attained 
by precepts, or built on principles; 4) any art or species of knowledge; and 
5) one of the seven liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, 
music, geometry, [and] astronomy." The second definition, "certainty 
grounded on demonstration," is the only one that approaches the modem 
conception and the only one that stresses methodology. 
The authoritative but controversial Encyclopedia of Diderot and d'Al, 
embert defines science as a "system of rules or facts relating to a certain 
object" but also indicates that the sister discipline art may comprise "any 
system of knowledge which can be reduced to positive and invariable rules 
independent of caprice or opinion." In this sense there is little difference 
between science and art. Indeed, the Encyclopedia speaks of the "science of 
communication of ideas." Following a classification originated by Bacon, 
the Encyclopedia recognizes three separate republics of letters, those of 
memory, wisdom, and pleasure, essentially the same grouping as Aken, 
side's memory, reason, and fancy. The Encyclopedia in another tripartite 
division classifies knowledge into the sciences, liberal arts, and mechan, 
ical arts. According to this system, there is a science of man, a science of 
God, and a science of nature. 2 The inclusion of theology as a branch of 
science is extremely important in regard to Franklin and most eighteenth, 
century Newtonians. The author of Principia specifically included the 
existence of God as part of his system. 3 Franklin began his scientific 
investigations with abstract theories concerning a master geometer. A 
major doctrine of the Encyclopedia is that of continuity or the interrela, 
tionship of all knowledge. If human understanding is conceived in terms of 
memory, reason, and imagination-or of scholarship, wisdom and intel, 
lectual pleasure-there is small likelihood of conflict between science and 
literature or between speculation and experiment. Franklin in his early 
years devoted considerable attention to metaphysics but in middle age 
turned his attention to physical experiment, the earliest source of his 
worldwide reputation. 
In the eighteenth century, the term "Newtonian philosophy," as 
I. Bernard Cohen has pointed out, had five distinct aspects: the cor, 
puscular theory of matter, the structure of the universe, the powers of 
gravity controlling the sun and planets, the motion of planets and comets, 
and the theory of the moon and tides. 4 Although contrasting "true 
philosophy" with "conjectures and suppositions," Franklin did not hesitate 
to engage in both observation and speculation on the structure of the 
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universe. His own experiments he sometimes called "philosophical amuse, 
ments." 
In order to place Franklin in the hierarchy of eighteenth,century 
science, a distinction should be maintained between conjecture and 
theory. Newton set forth a number of theories in his Principia based in large 
measure on mathematical proofs. Conjectures lack this mathematical 
foundation. In the eighteenth century, experiments such as those by 
Franklin on electricity not based on mathematical theory were considered 
by some authorities as belonging to a subsidiary level of investigation. This 
attitude was expressed by John Sargent late in the seventeenth century in a 
book entitled The Method to Science (London, 1696). In his preface, 
Sargent remarked that "however the Experimental Man may be highly 
Commendable in other Respects, yet onely those who can lay just Claim to 
true Principles, and make out their Title to them, can be truly held Natural 
PHILOSOPHERS, which sufficiently shows that the way of Experiments 
cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE." Long after Franklin's elec, 
tion to the Royal Society, an anonymous pamphleteer considered his 
"Pretensions to the title of NATURAL PHILOSOPHER." In this pam, 
phleteer's opinion, "Every one who observes facts and records them faith, 
fully, has a right to our thanks and esteem: but to consider such as Natural 
Philosophers, can have no other consequence than to bring science into 
contempt." 5 
According to this adverse critic, "God hath made every thing in the 
material world by weight and measure; and whoever pretends to compre, 
hend any part of his works, must be well skilled in the science of magnitude 
and number," that is, the discipline of mathematics, in which Franklin was 
notably deficient. In his Experiments and Observations on Electricity, how, 
ever, Franklin used almost identical words about God as a geometer. The 
existence of electric phenomena together with gravitational attraction, in 
Franklin's words, "affords another occasion of adoring that wisdom which 
has made all things by weight and measure! "6 
Franklin has been compared to Newton in both the eighteenth cen, 
tury and the twentieth, but by the standards of the anonymous critic I have 
just quoted, he does not deserve even to be considered a scientist. Com, 
parison with his contemporary Voltaire may help to clarify this point. 
Voltaire is ordinarily not looked upon as a scientist at all in the twentieth 
century, but he certainly would have easily met the anonymous critic's 
criteria. He had received an extensive training in mathematics at the 
exclusive Jesuit Lycee, Louis le Grand, in Paris. He corresponded on 
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mathematical aspects of Newtonianism with Pierre Louis Maupertuis, one 
of the most eminent French mathematicians of the time, whose book on 
the curvature of the earth in large measure introduced Franklin to the 
practical application of Newtonianism. In at least one of his letters, 
Voltaire showed a knowledge of the original text of Newton's Principia. 
Also, he became along with Pemberton and Maclaurin one of the three 
foremost popularizers of Newton in the eighteenth century. Although 
Voltaire modestly indicated to one of his friends that he based his book 
Elements of the Philosophy of Newton on the little he knew about the great 
scientist for the benefit of his countrymen who knew nothing at all, he 
maintains in the body of the work that his major concern was to provide 
clear ideas concerning the fundamental laws of nature that Newton had 
discovered. 7 Nothing approaching this comprehensive aim is to be found 
anywhere in Franklin's writings. 
There is considerable significance, moreover, in the circumstance that 
Franklin wrote no extended treatment of a scientific subject. His mind 
apparently responded more readily to individual situations or particular 
problems than to synoptic perspectives. In this way he was just the opposite 
of Voltaire, who portrayed various general relationships of phenomena in 
the Newtonian universe. A much broader panorama of scientific princi-
ples is reflected in the totality of Voltaire's works, moreover, than in 
Franklin's. Even in the nonscientific area, Franklin wrote only one exten-
sive work, his Memoirs, and that is fragmentary, repetitious, and episodic 
despite the efforts of old-fashioned formalists and less antiquated but 
equally transient structuralists to give it the appearance of unity. In his 
autobiography, Franklin devotes only eight paragraphs to his electrical 
experiments, from his introduction to the subject in 1746 to his receiving 
the Copley Medal of the Royal Society in 17 53. The only other topic in the 
Memoirs related to science is an account of Franklin on his first visit to 
England visiting Hans Sloane of the Royal Society and showing him a 
purse made of asbestos and, therefore, resistant to fire. Otherwise science 
did not intrude into his Memoirs, not even indirectly through metaphors or 
other figures of speech. In the reverse direction, however, Franklin made 
use of literary devices, particularly wit and humor, in making his letters on 
electricity appealing. I. B. Cohen has pointed out, for example, that when 
Franklin received the Copley gold medal, he remarked in his letter of 
acknowledgment, "I know not whether any of your learned Body have 
attain' d the ancient boasted Art of multiplying Gold; but you have certainly 
found the Art of making it infinitely more valuable." 8 Voltaire affirms in his 
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Elements that "it is indeed indecent to indulge in pleasantries when one 
pretends to speak about philosophy,"9 but he engages in persiflage, nev, 
ertheless, just as freely as Franklin. Voltaire also remarked that he would 
have liked Newton better if the latter had possessed a sense of humor.lO 
Perhaps modesty as much as anything else kept Franklin from weight, 
ing his autobiography with his scientific interests, but a better reason is 
that he was writing a personal memoir, not a history of science. Indeed his 
scientific writings provide a valuable supplement to his autobiography as a 
reflection of his psychological history. During the course of his correspon, 
dence with Collinson on his electrical experiments, Franklin admitted 
that some of the phenomena he had observed did not correspond with the 
general principles he had adopted. The "many pretty systems" erected by 
himself and other scientists, he realized, were doomed to destruction by 
new discoveries. "If there is no other Use discover' d of Electricity," Frank, 
lin declared, this "is something considerable, that it may help to make a vain 
Man humble." 11 Like his contemporary Rousseau, Franklin admitted his 
own vanity and made no apologies for it. Indeed in his autobiography he 
classifies vanity as one of the comforts of life. 12 
Jacques Barbeu Dubourg, Franklin's French friend and editor, re, 
marked that "those who see merely an electrician in M. Franklin know him 
only halfway." The multitude of other subjects on which he wrote "reveals 
the extent of his knowledge and the fecundity of his genius." 13 
Franklin did not, like Newton, attempt to survey broad relationships 
in an effort to discover new scientific laws. He was concerned merely to 
investigate particular phenomena, and the new laws came more or less as 
by,products. This does not mean, however, that Franklin was not inter, 
ested in general principles or in hypotheses. He sometimes began with 
principles (as in his investigation of the Gulf Stream) in order to under, 
stand particular phenomena. A remark of Franklin's concerning utility 
has received considerable attention: "What signifies Philosophy that does 
not apply to some Use?" 14 A later remark, made in France verbally but 
twice recorded, however, reflects the opposite opinion that the utilitarian 
purpose need not be immediate or apparent. It grew out of the first balloon 
ascensions in history. A number of people observing them asked, "To what 
use do they expect to put these experiments?" Franklin replied, "What 
good is a new, born baby?" 15 
He soon recognized, moreover, a very practical possible application of 
aerial navigation-warfare. Five thousand invading balloons, he specu, 
lated, would lead to the surrender of almost any empire. Convincing 
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sovereigns of the folly of conducting war in this manner, he suggested, 
"might give a new tum to human affairs," that is, to the abolishing of war 
altogether. 16 Franklin's phrase "Father of Lights" in his famous motion 
advocating prayers in the Constitutional Convention, moreover, was prob-
ably inspired by the sight of balloons flying over Paris. 17 
If it is important to notice that Franklin contributed his electrical 
discoveries in the form of letters, it is equally important to notice that, 
except for political subjects, he wrote on nearly every other major topic 
also in epistolary form. Many of these letters on subjects of general interest 
were printed during his lifetime and reprinted over and over throughout 
the nineteenth century. By means of these letters Franklin merged the 
realms of science and imaginative literature. This represents another 
parallel with Voltaire. One of Voltaire's earliest publications was a series of 
essays concerning English manners, literature, and philosophy, originally 
entitled English Letters and later changed to Philosophical Letters. Although 
ostensibly private epistles, they were actually written for the public and 
never addressed to individuals. Four of these letters concern Newton: the 
first, a contrast between systems of the Englishman Newton and the 
Frenchman Descartes; the second, a summary of Newton's concept of 
gravitation; the third, a summary of Newton's theory of light; and the 
fourth, a summary of Newton's theories of infinity and the chronology of 
the world. Although these chapters were undoubtedly the most difficult to 
understand of all those published in Voltaire's Philosophical Letters and may, 
therefore, have contributed little to the enormous popularity that the work 
as a whole eventually attained, they helped to acquire for Voltaire a 
reputation as a serious thinker. 
Similar letters of Franklin, written to an actual correspondent, were 
instigated by the curiosity of a young English girl, Polly Stevenson, daugh-
ter of his London landlady, who begged him to engage in a correspondence 
concerning moral and natural philosophy. IS Further to justify the parallel 
with Voltaire, it is relevant to notice that some of these letters were later 
printed in the 1769 edition of Franklin's Experiments and Observations. 
Barbeu Dubourg, the translator of a French edition in which these letters 
were reprinted, remarked "that many fathers would like to have a similar 
mentor for their daughters" and referred to proofs in his own hands "of the 
progress she has made under such a great teacher."19 
Although Franklin was probably second to none in his admiration and 
public praise of Newton, he felt an uncomfortable reserve concerning two 
of the major elements of Newtonian philosophy, its mathematical basis 
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and its use in metaphysical speculation. 20 In 1746, the year he began his 
electrical experiments, Franklin expressed regret to his friend Cadwallader 
Colden that he lacked "Mathematics enough" to work out the problem of 
why an eastern voyage across the Atlantic was shorter than a western 
one. 21 But in his Memoirs Franklin attempted, perhaps subconsciously, to 
minimize the importance of mathematics. After revealing that he had 
twice failed to acquire a grasp of figures while at school, he affirmed with 
apparent satisfaction that at the age of sixteen he took a widely used 
textbook, "Cocker's book of Arithmetick, & went thru' the whole by my 
self with great Ease." 22 At another point he characterized "Great Mathe~ 
maticians" as expecting "unusual Precision in everything said" or "forever 
denying or distinguishing upon Trifles, to the Disturbance of all Con~ 
versation." 23 As we have seen, he lightly disparaged "dry Mathematics" in 
writing to Polly Stevenson, and he took pride in one of his meterological 
papers for not having "with some of our learned Modems disguis'd my 
Nonsense in Greek, cloth'd it in Algebra, or adorn' it with Fluxions." 24 
Parenthetically, although Franklin never attained the higher reaches of 
abstract mathematics, he derived great pleasure from devising so~called 
magic squares and circles-that is, numbers arranged in such a manner as 
to add up to the same sum from several different directions. These mathe~ 
matical bagatelles were published in his Experiments along with his elec~ 
trical discoveries. 
Although it was a recognized convention in the eighteenth century to 
refer to the supposed regularity and order of the external universe as a proof 
of the existence of an intelligent creator, Franklin had an ambivalent atti~ 
tude toward the union of science and metaphysics. He protested strongly 
against the combination in connection with the publication in 1745 of a 
treatise by his friend Cadwallader Colden entitled An Explication of the First 
Causes of Action in Matter, and, of the Cause of Gravitation. In this work 
Colden pretended to have succeeded where Newton failed in discovering 
the cause of gravitation, a claim to intellectual eminence that has been 
considered the "most audacious" ever made in colonial America. 25 Col~ 
den's friends, unable to a man to follow his reasoning, urged him to do 
further reading in such European forerunners as Descartes, Malebranche, 
Boerhaave, Leibniz, Bernoulli, and Berkeley, but surprisingly enough, as 
Raymond Stearns has pointed out, none "appear to have been led to 
Newton's Principia and Optics, where they would have found the keys to 
Colden's baffling work." 26 
A group of Franklin's friends urged him to read as background for 
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Collinson's treatise a work by a Scotsman, Andrew Baxter, entitled An 
Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, wherein Its Immateriality is evinced 
(2nd ed., 173 7). This was of no greater help to Franklin than the advice of 
Colden's friends had been to Colden. Baxter had drawn upon a fundamen, 
tal Newtonian principle, but it does not appear that at this time Franklin 
recognized the principle as Newton's. In a letter to one of his friends 
Franklin complained: "The Author's Vis Inertiae essential to Matter, upon 
which the whole Work is founded, I have not been able to comprehend. 
And I do not think he demonstrates at all clearly (at least to me he does 
not) that there is really any such Property in Matter." 27 A corollary of 
Newton's first law of motion, the Vis Inertiae of matter, is described in 
Pemberton's View as that "quality in bodies, whereby they preserve their 
present state, with regard to motion or rest, till some active force disturb 
them." Apparently not recognizing the difference between velocity and 
acceleration, Franklin argued against Baxter and-although not aware of 
it-against Newton that "there is no Mass or Matter how great soever, but 
may be moved by any Force how small soever (taking Friction out of the 
Question) and this small Force continued will in Time bring the Mass to 
move with any Velocity whatsoever." By the last decade of his life, 
however, Franklin had come to accept the concept of Vis Inertiae as 
commonplace. In connection with a device of Bernoulli designed to 
increase the speed of a boat by funneling water through a tube with an 
intake above the surface of the river and the discharge below, a precursor of 
the modem hovercraft, Franklin remarked "it is to be considered, that 
every bucket,full pumped or dipped up into the boat, from its side or 
through its bottom, must have its vis inertiae overcome so as to receive the 
motion of the boat, before it can come to give motion by its descent; and 
that will be a deduction from the moving power." 28 
In his comments on Baxter, Franklin also treated a metaphysical 
problem that figures prominently in the works of Locke and Samuel 
Clarke and in the correspondence of Voltaire and Frederick the Great: 
whether matter has the power to think. Franklin settled it to his own 
satisfaction by referring to the intention of the creator. "If any Part of 
Matter does not at present act and think, 'tis not from an Incapacity in its 
Nature [but from] a positive Restraint." 29 This opinion did not by any 
means conflict with the principles of Newton, who, as we have seen, 
specifically included the existence of God as part of his system. Franklin 
concluded his critique of Baxter by affirming "some Reluctance" to "the 
metaphysical Way" because of"the great Uncertainty ... in that Science; 
Benjamin Franklin 47 
the wide Contradictions and endle&s Disputes it affords; and the horrible 
Errors I led myself into when a young Man." This was written in 17 46 just 
before Franklin began his electrical experiments. He did not completely 
abandon metaphysical conjectures and speculation but certainly devoted 
thereafter the major part of his scientific efforts to experimental investiga-
tion. 
Franklin's notion of the "positive Restraint" of the creator represents a 
close parallel with Voltaire's solution to the question of why the earth 
rotates from west to east. Voltaire maintained that the direction might just 
as well have been the opposite, that "this Rotation from West to East is an 
Effect of the Free-will of the Creator, and that this Free-will is the only 
sufficient Reason that can be assigned for it." 30 Franklin makes no com-
ment on the reasons behind the direction of rotation, but speculated on its 
effects upon navigation, particularly why the eastward voyage across the 
Atlantic is faster than the westward. As I have already indicated, he 
broached the subject to Cadwallader Colden in 1746. In his words, "Ships 
in a Calm at the Equator move with the Sea at 15 Miles per Minute and at 
our Capes suppose 12 Miles per Minute."31 Franklin was literally saying 
that ships at the Equator move at a speed of 900 miles an hour, although he 
knew very well that in actuality it is the earth itself that moves at this rate 
and becalmed ships move no faster than stationary houses on land. Frank-
lin, nevertheless, wondered whether ships traveled at different speeds at 
different latitudes because of the differences in velocity at these various 
latitudes and the resulting great resistance of the water at the equator and 
proportionately less in those approaching the North Pole. Colden replied 
that in his opinion the latitude would have no effect whatsoever because 
the minor difference in the force that the ship acquires from the diurnal 
rotation of the earth would be negated by the resistance of the water, and 
there would be no difference in the time coming and going. 32 Colden 
believed that the difference between the east and the west passage was 
caused by the tides. High water on the American coast is followed by high 
water in England six hours later. A boat leaving America at high tide could 
count on the ebb in her favor in America and the flow in England. A ship 
going in the westward direction, however, would have one tide against her 
in England and one in her favor in America. If the voyage from England to 
America takes thirty days, the tide would decrease YJo each day. I confess 
that Colden's explanation is as confusing to me as was his theory of 
gravitation to his contemporaries. Distinguished mathematicians I have 
consulted have had no greater success in understanding it. The editors of 
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an early volume of Franklin's writings suggested that Franklin in 1746 
solved the problem of the speedier eastward voyage by indicating the 
influence of the Gulf Stream. 33 This is no answer, however, since it must 
be decided to what degree the Gulf Stream itself is affected by the diurnal 
rotation of the earth. Franklin himself never regarded the Gulf Stream as a 
solution to his problem, and he continued to measure the Gulf Stream and 
speculate on the motion of the earth for many years. 34 Eventually a fellow 
member of the American Philosophical Society convinced him-Frank, 
lin does not say how-that his theory of relating different speeds to 
different latitudes has nothing to do with the speed of ships. 35 
Franklin's theories on rainfall and rivers are related to the modern 
science of meteorology as are his theories on thunderstorms, which are in 
turn linked to his electrical experiments. In the eighteenth century, all of 
these subjects were ranked under the rubric ''Natural History," which also 
embraced another of Franklin's primary interests, geology. Although little 
scholarly investigation of Franklin's geological studies has taken place 
until very recently, the topic was almost as important in Franklin's intel, 
lectuallife as it was in Voltaire's. Nearly all Voltaire scholars have had their 
say on the subject because of his highly publicized refusal to accept the 
received opinion that marine fossils on the top of high mountains were the 
result of a universal deluge. Franklin, in treating the same circumstances, 
accepted the notion of Christian apologists that a universal catastrophe 
was responsible for mountain chains and their fossil remains. He has 
received, perhaps for that reason, none of the derision directed against 
Voltaire because of the latter's explanation that oyster shells may have been 
deposited on the mountains by pilgrims or other human agents. 
An early illustration of Franklin's interest in theories of the earth 
combines literature and science. He published an essay in his newspaper, 
the Pennsylvania Gazette, December 15, 1757, concerning lightning as one 
of the causes of earthquakes. The concepts in this essay have been 
compared to almost identical ones in the diary of Jonathan Edwards. The 
essay, however, is largely a reprint from Ephraim Chambers's Encyclopedia, 
and so it cannot be considered as evidence of original scientific thinking 
on the part of either Edwards or Franklin. Ten years after this Gazette essay, 
Franklin wrote to a New England clergyman,scientist, Jaret Eliot, about 
storms and the origins of springs. 36 In this letter he alluded to places in the 
Appalachian Mountains revealing strata of seashells, including some in 
the solid rocks. Perhaps referring to the Biblical notion of a catastrophic 
deluge or perhaps indulging in a humorous reflection on it, he added, "'Tis 
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certainly the Wreck of a World we live on!" Obviously in a light-hearted 
mood, he prefaced a description of pillar-like formations in mountains with 
the agricultural metaphor, "Ideas will string themselves like Ropes of 
Onions." In another letter of the same period written to John Mitchell of 
Virginia and eventually published in his Experiments, he set forth a "new 
hypothesis for explaining the several Phaenomena of Thunder Gusts." 3 7 
The explanation in brief is that clouds bear in them electrical fire, which 
when driven by winds against mountains or against other clouds give off 
electricity in the form of lightning. In this paper he also attributes the 
origin of rivers to rain rather than to underground sources, essentially the 
same explanation he would offer to his London correspondent Polly 
Stevenson some years later. Incidentally, in his letter to Mitchell he denies 
stories that "a Sword can be melted in the Scabbard, and Money in a Man's 
Pocket, by Lightning, without burning either." 38 This may be a stroke of 
humor comparable to a reference in the French poet Du Bartas to a flash of 
lightning burning off a woman's pubic hair in an electrical flash and doing 
no other harm whatsoever. 39 
In commenting on a paper presented to the Royal Society by John 
Mitchell of Cambridge, England, Franklin revised his earlier interpreta-
tion of the origin of mountains. He was now "reconciled . . . to those 
convulsions which all naturalists agree this globe has suffered." And 
instead of considering the earth a "wreck," as he had previously, he 
regarded the exposure of formerly deep-lying strata as a benefit, since such 
exposure placed "a great variety of useful materials . . . into our power." 
"So that what has been usually looked upon as a ruin suffered by this part 
of the universe, was in reality, only a preparation, or means of rendering 
the earth more fit for use, more capable of being to mankind a convenient 
and comfortable habitation."4° This was conventional natural theology, 
adopted by orthodox Christians and deists alike. While in England in 
1759, Franklin visited salt mines in Norwich and renewed his speculation 
on the changes that may have occurred on the surface of the earth. There is 
no indication that Franklin at this time or at all throughout his life 
disagreed with the notion of a universal deluge. In a letter to his brother 
Peter, he affirmed his opinion that "all water on this globe was originally 
salt, and that the fresh water we find in springs and rivers, is the produce of 
distillation. "41 The rock salt found in mines was originally drawn from the 
sea, an effect of"Nature's distillery." Referring again to seashells and fossil 
remains of fish on high lands, he suggested that "either the sea has been 
higher than it now is, and has fallen away from those high lands; or they 
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have been lower than they are, and were lifted to their present height by 
some internal mighty force, such as we still feel some remains of, when 
whole continents are moved by earthquakes." 
Voltaire, unlike Franklin, refused to accept the hypothesis of a univer-
sal inundation. In a Discourse on the Changes Which Have Occurred on Our 
Globe, he rejected all theories that the world was at one time covered with 
water, expressed the concept of axial tilt, (that the earth has turned around 
completely so that what is now the North Pole was once the South Pole), 
explained the presence of maritime fossils on mountains as the refuse of 
pilgrims or other travelers, and affirmed that nothing in animated or 
vegetable life has changed since it was originally created. Voltaire had 
developed his theory of axial tilt at length in his Elements. It was based on 
the measurement by a French astronomer, who discovered the angle 
formed by the axis of the equator and the axis of the ecliptic to be twenty 
minutes less than it had been when measured by Pytheas more than two 
thousand years previously. Voltaire concluded that a single revolution by 
which the globe turns successively to the east, the south, the west, and the 
north would require a period of 1, 944,000 years and would be accompanied 
by drastic changes in all the climates of the earth. It was not this daring 
hypothesis that brought upon Voltaire general ridicule of his capacity as a 
geologist, however, but rather his insistence that human agency was 
responsible for seashells on the mountaintops. He steadfastly maintained 
his opposition to the theory of a universal inundation but eventually 
modified his hypothesis of the origin of seashells. He did not stop with 
speculation but made objective observations of actual conditions. From 
the time of the printing of his Discourse until almost the end of his life he 
painstakingly examined fossil shells around Lake Geneva in Switzerland 
and came to the conclusion, now corroborated by modern geologists, that 
these were of freshwater rather than saltwater origin. In other words, he 
repudiated scientifically the seashell argument as evidence for a universal 
deluge. On this subject at least, Voltaire was the pragmatic observer and 
Franklin the theorist. 
There is some indication that Franklin also adopted the notion of axial 
tilt or shifting of the poles but no evidence concerning the source from 
which he may have derived it. Some American naturalists at one time sent 
him specimens of the "great Bones at the Ohio," remains of a prehistoric 
animal just discovered there. Franklin observed that elephants in his day 
inhabited only hot countries with no winter, whereas the bones in ques-
tion had been discovered in the winter country of Ohio, and elephant 
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tusks had been found in Siberia, an even more wintry environment. This 
made him suspect, therefore, that "the earth had anciently been in 
another position, and the climates differently placed from what they are at 
present. "42 Franklin expanded his theory of the axial tilt in conversations 
with a French geologist, the abbe Soulavie. According to Soulavie's recol-
lection, Franklin remarked in a parallel between political and geographical 
revolutions, "One continent becomes old, another rises into youth and 
perfection. But the perfected continent will in tum correct the other."43 
Franklin later asked Soulavie for his evidence in French geography to sup· 
port the notion of a major bouleversement of the earth and sent to Soulavie 
his own observations on the coal mines of England. He later read his letter 
to the American Philosophical Society, and it was eventually published. 
The presence of oyster shells in the mountains Franklin accepted as proof 
of the great bouleversement or overturning of the earth. Indulging freely in 
imagination, he observed "superior beings smile at our theories, and at our 
presumption in making them." One of his own theories, eventually pre· 
sented in a paper for the American Philosophical Society, was the one he 
shared with Voltaire of an axial tilt. In his own words, 
present polar and equatorial diameters differing from each other near ten 
leagues, it is easy to conceive, in case some power should shift the axis 
gradually, and place it in the present equator, and make the new equator pass 
through the present poles, what a sinking of the waters would happen in the 
present equatorial regions, and what a rising in the polar regions; so that vast 
tracts would be discovered, that now are under water, and others covered, that 
are now dry, the water rising and sinking in the different extremes near five 
leagues. Such an operation as this possibly occasioned much of Europe, and 
among the rest this mountain ofPassy on which I live, and which is composed 
of limestone, rock and sea-shells, to be abandoned by the sea, and to change 
its ancient climate, which seems to have been a hot one. 44 
It should be noted that whereas Voltaire described a complete shifting of 
the poles, that is, a complete revolution of the globe, Franklin imagined 
merely half of the process, or the poles taking the place of the equator. 
Shortly before his death, Franklin supplied a cause for this axial tilt in a 
letter to James Bowdoin in 1788. Voltaire had supposed that the process 
was extremely gradual, taking more than a million years; Franklin assumed 
a sudden or catastrophic process. He wondered whether "in ancient times, 
the near passing of some large comet of greater magnetic power than this 
globe of ours have been a means of changing its poles, and thereby 
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wrecking and deranging its surface." The reference to changing poles may 
suggest either a complete revolution or a partial one. This supposition, 
Franklin felt, is "the easiest way of accounting for the deluge, by getting rid 
of the old difficulty how to dispose of its water after it was over."45 
In his letters to Soulavie and Bowdoin, Franklin indulged his imagina-
tion to such a degree that he wondered whether there might be a magnet-
ical north and south of the entire universe as well as of the earth. From 
here he went on to imagine space flight. If such a universal magnetism 
existed and if it were possible for a man to fly from star to star, Franklin sug-
gested, the spaceman might even "govern his course by the compass."46 
Franklin wrote this in 1782 at the age of seventy-five. Over fifty years 
previously at the age of nineteen, Franklin had also allowed his mind to 
conceive the possibility of penetrating outer space. At that time he wrote, 
"If we could take a Trip to the Moon and back again, as frequently and with 
as much Ease as we can go and come from Market, the Satisfaction would 
be just the same. "47 Voltaire is generally considered to be the more 
imaginative and Franklin the more practical of the two, but here is an 
example of Franklin's greater imaginative excursion into the unknown. To 
be sure, Voltaire wrote Micromegas about a visitor from 'another planet, but 
this was a satire on life in this world, and this kind of interplanetary travel 
as pure fantasy belonged to a recognized literary convention of human 
satire. Franklin conceived of space travel in terms of Newtonian philoso-
phy, however, and as an eventual scientific possibility. 
Three years after his speculation about travel to the moon, Franklin 
devised for his private use a creed and system of worship to which he gave 
the name "Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion." He conceived of 
"many Beings or Gods, vastly superior to Man" and that "each has made for 
himself, one glorious Sun, attended with a beautiful and admirable System 
of Planets." 48 A few years later in Poor Richard's Almanac, he further 
speculated on the higher reaches of the chain of being, turning into prose 
Alexander Pope's lines concerning the contrast between mere mortals and 
superior beings. According to Franklin, if angels observe "our actions, and 
are acquainted with our affairs, our whole body of science must appear to 
them as little better than ignorance. "49 He also quoted Pope's original 
lines concerning these superior beings, who "Admir'd such wisdom in a 
human shape, I And shew'd a Newton, as we shew an ape." In the same 
issue of Poor Richard, he showed a certain scepticism toward the notion of 
the inhabitability of plural worlds. "It is the opinion of all the modem 
philosophers and mathematicians," he observed, "that the planets are 
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habitable worlds. If so, what sort of constitutions must those people have 
who live in the planet Mercury? where, says Sir Isaac Newton, the heat of 
the sun is seven times as great as it is with us; and would make our Water 
boil away. For the same person found by experiments, that an heat seven 
times as great as the heat of the sun in summer, is sufficient to set water a 
boiling." 50 
Voltaire included in his Elements a similarly cynical attitude toward the 
theory of the plurality of inhabited worlds. "We may suspect," he says, 
"that planets similar to ours are populated by animals; but we have on this 
subject no other degree of probability, to speak exactly, than a man with 
fleas would have, who would conclude that everyone he sees passing on the 
street would have fleas as well as he." 
Franklin in his "Articles of Belief" affirmed his opinion "that Man is 
not the most perfect Being but One, rather that as there are many Degrees 
of Beings his Inferiors, so there are many Degrees of Beings superior to 
him." He also incorporated the notion of the Great Chain of Being in an 
oriental tale of unknown date. He called upon his readers to contemplate 
"the scale of beings, from an elephant down to an oyster," as well as a 
similar gradation "from an elephant to the infinitely Great, Good, and 
Wise." 51 Franklin and other eighteenth,century thinkers, with the appar, 
ent exception of Voltaire alone, who treated the chain of being were 
concerned exclusively with animated and organic creatures. Voltaire pro, 
posed the scientific relevance of the concept of the chain in his Elements, 
suggesting that it should be enlarged to include nonorganic matter. "Every, 
thing tends to make us believe," he affirmed, "that there is a chain of 
beings who elevate themselves by degrees. We are acquainted only imper, 
fectly with some links in this immense chain, and we little men, with our 
puny eyes and puny brain, we boldly divide all of nature into matter and 
spirit, including God, and not knowing, moreover, a word about what is 
basically spirit and matter." In his Dissertation on the Nature and Propagation 
of Fire, moreover, Voltaire suggested that fire itself should be considered as 
part of a chain of beings midway between those substances that are more 
solid and those that are rarer than itself. It would resemble in this sense 
"those substances which seem to mark the limits of those species which are 
neither absolute animals nor absolute vegetables and which seem to be the 
degrees by which nature passes from one genre to another." Franklin also 
talked about a missing link in the chain of being, specifically an organism 
between an animal and a vegetable, but did so in the form of a hoax. He 
several times told the French physician Cabanis about an American bird 
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carrying two tubercles at the joints of its wings. At the death of the bird 
these tubercles "become the sprouts of two vegetable stalks which grow at 
first in sucking the juice from its cadavre and which subsequently attach 
themselves to the earth in order to live in the manner of plants and 
trees." 52 Voltaire eventually rejected the notion of a chain of being 
entirely-primarily because of the disappearance of various species from 
the earth and the consequent interruption of the pretended continuous 
gradation among vegetables and animals. 53 Franklin, however, presumably 
never abandoned faith in the chain. 
Much as Franklin prized scientific research and conjecture, he felt that 
social service and community leadership were vastly more important, a 
principle that he exemplified in his own life. Writing to Cadwallader 
Colden on the latter's "Retirement from Pub lick Business," he urged him 
not to let the "Love of Philosophical Amusements have more than its due 
Weight." 54 "Had Newton been Pilot but of a single common Ship, the 
finest of his Discoveries would scarce have excus' d, or atton' d for his 
abandoning the Helm one Hour in Time of Danger: how much less if she 
had carried the Fate of the Commonwealth." In a similar vein, Franklin 
reminded Polly Stevenson seriously that "there is no Rank in Natural 
Knowledge of equal Dignity and Importance" with that of being a responsi, 
ble member of one's family, community, and country. 55 Franklin also 
unequivocally placed morality over scientific activities. The person who 
could discover a means of inculcating lasting virtue, he wrote to the 
evangelist George Whitefield, would "deserve more, ten thousand times, 
than the inventor of the longitude." 56 
But when social and political duties did not interfere, Franklin could 
not imagine a more worthy and pleasant style of life than that of pursuing 
philosophical knowledge. At a crucial stage in the career of his physician 
friend John Fothergill, Franklin advised him to "retire to your Villa, give 
your self Repose, delight in Viewing the Operations of Nature in the 
vegetable Creation, assist her in her Works, get your ingenious Friends at 
times about you, ... or, if alone, amuse yourself with your Books and 
elegant Collection." 57 Franklin therefore ironically condemned the prac, 
tice of medicine, or, as he put it, "the Impiety of being in constant Warfare 
against the Plan of Providence." He admonished Fothergill, perhaps partly 
seriously, "Disease was intended as the Punishment of Intemperance, 
Sloth, and other Vices." In effect, Franklin concluded, by curing the sick 
Fothergill performed the same service to society "as some favourite first 
Minister, who out of the great Benevolence of his Heart should procure 
Pardons for all Criminals that apply'd to him." 
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In just the opposite frame of mind, Franklin wrote to Joseph Priestley a 
famous letter predicting the absolute triumph of science over the forces of 
nature. In the midst of the American Revolution, he rhapsodically pre~ 
dieted the advances that what he termed "true Science" would make, 
including "the Power of Man over Matter." 58 "We may perhaps learn to 
deprive large Masses of their Gravity, and give them absolute Levity, for 
the sake of easy Transport. Agriculture may diminish its Labour and double 
its Produce: all Diseases may by sure means be prevented or cured, not 
excepting even that of Old Age." This is obviously hyperbole, and Frank~ 
lin used similar exaggeration in the same letter in order to contrast the 
deplorable condition of contemporary ethics. In a serious paper written 
four years later and presented to the American Philosophical Society in 
1788, Franklin gave a more realistic picture of scientific progress. "The 
power of man relative to matter," he declared, "seems limited to the 
separating or mixing the various kinds of it, or changing its form and 
appearance by different compositions of it; but does not extend to the 
making or creating new matter, or annihilating the old. . . . We cannot 
destroy any part of it, or make addition to it." 59 
Franklin is also the author of a scatological satire on the scientific 
community, a parody of the prizes offered by such learned societies, as the 
French Academy of Sciences, for which Voltaire wrote his Dissertation on 
Fire. Franklin suggested the offering of a prize for the discovery of a drug 
"that shall render the Natural Discharge of Wind from our Bodies, not 
only inoffensive, but agreeable as Perfumes. "60 
Franklin was a scientist with a sense of humor. He hoped to understand 
and to control the natural universe to the highest degree possible, but he 
placed human relations on a higher plane. Like most thinkers of his age, 
Franklin found in the natural universe much more of a geometrical plan 
than has been revealed by the research oflater scientists. Franklin is known 
by his phrase "Let the experiment be made" 61 and Voltaire by the adage 
"Beware of systems," but in actuality both carried on serious experiments 
and both speculated about all conceivable aspects of the natural universe. 
Franklin did not, like Voltaire and the editors of the Encyclopedia, inveigh 
against systems, possibly because he was not personally involved with any. 
He was a Newtonian in the broad sense but carried his interests far beyond 
the range of Newton's physics and optics. Although he wrote on agricul~ 
ture, he was, like Voltaire, relatively unacquainted with the life sciences. 
Despite his practical experiments, his deficiency in abstract mathematics, 
and his distaste for metaphysical reasoning, elements of his Newtonianism 
consisted in conjectures concerning unexplored space and the distant 
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future. He thus had great success in reconciling the world of experiment 
with the world of imagination. 
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4 
Thomas Jefferson 
JOSEPH W. SLADE 
Mr. Jefferson came into Congress in June 1775, and brought with him 
a reputation for literature, science, and a happy talent of composition. 
-John Adams to Timothy Pickering 
6 August 18221 
Thomas Jefferson gloried in his reputation as a scientist but did not seek 
recognition as a writer of literature. To be sure, he listed his authorship of 
the Declaration of Independence and the Statute of Virginia for Religious 
Freedom as two of his greatest achievements on the inscription he wrote for 
his tombstone, and Americans revere him for having invented their nation 
with his pen, in a primal literary act. Aside from these documents, some 
unsigned articles, and his political pamphlets, however, Jefferson did not 
generally write for publication;2 the dozens of volumes bearing his name 
are compilations of his private papers, some of them-the Anas, his diary 
of his mature political years-being gossipy if not downright scurrilous. 
Under pressure, he did cobble together an Autobiography of astonishing 
dullness, fortunately never finished. His only book, on which serious con, 
sideration of him as a writer of literature must ultimately depend, is his 
Notes on the State of Virginia (written in 1780,81, published in 1785), which 
Jefferson first published anonymously in France, not the United States. 
His modesty about Notes on the State of Virginia, the first natural his, 
tory of America, was extreme. He told a friend that it added "nothing new" 
to literature. 3 Historians and biographers have too easily dismissed Jeffer, 
son's assessment of his own talents; studies of Jefferson the scientist 
markedly outnumber those of the man of letters. 4 Of course, almost all of 
the books treating him as a philosopher, a statesman, a founding father, a 
tormented slaveholder, a conflicted lover, a canny politician, or a sage of 
Monticello, 5 include praise for the Declaration of Independence as "great 
literature," a term that acknowledges its ravishing rhetoric rather than its 
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imaginative elements. And almost all of them note that the mighty chords 
of the second paragraph of the Declaration vibrate with the harmonies of 
Newtonian physics. But this cliche suggests that it is easier to calculate 
Jefferson's place in American science than it is to establish his rank in 
American letters, particularly if the historian concentrates on the Declara-
tion of Independence. By now, that document has attained a supra-literary 
status, partly because-as Garry Wills has observed in his magisterial 
analysis of its composition-there are actually three Declarations: the one 
written by Jefferson, the one revised by Congress, and the one that has 
come down to us misted in legend. 6 In any version, the Declaration 
overshadows everything else in the Jefferson canon, but its political nature 
muddles its status as a literary text. It demonstrates Jefferson's familiarity 
with the science of his day, to be sure, but no more than anything else in 
his career. By contrast, Notes on the State of Virginia proves that his literary 
talents exceeded his scientific accomplishments. 
One of the ironies of that career is that while he fostered American 
science to the extent that he is regarded as one of its founders, he was 
himself not very distinguished as a scientist in any particular field-pre-
cisely because he resisted the specialization that was required. Although 
professional writers like Washington Irving, William Cullen Bryant, and 
Charles Brockton Brown sneered at his science as evidence of his literary 
failings, 7 Jefferson's contributions to literature-even leaving aside the 
Declaration of Independence-were quite specific. The democratic im-
pulses that prevented his becoming a great scientist enhanced his writing, 
but he would himself not have believed that possible. He conceived of 
science and literature as moral activities: both were forms of experience, 
tools for understanding, and, more important, patterns for living. He 
wrote Hector St. John de Crevecoeur that American farmers could read 
Homer, 8 and he advised astronomer David Rittenhouse to live, not just 
study, his discipline. 9 In any case, Jefferson wedded scientific exploration 
to literary sensibility in his own life, 10 and he did so only partly because his 
contemporaries did also. 
John Adams used the word literature in the loose eighteenth-century 
sense. The term was applied haphazardly to almost any written or printed 
page on any subject. Benjamin Franklin's 1743 charter for the American 
Philosophical Society, which Jefferson served as president for seventeen 
years, gave equal weight to science and literature, as if a fluent pen were 
the natural extension of a curious mind. Indeed, the terms literary and 
scientific were virtually interchangeable as descriptions of the society's 
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activities. 11 Obviously, eighteenth,century Americans did not use the 
word science in its modem meaning, either; it was only gradually losing the 
connotations of scientia, or general knowledge, and taking on the hard, 
edged virtues of close observations and rigorous experimentation. That 
does not mean that nobody knew the difference. Jefferson's most scathing 
criticism of a scientist was to call him a "romancer," 12 and one of his 
own colleagues gently reproved Jefferson's paleontology as "fiction." 13 But 
this semantic confusion-perhaps still not entirely resolved-was com, 
pounded by the professionalization that was transforming many intellec, 
tual activities at the end of the eighteenth century. Professionalization is 
very important in assessing the relationship of science and literature for 
Thomas Jefferson, for it is the wedge that splits culture into the two 
traditions identified by C. P. Snow. If we simply enumerate all of the man's 
talents, as so many historians have understandably been tempted to do, we 
risk not noticing that both realms were undergoing intense change and 
that the changes undermined Jefferson's efforts to domesticate both liter, 
ature and science. 
Like Dr. Johnson and Goethe, like Voltaire and the French ency, 
clopedists-all contemporaries of catholic interests-Jefferson was famil, 
iar with virtually every type of intellectual discourse. He had "a canine 
appetite for reading," 14 he said, and it is just this ability to comprehend an 
entire universe through texts that we admire in the great figures of the 
eighteenth century-before various revolutions fractured knowledge and 
experience into specialized disciplines. Unlike those other polymaths, 
however, Jefferson was foremost a pragmatic egalitarian. He resisted the 
divisions deepened by the professionalization of both science and literature 
not just because he was an amateur scientist and an amateur writer, but also 
because he thought those transformations undemocratic and ultimately 
harmful to a fully realized life. His orientation was shaped by Francis 
Bacon, Issac Newton, and John Locke; these three, he told Alexander 
Hamilton, made up his personal pantheon. 15 What that meant was that all 
knowledge (or "knolege," as he consistently and charmingly misspelled it) 
must have utility, must be rational, and must be accessible to any educated 
person, since political equality rested on understanding applied to state, 
craft. Again and again he emphasized these points; his correspondence is 
studded with assertions that wide knowledge is crucial to a republican form 
of government, especially America's. 
The progress of science and literature during the eighteenth century 
thwarted Jefferson's hopes. Daniel Boorstin has struck an elegiac note in 
Thomas Jefferson 61 
The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson, 16 which deals with the attempts of 
Jefferson's circle to circumscribe the world through knowledge, but few his, 
torians have quite grasped the mutations that professionalization wrought 
on intellectual traditions. Jefferson could dabble in anthropology, lin, 
guistics, physics, agriculture, theology, anatomy, biology, medicine, archi, 
tecture, engineering, political science, and meteorology-the list is not 
exhaustive-because people in those disciplines still all spoke the same 
language. More important, they all subscribed to the same cosmology, 
whose outlines were knowable through reason and research. Their uni, 
verse was uniform and fixed in design, driven by balanced Newtonian 
forces operating along a chain of being, the whole set in motion by some 
creative principle. As Howard Mumford Jones has said, "the natural 
philosopher thought God's thoughts after Him," and "from the point of 
view of developing science, it made little difference whether the deity was 
the god of the Christians or the God of the deists." 17 Another way of 
putting it would be to say that the science of Jefferson's time was largely 
deductive and descriptive narrative, one reason why so many ofJefferson's 
friends could refer to scientists as literati. At the same time, literature, in 
the person of writers like Pope and others-like Jefferson himself-who 
relied on Newton for their model of reality, was at its most scientific. 
Science had presence chiefly as writing, while literature was preoccupied 
with social and ethical symmetries. Eighteenth,century intellectuals read 
the universe like a book and unfolded its beauties on pages of their own 
composition. 
So comfortable a worldview often made for poor science. Because the 
design of the universe was immutable, for example, Jefferson thought 
geology, or the ~tudy of the earth's evolution, "not worth an hour" of a 
man's time. This and other mistakes were the consequence of an age 
disposed toward what Brooke Hindle has called "synthesis based on inade, 
quate data." 18 Even so, Jefferson helped not only to gather but also to 
organize better data. Experimental methods were still crude, but re, 
searchers invented new-and almost literary-tools for dealing with 
discoveries, chiefly systems of nomenclature and precise, descriptive lan, 
guages. At the same time, as scientists refined their languages, they found 
that their goal of unified knowledge receded, through data too enormous 
for one man to grasp. When Jefferson was born, the sciences and some 
forms of literature were still subsumed by philosophy (divided, according 
to far from universal practice, into categories like "natural," "moral," and 
"political"). By the time of his death, they had rigidified into distinct 
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endeavors. Jefferson had always planned to spend his retirement in scien~ 
tific research. When he finally escaped public office, however, he realized 
that his favorite disciplines had advanced beyond his ability to catch up, 
and he devoted considerable time instead to reading literature at Mon~ 
ticello. Advances in taxonomy-the search for pattern-led to new ways 
of categorizing knowledge and experience. Far from restricted to science, 
this impulse affected writers like Jonathan Edwards, whose excursions into 
typology have been explored by Ursula Brumm, 19 and a succession of poets 
and novelists before and after Whitman, for whom only catalogs and types 
could contain the diversity of American experience. New systems of 
nomenclature caused great excitement, as when the classifications by 
Georges Louis Leclerc, Count Buffon, "actually received more popular 
attention than the literary classics of Voltaire and Rousseau." zo 
Devising systems of classification was an extension of the age of 
reason, the agenda set as much by the encylopedists as by Newton. In 
France, the Physiocrats identified the elements of economics, and in 
Britain, Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, a work almost as important 
for America's future as the Declaration (both were published in 1776), 
dealt with the division of labor. jefferson's fondness for classification is 
evident in the Declaration; after its early invocation of laws of nature 
comes a classification of grievances that spells out violations of those laws. 
It is even more visible in his Notes on the State of Virginia, which relies 
heavily on nomenclature. Since that work was in many ways seminal for 
various sciences in America, Jefferson thus stimulated professionalization 
of those sciences unintentionally. Professionalization involved formulating 
languages appropriate to different disciplines, but the scientists who in~ 
vented specialized terms inevitably closed those disciplines to outsiders. 
(Thomas Kuhn has suggested that a science is on its way to maturity when 
it becomes incomprehensible to amateurs. 21 ) The process is as irreversi~ 
ble-and perhaps as disturbing-as the progress of rationalization out~ 
lined by Max Weber. A great many disciplines made strides toward 
professionalization during Jefferson's lifetime, but the most obvious revolu~ 
tions occurred in the revisions of nomenclature and classification in 
biology and chemistry, both of which he thought important, and about 
both of which he was ambivalent. 
As he asserted often, the ideal American was a literate, scientific 
farmer, partly because Jefferson had absorbed his economic principles from 
the French Physiocrats, who believed that a country's agriculture was its 
only real source of wealth. Better agriculture might produce better citizens, 
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and in that hope Jefferson rotated his crops, collected new seeds, and kept 
fastidious records. 22 Botany was probably Jefferson's greatest love, though 
he was fascinated by all living things. He embraced Linnaeus's classifica~ 
tion of flora and fauna into genera and species and did what he could to 
improve these systems of comparison by describing plants and animals 
meticulously and sending specimens to specialists for official recording. In 
fact, wary of innovation, he clung to the Linnaean zoological classifica~ 
tions even after they had proved less useful than those for botany. 23 
Jefferson not only recognized the need for nomenclature, he also invented 
notational schemes for meteorology and classification systems of Indian 
languages for comparative linguistics, while his efforts to catalog pre~ 
historic animal bones earned him the title "Founder of American Paleon~ 
to logy." 24 But he knew that labels were artificial. As he told one corre~ 
spondent in 1814, using terminology appropriate to a democrat, "Nature 
has, in truth, produced units only through all her works. Classes, orders, 
genera, species, are not of her work. Her creation is of individuals. No two 
animals are exactly alike; no two plants, nor even two leaves or blades of 
grass; no two crystallizations." 25 He was as suspicious of language as only a 
master writer can be. "I do not pretend that language is science. It is only 
an instrument for the attainment of science," he wrote in Notes on the State 
of Virginia. 26 
Jefferson's ambivalence toward nomenclature increased when he con~ 
fronted chemistry, which he liked best when it improved beer or cheese. 
Perhaps the greatest single achievement of science during jefferson's period 
was the reform of chemical nomenclature carried out by Lavoisier. Lavoi~ 
sier suspected that behind matter lay a coherent arrangement of chemical 
elements, the basis for the periodicity of atomic weights that would be 
articulated by Mendeleyev in 1871. With Guyton de Morveau, Berthollet, 
and Fourcroy, Lavoisier published Methode de nomenclature chimique in 
1787, and in 1789 refined the method with greater clarity in his own Traite 
elementaire de Chimie (translated into three American editions by 1805). 
Ironically, Lavoisier had been powerfully influenced by Condillac, a politi~ 
cal philosopher whom Jefferson respected. Condillac had condemned 
antiquated jargon in all fields on the grounds that it led people astray. 
Lavoisier included this passage from Condillac, which should have been 
well received by the author of the Declaration of Independence: "We only 
reason well or reason badly in so far as our language is well or badly 
constructed . . . the whole art of reasoning can be reduced to the art of 
speaking well."27 Condillac was more specific: "the progress of the sci~ 
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ences depends entirely on the progress of their languages." But the oxygen 
theory pioneered by Jefferson's close friend Joseph Priestley, which formed 
the basis of Lavoisier's system (though Priestley himself was unconvinced), 
was not yet fully established, so Jefferson thought the French scientist's 
reforms "premature." 28 "Chemists seem to write only for one another," the 
great layman complained. 29 
In addition to his objections to the increasing inaccessibility of science 
to the amateur, Jefferson had patriotic and political reasons for opposing 
specialization. A young nation could not afford that luxury. As Jefferson's 
close friend and fellow generalist Benjamin Rush remarked, a whole 
continent lay awaiting investigation; it would have been foolish for Amer-
ican scientists "to tum our backs upon a gold mine, in order to amuse 
ourselves catching butterflies." 30 However urgent the need to catch up to 
European science, Jefferson believed, specialization would have to be left 
to later generations. Although he could promote science, could build 
educational institutions, could send out expeditions, could keep the infor-
mation flowing-indeed, his famous writing desk was a virtual clear-
inghouse of scientific news-he did not himself have time to devote to 
detailed investigation. For the time being, knowledge had to be judged by 
its immediate utility. 
Jefferson understood that the process of discovery follows no man's 
timetable, of course. "No discovery is barren," he remarked in 1802; "it 
always serves as a step to something else." 31 Jefferson's pragmatism derived 
from his conviction that American culture was immature and vulnerable, 
while its needs were urgent. Rightly or wrongly, he emphasized practicality 
to offset what he saw as widespread American antipathy to European 
decadence, which often seemed to celebrate the intellect for purely aes-
thetic reasons. Practicality was a test of necessity, just as a determination to 
remain an amateur was an index of sincerity. Pragmatism certainly shaped 
his attitude toward literature, which he ranked below science in its utility. 
Although he wanted to domesticate both literature and science into 
American vernaculars, he may have felt that he could impose his preju-
dices on literature more easily. At any rate, in devising programs of 
education, he suggested reading literature in the evening, after a full day 
devoted to more important subjects. 32 
Jefferson often read literature through the lenses of science. A scholar 
of Greek and Latin, he parsed Homer and Virgil-in his view the only 
great poets, because they had withstood the test of time and because all 
educated men shared their experience. 33 In their works he found what he 
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called "stores of real science" relevant to the astronomy, mathematics, and 
natural history of his own period. 34 But he was just as convinced that a 
familiarity with imaginative literature was essential to a full education. 
After his first library burned, he composed a list of books to be included in 
an ideal collection. Prominent among them, he wrote to Robert Skipwith, 
should be novels, poetry, and drama. 35 The list contained many great 
names of literature, including Shakespeare, Smollet, Richardson, and 
Sterne. Sterne's works, he said, "form the best course of morality that ever 
was written," and King Lear was better than "all the dry volumes of ethics 
and divinity that ever were written." Imaginative fiction evoked an inter, 
est in the lives of other people and encouraged "moral" responses like 
sympathy and altruism. He told Skipwith that readers were "wisely framed 
to be as warmly interested for a fictitious as for a real personage." The 
ethicality he demanded of literature he also demanded of science, which 
he thought had only truth as its end. Science for Jefferson was quite 
literally a replacement for religion: if it was skeptical, chaste, and rigorous, 
it was also complete and self,sustaining. More important, it was a fraternal 
and humanistic endeavor, the source of sensibilities common to those 
found in literature. To read and write literature, in tum, was to enter a 
republic of letters. Despite his celebrated mistrust of religion, he was 
sufficiently a Puritan to accept the notion that Americans are a people of 
the book and to share the conviction that every man could read and 
interpret that book for himself. So powerful an empirical tradition shaped 
his writing. 
So did formal literary models, mostly classical, a preference that owed 
something to his father, who had insisted that young Thomas's education 
emphasize Tacitus and Livy rather than English essayists. But Jefferson 
schooled his own formidable powers of expression. That is evident from his 
commonplace books, one of which was published as The Literary Bible of 
Thomas Jefferson by Gilbert Chinard. 36 As a young man, Jefferson wrote 
poetry but recognized his lack of facility. Many years later, he responded to 
a gift of Joel Barlow's "American" epic, The Columbiad, with the state, 
ment, "Of all men living, I am the last who should undertake to decide as 
to the merits of poetry," 37 but his reluctance to comment was probably 
occasioned by diplomacy, for Barlow's composition was unreadable. Actu, 
ally he had pronounced opinions about poetry and about writing in 
general. Jefferson wrote the first American essay on prosody (which 
remained unpublished until1903 ). Among reflections on style, he offered 
a preference for blank verse, which he thought was superior to jingling 
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rhyme. 38 Throughout his life he honed his own prose into a gleaming 
instrument, an American "plainstyle," bereft of ornamentation, equally 
adaptable to cool observation or passionate enthusiasm. 39 
The dimensions of the republic ofletters, like those of the fraternity of 
science, were determined by the principles of an orderly universe. Both 
scientists and writers could discover these principles and express them as 
observation and imagination. Scientific power derived from comprehend~ 
ing nature, not by achieving control over her, just as political power 
stemmed from understanding man, not by commanding. Literature ac~ 
quired its force through expression, without which there could be no 
understanding, and it was powerful to the degree that it accurately mir~ 
rored nature. Since nature was there to be expressed, no one could claim 
that the ideas nature generated were original, and no one could claim 
property rights to them. This belief was the bedrock of Jeffersonian 
democracy, and it has offended the elitist sensibilities of professional 
writers-which might explain why Jefferson's literary reputation has lan~ 
guished. 
Susan Sontag has noticed that literature as "a secular calling" -i.e., 
as a professionalized activity-separates from other forms of writing like 
journalism, belles lettres, hack fiction, and history in the eighteenth 
century, 40 but Caesar Grana has linked this splitting away to the rise of 
industrialization, when writers lost the patronage of church, crown, and 
aristocracy. Patronage had not entirely disappeared during Jefferson's time, 
of course; Goethe, to mention just one example, still drew subsidies from 
Weimar princes. The loss of patronage meant that the writer, like other 
artists, had to compete in a cultural marketplace as an independent agent 
as he saw fit. What the writer could sell was originality. The "absence of 
obligation to the standards of a specific social environment had made 
originality not only possible but also, in a sense, the sole point and 
foundation of literary creation. "41 Originality arose, as it did in the 
sciences, from experimentation, but in addition-as was not at all the case 
with science-from the kind of self~discovery historians would later call 
Romanticism. The very precariousness of the writer's economic position, 
says Grana, "bred in many writers a tendency to grow touchy concerning 
the momentousness and dignity of their trade, and one after another fell to 
speaking reverentially of the natural gap between the creator and the 
layman."42 That was reflex, a defensive posture designed to offset the 
difficulty of making a living at authorship. The hardheaded Dr. Johnson 
put things less mysteriously: "No man but a blockhead," he said, "ever 
wrote for anything but money." 
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Jefferson disliked the Romantic writers as a group, although at the 
close of his life he enjoyed the poems of Ossian (the fictional persona 
created by James McPherson), whom he described as the greatest of 
poets. 43 Jefferson did not object to writers making money, although like 
Benjamin Rush he seems to have thought fame the chief "stimulus" to 
"difficult and laborious literary pursuits. "44 In fact, the small American 
population during the Revolutionary period could not support many pro· 
fessional writers, nor was original literature as a commodity adequately 
protected by copyright for many years. Jefferson was just as skeptical of 
copyright as he was of patent monopolies. 45 As the nation's first secretary 
of state, Jefferson did not administer the first Federal Copyright statute of 
1790 as he did the first Federal Patent Act of that year, but his feeling about 
copyright was probably similar to his views on patents. The moment an 
idea "is divulged," said Jefferson, "it forces itself into the possession of 
everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. "46 The outrage 
occasioned by Jefferson's refusal to grant more than sixty-seven patents in 
three years led Congress to create a new patent office to take over his 
duties. So far as writing was concerned, he seemed to think that what the 
culture would lose in sophistication by keeping literature as the leisure 
pursuit of amateurs would be made up for in intellectual suppleness-an 
attitude, needless to say, that retarded the growth of a professional writing 
class in America. 
Jefferson did not patent his famous moldboard plow nor did he copy· 
right Notes on the State of Virginia. 47 Nor did he claim originality in the 
Declaration. At the height of his political battles with Jefferson, John 
Adams told Timothy Pickering that scarcely any of the ideas in the 
Declaration of Independence had been original. Jefferson was bewildered 
by the charge: "Pickering's observations, and Mr. Adams' in addition, that 
[the Declaration] contained no new ideas, that it is a commonplace 
compilation, its sentiments hacknied in Congress for two years before . . . 
may be all true. Of that I am not judge. Richard H. Lee charged it as copied 
from Locke's treatise on Government. . . . I only know that I turned to 
neither book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as any part 
of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer no sentiment 
which had never been expressed before."48 In 1825, a year before his 
death, Jefferson responded to Lee more elaborately: he had provided 
readers of The Declaration with arguments of such common sense as would 
"command their assent": "Neither aiming at originality of principles or 
sentiments, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was 
intended to be an expression of the American mind. . . . All its authority 
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rests on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in 
conversation, in letters, printed essays, on the elementary books of public 
right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc."49 
What would have been the good, he implied, in springing new ideas 
on his audience? Revolutions were not made of novelty but of ideas that 
had been seething. The whole point was to make sure that nobody missed 
the point, that the expression be accessible to all. The expression of "the 
American mind" in the Declaration certainly made it as much a literary as 
a political document. Like so many of our native classics, including the 
Preamble to the Constitution, the Declaration is a first-person narrative, 50 
and one could in fact argue that American literature itself grew slowly in 
part because that masterpiece said everything that the age required about 
the American mind. 
Rather than add to the vast comment on that document, however, we 
might more profitably look at Notes on the State of Virginia, a work that does 
not express "the harmonizing sentiments of the day," as an example of 
Jefferson's ability to transform his scientific principles into literary state-
ment that is clearly original. Written as a series of answers to scientific 
questions posed by Fran~ois Marbois, secretary of the French legation at 
Philadelphia while Jefferson was wartime Governor of Virginia, Notes on 
the State of Virginia began in 1780 as a statistical survey, an outgrowth of the 
author's obsessive habit of note-taking, and over several months swelled 
into a full-scale manuscript complete with bibliography of works on the 
state. He arranged for an edition of two hundred copies to be printed 
privately five years later in France, without his name on the title page, for 
limited distribution to his friends, and then in 1787 for an English edition 
bearing his name to counter the threat of inaccurate pirated editions (the 
complicated publishing history has been best traced by William Peden 51). 
The delay in acknowledging it can be attributed to Jefferson's worries that 
the chapters on religion, Indians, and slavery contained remarks that were 
not simply unharmonious but explosive. Fawn Brodie suggests that he first 
printed it anonymously because he knew that it was a work of emotion 
(which it is) and that its content violated his sense of scientific objectivity 
(which it does). 52 However factual he thought it, his treatment of the facts 
transformed them into literature. And whatever anxieties the book caused 
him, he revised and polished it for the rest of his life, doubtless because he 
secretly cherished its literary excellences. 
Notes on the State of Virginia is the complement to the Declaration and 
the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, for it reveals the emotional 
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turmoil behind those bold statements of idealism. Here is the originality 
smelted out of principles that appear now to have been engraved in 
empiric, metallic permanence. Most of what subsequent generations have 
called Jeffersonianism derives from this work, in which the man noted his 
thoughts on America in sustained form rather than in snippets of letters. 
Here is the glorification of fanners ("the chosen people of God, if ever he 
had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for 
substantial and genuine virtue" [165]), the mistrust of manufacturing 
(although Jefferson would change his mind about factories after the Na~ 
poleonic Wars demonstrated the vulnerability of an economy dependent 
on imports), the fear of cities, and the worries about the democratic 
loyalties of future immigrants that would be echoed in the poetry and 
fiction of subsequent generations. But where later American writers adopt 
these themes as critiques of society, Jefferson's concern is with the fragility 
of culture in the new land. His antipathy to large~scale manufacturing in 
the United States arises from the desire to preserve the innocence of the 
scientific and democratic experiment, just as his resistance to the profes~ 
sionalization of both science and literature-what might be called the self~ 
conscious creation of culture-grows out of a belief in the integrity of 
simpler intellectual cottage industries. 
Notes is a personal "vision by turns utopian and sober. It is a narrative of 
America: a chronicle of unfolding drama told in the languages of botany 
and zoology, meteorology and geography, ethnology and paleontology. 
These were, as we have noted earlier, languages that he helped to invent. 
Notes draws on Jefferson's scientific predecessors, builds upon and disputes 
their ideas. Its patriotism is most evident in its responses to Buffon, "the 
pope of eighteenth~century zoologists" 53: Jefferson dismissed the French~ 
man's patronizing pronouncements on American topography, meteoreol~ 
ogy, and biology, which were easily refuted by direct observation. Among 
other things, Buffon had claimed that American mammals were smaller 
than their European counterparts. Jefferson simply cataloged animals by 
classes, using the Linnaean nomenclature, and ranked species according 
to continent by weight and size; little else needed be said. As this method 
indicates, scattered throughout Notes are tables of all sorts-on rainfall, 
on Indian tribes, on birds, on trees, on population-composed by a 
naturalist pleased at his ability to validate his chauvinism with figures. 
The narrative voice charms, its ingenuousness neither smug nor naive, 
untainted by assumptions of great learning-convinced, rather, that any 
area of knowledge requires only reason to grasp. Jefferson is just an 
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amateur, he implies, while Buffon is a professional zoologist whose errors 
are literary: the result of "his vivid imagination and bewitching language" 
(64). The strategy is effective; because Jefferson seems to aim only at fact, 
his own seductive style persuades. In its epistolary form Notes bears some 
resemblance to Letters From an American Farmer (1782 ), which was com, 
posed about the same time, although neither Crevecoeur nor Jefferson, 
despite a later friendship, seems to have influenced the other. A more apt 
comparison would focus on a later work. Notes on the State of Virginia is as 
much about the character of Thomas Jefferson as Walden is about the 
mental "state" of Henry David Thoreau. They are similar personalities: 
Jefferson driven by a faith in objectivity but tugged also by his love of 
expression. Thoreau (in the words of Dirk Stroik) spoiled by Emerson as a 
scientist, spoiled by Agassiz as a poet. 54 Thoreau and Jefferson are kindred 
naturalists, their penchant for careful observation wedded to a predilection 
for pithy comment. For example, in the section on religion, after review, 
ing the pressures for orthodoxy in Virginia, Jefferson makes the Thoreau, 
vian remark, one of dozens of possible instances: "But it does me no injury 
for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my 
pocket nor breaks my leg" (159). Notes on the State of Virginia is thus the 
first example of an American genre of naturalism as substratum for opin, 
ions and imagination that runs through Thoreau, Burroughs, and Muir to 
Annie Dillard and John McPhee in the present. 
More significant, Jefferson in this work emerges as the psychic and 
visual geographer of America, her cartographer of the future. Howard 
Mumford Jones has singled out "the full panoramic landscape originated in 
aesthetic principles [as] ... the special creation of Thomas Jefferson in his 
Notes on Virginia. In this book he did it twice: once in describing the 
Natural Bridge, and once in describing the confluence of the Shenandoah 
and the Potomac." 55 "For the mountain being cloven asunder," says 
Jefferson in the second instance, "she presents to your eye, through the 
cleft, a small catch of smooth blue horizon, at an infinite distance in the 
plain country, inviting you, as it were, from the riot and tumult roaring 
around, to pass through the breach and participate of the calm below" (19). 
According to Jones, Jefferson's "painterly" descriptions influenced the 
Hudson River School and also writers like James Fenimore Cooper and 
William Cullen Bryant. 56 That visual sense persists. Nearly two centuries 
later, Edmund Wilson would be amused by his own tendency to write "still 
. . . in the vein of old, fashioned landscape description." 57 It is the expres, 
sian of an American consciousness aware of space rather than time, as 
Thomas Jefferson 71 
befitted a national identity without much past or history. Jefferson's images 
fixed the parameters of America's visual landscape as much as his later 
Louisiana Purchase established the physical boundaries of the nation. 
It is important to remember that Virginia then claimed territory in 
enormous excess of her present boundaries, so that in a genuine sense 
Jefferson's eye traverses at least a third of the continent. But though the 
vastness of the region is one of the subjects of Jefferson's narrative, it is 
limited, psychically, by the consciousness of a wider cosmos. Where the 
Declaration is confident, even aggressive in its nationalism, Notes seems 
more aware of the rest of the world's scrutiny of the new democracy, more 
doubtful of the moral superiority of its small population. In fact, virtually 
all of the memorable passages are the consequence of Jefferson's encoun· 
ters with aberrations in the Newtonian universe whose principles he thinks 
so orderly and self-evident. 
That does not mean that the work's literary characteristics are aug-
mented by its author's scientific mistakes, only some of which are attribut· 
able to the ignorance of the time. Jefferson speculated absurdly on geology, 
essayed into areas of physiology he knew nothing about, reproduced 
questionable data from physics, allowed his prejudices to intrude. The 
mistakes do not make him a bad scientist, although they make him a less 
than first-rate one, at the same time that they make the man himself more 
human. Nor can we call Notes on the State of Virginia one of the foun-
tainheads of American literature simply because it announces major na-
tional themes, or because it establishes a genre, or because it fixes a 
landscape. It is a triumph of our literature because of its ethicality (the 
quality Jefferson so readily praised in the poetry, drama, and fiction of 
others). Its honesty consists in its acknowledgment that Jefferson's at· 
tempt to domesticate his science has failed, a failure rendered all the more 
poignant by his evident longing. That is the real difference between the 
Declaration of Independence and Notes on the State of Virginia. If the 
former is a masterpiece because it finds in Newtonian mechanics a model 
whose rationality can inform the politics of a nation, the latter is a 
masterpiece because it discovers that the Newtonian model lacks humanity 
sufficient to guide the ethics of its citizens. 
The cracks in the eighteenth-century cosmos of the Notes appear 
gradually, as Jefferson recognizes America's failings. For example, when he 
describes Virginia houses, he laments that "the genius of architecture 
seems to have shed its maledictions over this land. . . . The private 
buildings are very rarely constructed of stone or brick; much the greatest 
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proportion being of scantling and boards, plaistered with lime. It is 
impossible to devise things more ugly, uncomfortable, and happily more 
perishable" (152-53). At a more important extreme, he marks injustices to 
Indians. He lists the major tribes, praises their virtues, refutes European 
myths of Indian inferiority. Forty years before Cooper, he asserts the 
nobility of native Americans and includes in the Notes a transcription of a 
speech by the Indian chieftain Logan, whose family was massacred by 
whites: "There runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of any living 
creature. This called on me for revenge. I have sought it: I have killed 
many: I have fully glutted my vengeance. For my country, I rejoice at the 
beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear. 
Logan never felt fear. He will not tum on his heel to save his life. Who is 
there to mourn for Logan?-Not one" (63). The reproduction of that 
speech, almost as eloquent as anything Jefferson himself ever wrote, caused 
outrage among many Americans and led to charges that Jefferson was 
betraying his white brethren when the book's authorship became known. 
As Jefferson handles it, Logan's is a story within the larger story of the 
nation, part of her chronicle, never told better. Not exactly small matters, 
these acknowledgments of blight in paradise are preludes to treatment of a 
more basic evil. Besides, Jefferson did his part to improve his state's 
architecture, and to redress injuries to the Indian. He spent years compil-
ing Indian vocabularies that materially contributed to the study of Indian 
origins through philology. 58 The moral fault line in the book originates in 
the contrast between the personal and social inertia that permitted Jeffer-
son to own two hundred slaves and the conscience that tormented him. 
When toward the end of Notes he confronts the institution made peculiar 
by democratic principles that he himself had derived from a scientific 
reading of the cosmos, the schism shakes his world. 
Jefferson himself traces the crack in his Newtonian universe in the 
section innocuously titled "Manners," which is entirely concerned with 
slavery. The crack deepens sentence by sentence, from references to the 
"unhappy influence" of slavery upon America's citizens, to the infection of 
white children by this canker in the body politic, to deepening depravity, 
to the utter destruction of the country's morality. The litany is capped by 
epiphany, as the Newtonian architect of the world's greatest experiment in 
scientific statehood exclaims, "I tremble for my country when I reflect that 
God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever" (163). The mea culpa 
emerges as the hidden "expression of the American mind" behind the 
sublime cadences of the Declaration. The author embellishes the epi-
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phany only to the extent that his rationality balks at blaming the power of 
darkness: the crime is a failure of light. 
Jefferson's heirs, having ceded the responsibilities of the amateur to 
professional scientists, may view his eighteenth~century consciousness 
with a cynicism sharpened by the awesome discoveries that science has 
made in almost two centuries. Veteran readers of texts overwrought by 
generations of professional writers, they may find in his directness an 
imagination without artifice and a sensibility unaware of its own orig~ 
inality. Reading Notes on the State of Virginia, however, Americans perhaps 
may acknowledge Thomas Jefferson's paternity of their literature, just as 
they already call him father to their science. 
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5 
An Intrinsic luminosity: 
Poe's Use of Platonic 
and Newtonian Optics 
WILLIAM j. SCHEICK 
The place of science in Poe's thought and imagination can be easily 
misassessed if we judge it on the basis of his poetry. Such verse as 
"Sonnet-to Science" (1829), with its identification of the poet with the 
defiant but doomed mythological figures of Prometheus and Icarus, repre, 
sents a clear assault on science as a force preying on the poet's heart, as a 
force inimical to creative imagination (Promethean fire) and mythic or 
metaphoric language (lcarian flight). This poem, however, appeared early 
in Poe's career, and although he later revised and continued to republish it 
together with much of his other early verse, this work remains a testament 
to the author's youthful, possibly exaggerated reaction to science. The true 
place of science in Poe's thought is manifest in his prose, where in various 
forms it plays significant roles in his layering of meanings in these writings. 
In the 1840s-in fact, on no less than five separate occasions-Poe 
remarked the common ground between the scientist and the artist. This 
relationship is implied in the introductory remarks to "The Murders in the 
Rue Morgue" (1841), and in "A Chapter of Suggestions" (1845) Poe 
specifically wrote: "Some of the most profound knowledge-perhaps all 
very profound knowledge-has originated from a highly stimulated imag, 
ination. Great intellects guess well. The laws of Kepler were, professedly, 
guesses." This same comment, in somewhat different words, is made in 
"Mellonta Tauta" (1849) and Eureka (1848), emphasizing that "Kepler 
guessed," "imagined," "grasped . . . with [his] soul" laws he surmised 
"through mere dint of intuition." And in a letter (September 20, 1848) to 
Charles Fenno Hoffman he explained his position more fully: "There is no 
absolute certainty, either in the Aristotelian or Baconian process . . . 
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neither Philosophy is so profound as it fancies itself-and ... neither has 
a right to sneer as that seemingly imaginative process called Intuition (by 
which Kepler attained his laws;) since 'Intuition,' after all is but the 
conviction arising from those inductions or deductions of which the 
processes are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason 
or defy our capacity of expression." 1 
At the outset of any attempt to assess the place of science in Poe's 
prose, however, one needs to express a cautionary note. Poe did in fact 
know much about science, but this knowledge came to him in various 
ways. Some scientific information came to him while he was a student, 
whereas much came to him from reading as an adult. But this reading is 
difficult to trace sometimes. Poe's scientific information came to him from 
primary and secondary, even sometimes journalistic, sources. As a result, 
when Poe cites a scientific source, we might be tempted to think he read 
the work containing the reference, when in fact he might well have read 
some other book or magazine article and might only be repeating some, 
thing cited in this other source. This is certainly the case when in "Margi, 
nalia" (1844,49) he seems to quote from Newton's Opticks (1704 ), but in 
fact the misattributed remark derives from an article Poe had read (Writ, 
2:176). This problem does not delimit a study of the function of science in 
Poe's writings, where traces of scientific information are in abundant evi, 
dence;2 it does delimit any attempt at concluding with ease whether he 
had a first,hand familiarity with and a thorough knowledge of a specific 
scientific treatise. So a quotation from Sir Isaac Newton's Principia (1687) 
in "Marginalia" or a reference to it in "Mesmeric Revelation" (1844; W, 
3:1035) and Eureka (CW, 16:223) does not necessarily mean that Poe read 
an edition of this late seventeenth,century work; it does mean that Poe was 
interested in the scientific observation made in the quotation or reference. 
Perhaps the scientific field that most fascinated Poe was astronomy. 3 
For his account of Hans Pfaal's trip to the moon, Poe relied on Sir John 
Herschel's Treatise on Astronomy (1833 ), which is quoted from and para, 
phrased in Poe's story. Eureka abounds in astronomical information, with 
reference to John Pringle Nichol's Views of the Architecture of the Heavens 
(183 7) and some reliance upon David Brewster's notes to James Ferguson's 
Astronomy (1811). Poe's astronomical lore sometimes coalesced with his 
. interest in physics, 4 especially the principle of gravity in Eureka, where he 
contrasts gravity's power of attraction to electricity's power of repulsion; if, 
Poe explains, "the principle of Newtonian Gravity" exhibits "the tendency 
of the diffused atoms to return into Unity," in contrast, electricity always is 
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produced when the bodies that meet differ appreciably from one another in 
the character of their atoms (CW, 16:212-13). 
The word sums alerts us to another scientific field of great interest to 
Poe: mathematics. Poe seems to have known the writings on mathematics 
and meteors by the Newtonian editor of Principia, Roger Cotes, among 
others. On mathematics and light, in particular, Poe notes in one place 
that "the diffusion-the scattering-the irradiation [oflight], in a word-
is directly proportional with the squares of the distances" (CW, 16:226). 
The pyrotechnical display of mathematical learning in some of Poe's works 
has led several critics to express a high regard for Poe's ability in this 
subject, although there has been dissent to that opinion. 5 Less evident 
than mathematics are traces of Poe's knowledge of chemistry (particularly 
the nature of phosphorescence and the use of bichloride of mercury in 
preservation), geology (primarily earthquakes), aeronautics (especially in 
ballooning), biology (specifically plants such as the sugar beet), and 
animal magnetism (preeminently in the pseudoscience of mesmerism, in 
which Poe seems to have believed). 6 Poe knew a little about paleontology 
and was familiar with Jacques-Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's Studies of 
Nature (1808). Sometimes he could use technical terms drawn from biol-
ogy, such as his reference in "Marginalia" (Writ, 2:122) to some people as 
Epizoae (parasites). He also had a hand in the revised The Conchologist's 
First Book (1839) and might have played a role in the production of A 
Synopsis of Natural History with Human and General Physiology and Biology 
(1839). 7 
More influential than all of these interests is Poe's information on 
psychology and medicine. In his fiction Poe delved into the subjects of 
mind, memory, dreams, hallucinations, insanity, fear, hysteria, personal 
identity, sexuality, and phrenology (the study of the shape of a skull as an 
index to a person's emotional, intellectual, and imaginative predisposi-
tions). 8 Poe was also an avid reader of medical journals, which in the 
nineteenth century were not so technical that the average literate person 
would find them inaccessible, and he even reviewed medical journals. He 
possibly wrote an article on A Dissertation on the Importance of Physical Signs 
in the Various Diseases of the Abdomen and Thorax (CW, 9:164-66). Perti-
nently, in his stories one finds frequent references to catalepsy, fevers, 
pestilence, consumption, synaesthesia, and hypochondria. 9 
Poe's interest in human psychology and biology, particularly as they 
correspond to his knowledge of physics, is manifest as well in a critically 
neglected feature of his work: how his notions about human perception 
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relate to his ideas about optics. Even a cursory exposure to Poe's fiction 
leaves a strong impression of his recurrent emphasis on the eye, whether it 
be a horse's human,looking eye in "Metzengerstein" (1832), the seemingly 
pupilless eye of the subject of"Berenice" (1835), the deep well,like eyes of 
the heroine of"Ligeia" (1838), the luminous eyes of Roderick in "The Fall 
of the House of Usher" (1839), the entrancing eye of the artist's dying bride 
and model in "The Oval Portrait" (1842), the fiery feline eye in "The Black 
Cat" (1843) or the veiled, pale eye of the victim in "The Tell, Tale Heart" 
(1843). In Poe's time there was, among philosophers and scientists, a 
consensus that sight was the most comprehensive and engaged of the five 
senses. 10 In detailing the relationship between Poe's ideas about human 
perception and his understanding of optics, the depth of his knowledge of 
certain scientific information and the role of this knowledge in his fiction 
can be better appreciated. To date, the function of optics in Poe's works has 
not been immediately self,evident. Coming to terms with his thought 
about perception discloses features of his symbolism and shows how he 
found scientific authority to support his aesthetic management of optical 
concepts. 
Classical Optics 
An exploration of Poe's use of knowledge about the physics and physiology 
of human optics should begin with a consideration of his reliance in some 
instances upon optical theory derived from classical tradition. Concerning 
light and vision, there were two classical notions, the Platonic and the 
Aristotelian. These two notions differed over the source of light in the 
process of vision. The Platonic concept, which appears in Meno (76C), 
Timaeus (45), and Thentetus (153), held that the eye is the source of light, 
that vision results from the impact on objects of ocular beams emanating 
from the eye. Opposed to this concept-perpetuated as well by Euclid, 
Lucretius, and even Roger Bacon-is the Aristotelian notion set forth in 
De Anima (Pt. 2, ch. 7), Parvanaturalia (ch. 2), andMeteorologica (372b), 
a belief perpetuated by Johannes Kepler (Dioptrik, ch. 61). The Aristo, 
telian concept of optics maintained that light rays derive from luminous 
objects and that vision is the result of the reflection of the images of these 
objects upon the watery surface of the eye. 
Poe knew well Plato's work, which echoes not only in, say, the word 
Eidolon in "Dream,Land" (1844 ), but also in all of Poe's works concerning 
the play between an essential Unity and its fragmentation into the phe, 
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nomenological world of shadowy forms. "The Colloquy of Monos and 
Una" (1841), the second of Poe's trilogy of dialogues by heavenly creatures, 
refers to "the pure contemplative spirit and majestic intuition of Plato," 
whose teachings are "most desperately needed" now when they are "most 
entirely forgotten or despised" (W, 2:610-11). And it is not only the notion 
apparently fictitiously attributed to Plato by the devil in "Bon-Bon" (1835) 
that the mind is light (W, 2:108) but also the Platonic notion of vision, of 
light originating from the eye, that Poe sometimes adapts to symbolize the 
sight of a character who represents ideality, especially the artist in posses· 
sion of an intense imagination recalling primal Unity. 
This is the case with Augustus Bedloe in "A Tale of the Ragged 
Mountains" (1844) and Roderick Usher in "The Fall of the House of 
Usher." The narrator of "A Tale" reports that "in moments of excitement" 
Augustus's "abnormally large" eyes "grew bright to a degree almost incon-
ceivable; seeming to emit luminous rays, not of a reflected, but of an 
intrinsic lustre, as does a candle or the sun" (W, 3:940). In "The Fall of the 
House of Usher" Roderick also possesses eyes "large, liquid, and lumi-
nous," a description repeated in "The Haunted Palace" (1839), the poem 
reprinted in this story that refers to "two luminous windows" representing 
Roderick's two eyes (W, 2:401, 407). At first one might be inclined to 
think that this luminosity in Usher's eyes is reflected light, but it is 
important to recall two facts. First, in Eureka Poe follows David Brewster's 
example in restricting the word lumi1WUS to a source of issuing light (CW, 
16:225). Second, we need to recall how little light exists in the home of 
Roderick, whose eyes we are told "were tortured by even a faint light" 
(W, 2:403 ). Then, too, the narrator refers to the "miraculous lustre" of 
Roderick's eyes (W, 2:402 ). Roderick is an artist who pulls away from the 
world of sensation-he suffers, as in the instance of natural light, from "a 
morbid acuteness of the senses" (W, 2:403 )-and through his art tries to 
retreat into the realm of the imagination. Augustus too possesses an 
"imagination ... singularly vigorous and creative" (W, 3:942). The fever-
ish light in their luminous eyes comes from within, as if Platonically 
defined, and it represents the interior light of the imagination shining 
outwardly through their eyes upon the world. 
That this luminosity represents the Platonic interior light of the 
imagination is suggested as well in "Ligeia." Throughout the story, Ligeia is 
associated with art, mysticism, and imagination. Like Roderick, she has an 
inordinate swelling at the temples, which in phrenological studies (a 
pseudoscience in which Poe believed for a while) is said to suggest ideality, 
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a frame of mind that strives toward Platonic essence beyond the material 
realm. Like Roderick and Augustus, her eyes are "large and luminous 
orbs," eyes of "radiant lustre" seemingly lit from within (W, 2:314, 316). 
Her very presence, the narrator reports (as he struggles to regain an 
imaginary vision of her), "rendered vividly luminous the many mysteries of 
the transcendentalism in which we were immersed" (W, 2:316). 
Poe, as we shall see, was fundamentally Newtonian in his optical 
theory, and so this recourse to the classical Platonic optical concept that 
the eye emits light from within might seem odd, even if Poe used much 
from Plato and even if his symbolism is well served by these appropriations. 
But surprisingly he may have found some support for the Platonic concept 
among the Newtonian optical theoreticians, who make a sharp distinction 
between a luminous object (one that emits rays) and an illuminated object 
(one that reflects rays). Poe knew, for instance, David Brewster's Letters on 
Natural Magic (1832), which appeared six years before the publication of 
"Ligeia," seven years before the publication of "The Fall of the House of 
Usher," and twelve years before "A Tale of the Ragged Mountains." In this 
work, Brewster, who is the last great champion of Newtonian optics, 
writes, "When the retina is compressed in total darkness, it gives out light" 
because there exists a "phosphorescence of the retina." 11 
This might seem strange coming from a Newtonian, but there it is 
stated; and it might have given Poe scientific authority to use Platonic 
optical theory for symbolic purposes. Brewster resorts to this idea when he 
tries to explain why a blow to the eye or head produces a bright flash of 
light; Brewster concluded that the light is generated by the phosphores-
cence of the retina. Brewster did not know, as we do today, that the flash of 
light perceived from a blow to the head is the result of the stimulation of 
the optic nerve, which sends the only message it can to the brain which in 
turn translates all optic nerve messages as lig__ht. As Brewster's observation 
stands, however, it could have given particu1ar authority to Poe's artistic 
predisposition to depict the eye as innately luminous, as if in accord with 
Platonic optical theory, to symbolize the imaginative orientation of the 
artist's vision toward ideality, essential Unity. 
Newtonian Optics 
Both Platonic and Aristotelian concepts assumed that light was only a 
means of sight and so was nothing itself, and this belief is precisely what 
Newton's rainbow disproved in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. 
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In Opticks, which Poe knew at least secondhand through the writings of 
subsequent Newtonian optical theoretians such as Robert Smith and 
David Brewster (both of whom he specifically cites), Newton demon~ 
strated how a prism reveals the several components of the particles of light, 
bands of colors (particles of light differing in mass) that cannot be further 
reduced. Smith took Newton's idea, advanced in Principia, of attraction as 
a primary quality of all physical bodies-this is the Newtonian notion 
underlying Poe's belief in the imagination's intuitive sense of the return of 
matter to essential Unity-and Smith applied this concept to the cor~ 
puscular nature of light, the rays of which were thought to be attracted by 
material bodies.lZ 
Apparently Newton was aware that the corpuscular theory did not 
explain every behavior of light, and there are moments in Opticks, es~ 
pecially in reference to the transmission of the stimulus of light to the 
brain, when he intimates that some properties oflight might be undulatory 
rather than corpuscular. During the eighteenth century, however, New~ 
ton's corpuscular theory held sway among his followers (such as Smith) as 
if there were no questions about light left unanswered by Newton's concept 
of particles. In the first decade of the nineteenth century Thomas Young 
published an essay challenging the corpuscular theory and advancing a 
wave theory of light. Poe, who is fundamentally Newtonian in his optics 
theory, did in fact know something about this emergent undulatory theory. 
His knowledge of it may have come from a first~hand reading of Young's 
essay, for Poe did read issues of Philosophical Transactions, which published 
Young's article; but Poe more certainly encountered the concept in Brew~ 
ster's writings, possibly in Brewster's otherwise fully Newtonian Treatise on 
Optics (1831), for example. 13 
In "Mesmeric Revelation" Poe gives a Newtonic account of how the 
eye sees: "A luminous body imparts vibration to the luminiferous ether. 
The vibrations generate similar ones within the retina; these again com~ 
municate similar ones to the optic nerve. The nerve conveys similar ones 
to the brain; the brain, also, similar ones to the unparticled matter which 
permeates it. The motion of this latter is thought, of which perception is 
the first undulation" (W, 3:1038). This reference to undulation aside, 
however, Poe here is esentially Newtonian. In this instance the eye seems 
passive, a view typical of the eighteenth~century Newtonists, who tended 
to stress the objective reality of an object. Although this sense of the 
fundamental passivity of the eye would be revised in the early nineteenth 
century by Brewster, the last Newtonian, it tended to be reinforced by 
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nineteenth,century medical texts of the sort Poe read. In a review (South, 
em Literary Messenger 2 [November 1836], 784,86) of several volumes of 
The British and Foreign Medical Review Poe includes extensive praise of 
Andrew Combe's The Principles of Physiology (1834 ). In such works as this, 
he read about the passivity of the eye. In Andrew Combe's Observations on 
Mental Derangement (1831) we are typically told that the eye is "a passive 
instrument," with no "vital properties," and it only obeys "the ordinary 
laws of matter." 14 In this book, as in George Combe's A System of 
Phrenology (1825) and Lectures on Phrenology (1838), both of which Poe 
knew very well, the enlargement of size of this passive treatment increases 
its function. 15 Recall that Augustus Bedloe, Roderick Usher, and Ligeia 
each is characterized by especially large eyes. 
But, as we have seen, the eyes of these three characters are far more 
active than the passive instrument described in many eighteenth,century 
treatises on optics and early nineteenth,century medical books. Besides 
Brewster's notion of the phosphorescence of the retina, was there any other 
authority for Poe's attention to the eye as an active agent in vision? Besides 
the possible authority provided by Brewster's idea, Poe's description of the 
eyes of Augustus, Roderick, and Ligeia as Platonic emitting luminosities 
could have also been authorized by medical and optical studies that inti, 
mated the subtle capacity of the eye to be a shaper, even a creator of percep, 
tion well beyond the usual sense of that organ as a passive instrument. 
A clue surfaces in George Combe's A System of Phrenology, which 
argues that "the eye only receives, modifies, and transmits the impressions 
of light," but also in another place states: "So little power has experience to 
alter the nature of our perceptions, that even in some cases where we 
discover, by other senses, that the visible appearance of objects is illusive, 
we still continue to see that appearance the same as before." 16 Combe does 
not speculate whether this problem of illusion, emphasizing the passivity 
of the organ of the eye, is the result of the objective limits of the eye or the 
subjective power of the mind. Whatever the implications of Combe's 
observation, Poe understood well the nature of illusions of sight. In "The 
Spectacles" (1844 ), "The Sphinx" (1846), and Eureka, for example, Poe 
specifically noted that a gap can exist between material reality and human 
perception. 17 
Optics and Perception 
In Poe's prose this lacuna between phenomena and the perception of the 
human eye has five sources: technical problems with the eye, contextual 
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influences on vision, innate capacities for indirect sight, conceptual deter~ 
minations of vision, and powerful mental images informing perception. 
These features range from difficulties of an objective nature to difficulties 
of a subjective nature, and in reviewing them we shall see finally where Poe 
found scientific, late~Newtonic authority for his symbolic use of Platonic 
optics. 
The first of these explanations, technical problems with the organ of 
sight such as myopia, receive ample coverage from nineteenth~century 
optical and medical studies. Poe, in fact, had fun with such technical 
problems in "The Spectacles." In this narrative, Simpson, who is badly 
nearsighted and who refuses to wear eyeglasses, falls in love with and 
almost marries his great~great grandmother. In an unfolding of plot that 
seems in part a parody of Poe's earlier detective fiction, Simpson's misper~ 
ceptions are eventually revealed at the end of Poe's satire on "love at first 
sight," apparently (Poe suggests) an always myopic perception. 
More fascinating is a second feature of human sight: contextual influ~ 
ences on vision. Context introduces complexity to perception, and what 
one sees depends not only on what occurs but also on the situation, or the 
ensemble of events, or the relation of the seer to the thing seen. Poe, for 
instance, knows that a mirage is, as Brewster explains in Letters, an unusual 
refraction of light through strata of air of different densities. A mirage is a 
matter of context, the physical relation of light to atmosphere and the 
spatial relation of viewer to image. 
Contextual problems pertaining to spatial relationships especially fas~ 
cinated Poe. He hints at them when in Eureka he refers to "the wiseacre 
who fancies he must necessarily see an object the more distinctly, the more 
closely he holds it to his eyes" (CW, 16:190). Indeed, Poe's "The Sphinx" 
concerns just this problem, a story in which the narrator mistakes a 
butterfly for a "monster of hideous conformation" (W, 3:124 7). The combi~ 
nation of evening light and the narrator's proximity to the insect-it is 
one~sixteenth of an inch long and one~sixteenth of an inch from his face-
creates a contextual distortion, as Poe's narrative raises the question of 
whether we can always trust "the evidence of [our] own eyes" (W, 3:1247). 
Still more interesting to Poe is a third feature of sight: the eye's capacity 
for indirect perception. Brewster and Herschel refer to it as oblique vision, 
which they say is inferior to direct vision in both the distinctness of image 
and the preservation of a sustained view of an object; yet, Brewster 
explains, "it might give us a more perfect view of minute objects, such as 
small stars not seen by direct vision," a conclusion argued as well in 
modem~day textbooks on human perception. 18 Poe applies this concept in 
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"Murders in the Rue Morgue," in which Dupin points out that one can 
"impair ... vision by holding the object too close. He might see, perhaps, 
one or two points with unusual clearness, but in so doing he, necessarily, 
lost sight of the matter as a whole." Dupin continues: 
The modes and sources of this kind of error are well typified in the con-
templation of the heavenly bodies. To look at a star by glances-to view it in a 
side-long way, by turning toward it the exterior portions of the retina (more 
susceptible of feeble impressions of light than the interior), is to behold the 
star distinctly-a lustre which grows dim just in proportion as we tum our 
visionfuUy upon it. A greater number of rays actually fall upon the eye in the 
latter case, but, in the former, there is the more refined capacity for com-
prehension. By undue profundity we perplex and enfeeble thought; and it is 
possible to make even Venus herself vanish from the firmament by a scrutiny 
too sustained, too concentrated, or too direct. rw, 2:545-46] 
To an extent, furthermore, Poe maintained that beauty, truly supernal 
beauty, could not be apprehended by direct vision, but only obliquely, and 
this idea doubtless found reinforcement in the Newtonian recognition of 
indirect vision. 
All three of the preceding characteristics of vision are for the New-
tonian objectively definable. They have to do with the objective phys-
iological makeup of the complex organ of sight, with its abilities and 
limitations, as well as with the context of the object perceived. In the 
nineteenth century the physical malfunction of the apparatus of the eye 
was not very mysterious and could sometimes be corrected by the use of 
glasses. The contextual influences on the eye seemed somewhat more 
mysterious, but in learning about them Poe's contemporaries could accom-
modate the limitations these influences suggest. The capacity for oblique 
vision-the function of the rod cells of the retina-was even more 
mysterious in Poe's day, and it was accepted as a surprising, unusual, posi-
tive attribute of the eye. 
This increasing sense of mysteriousness compounds in the last two 
traits of human perception: conceptual determinations of vision and 
powerful mental images informing sight; and these two concems are 
subjective in nature rather than objective, as in the instance of the first 
three features. These remaining two problems really stress the gap between 
perceiver and perceived, and Poe was especially fascinated by them. It is in 
light of these two problems particularly that we can appreciate Brewster's 
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and Poe's early nineteenth-century sense of the abiding enigma of human 
perception: a sense of mystery that characterizes the eighteenth-century 
poetic reponse to Newtonic optics, appears in early nineteenth-century 
treatises like Brewster's, and still at times is explicitly expressed in today's 
studies of human sight.19 
Conceptual determinations of perception interested nineteenth-
century scientists, doctors, and artists. As we noted in passing earlier, in A 
System of Phrenology George Combe mentions the "illusions of optics" in 
terms that leaves uncertain whether they are the result of objective limita-
tions of the eye or of the subjective powers of the mind. Specifically he 
remarks on those illusions associated with perspective in pictures: "The 
picture appears to us to represent objects at different distances, and the 
most determined resolution to see them all equally near is of no avail, 
although we know that, in point of fact, they are so." 20 That pictures, or 
art, can delude viewer perspective by illusions that are paradoxically 
complex is a theme of Poe's landscape tales: "The Landscape Garden" 
(1842), "The Domain of Amheim" (1846) and "Landor's Cottage" 
(1849). 21 Moreover, in these works, as elsewhere, Poe allows for the 
possibility that conceptual influences can be active determinators of per-
ception. 
Perhaps Poe's most outspoken remarks on this point about how con-
cepts shape vision occur in "Marginalia." In item 38 of "Marginalia" Poe 
attacks Oionysius Lardner, who tried to explain "the apparent difference in 
size between the setting and the noon-day sun." He believed that in 
looking at the setting sun we mentally, "by a process of the mind so subtle 
and instinctive" that we are "unconscious of it," compare the sun with the 
objects seen between it and ourselves; since we know that the intervening 
objects are smaller than the sun, we adjust our actual vision in terms of our 
conceptual knowledge of the larger size of the sun, a comparison we do not 
make when the sun rises to the meridian and consequently looks smaller 
than the setting sun. Poe objects, noting that even on a smooth sea, where 
there are no intervening objects, the setting sun on the horizon seems 
larger than usual. Poe then goes on through some difficult reasoning to 
argue that objects do not have to be actually present, for the viewer posits 
them there "mentally" and, rather than their size, abstractly senses their 
distances; he concludes that when distance increases or diminishes, "the 
mind instantaneously" increases or diminishes the size of a perceived 
object (CW, 143-46). 
Lest we hastily conclude that both Lardner and Poe were mistaken that 
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the setting sun appears larger at sunset than at meridian because of the 
greater amount of atmosphere and atmospheric particles at that angle to 
the viewer, we might consider that a modem-day textbook on this experi-
ence of human perception suggests that the apparent difference in size "is 
not produced by factors such as the scattering of light by atmospheric 
conditions or disparities in the relative luminance ... in different sky 
locations," for photographs do not show any size difference; and today, this 
text continues, arguments about the illusion are still made on the basis of 
real or apparent size, distance, and angle of regard-the last having to do 
with the belief that what is seen may differ depending on whether the 
viewer's eyes are looking straight ahead at the horizon or raised toward the 
zenith. 22 This text concludes "that there may be no single answer to the 
ancient puzzle of [this] illusion." Finally, of course, the rightness or 
wrongness of Poe's notion is less important than the fact that he was fully 
aware of how, mysteriously, interior conceptions in the mind can influence 
and even determine what is seen, thereby reflecting an enormous gap 
between the subject's mind and the object's corporeal reality. 
This division between mind and world is even more radically enig-
matic in the fifth feature of vision recognized by Poe and some nineteenth-
century scientists: the effect on perception of powerful mental images. In 
A System of Phrenology George Combe, without focusing on the mind as an 
active agent in actual vision, speaks of the imagination as "the impassioned 
representation of. . . things-not merely in the forms and arrangements of 
nature, but in new combinations formed in the mind itself." 23 Representa-
tion: this process involves the depiction of imagery, but just how are these 
images depicted so that they enter the mind? Andrew Combe, in The 
Principles of Physiology (a Poe favorite), remarks that "the mind cannot see 
without the intervention of the eye"; "the eye is the mind." 24 Neither of 
the Combe brothers quite closes with the relation of the imagination and 
the mind, nor does either of them quite suggest that subjective mental 
images can determine sight. But Poe could have found support in David 
Brewster's Letters on Natural Magic (another Poe favorite), which argues 
explicitly that spectral apparitions, recollected images, or imagined forms 
are pictures in the mind's eye that can be more vivid than those of the 
body's eye. Brewster asserts that the mind's eye is the body's eye, that 
imagination and memory generate actual impressions upon the retina, 
from whence they travel through the optic nerve to the brain. These 
impressions are actual, and they can be more vivid than what the retina 
perceives of the world through the eyeball. 25 Brewster's concept might 
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inform Poe's presentation of obsessed characters, who perhaps do not 
merely hallucinate but possibly actually see what their heated imagination 
projects upon their retinas. 
Moreover, Brewster could have provided Poe with late,Newtonic sci, 
entific authority for resorting to Platonic optics in order to symbolize how 
the fiery imagination seems to cause the emanation of an inward light from 
the eyes of an artist (like Roderick) or of a personification of the artist's 
ideal of beauty (like Ligeia). Even in "The Spectacles," which principally 
concerns a technical deficiency of Simpson's eyes, there is a clue that his 
imagination informed the impressions he had of the woman with whom he 
fell in "love at first sight," a woman not fully seen by his myopic eyes but a 
woman envisioned "rather of the imagination"-"the beau ideal of [his] 
wildest and most enthusiastic visions," who (in a self, parodic move by Poe) 
seems to possess Ligeia,like "large, luminous eyes" 26; thus seen in his 
imagination, this lady is nonetheless apparently retinally perceived by 
Simpson. 
Not only did Brewster assert that the retina of the eye was phosphores, 
cent, thereby unwittingly preserving something of Platonic optics, but, 
more important, he also asserted the physiological realness of sense im, 
pressions on the retina that derive solely from imagination and memory. In 
a way Brewster was reaffirming the belief attributed to Plato in "Bon, Bon," 
that the mind is light (CW, 16:108). The imagination has the power to 
emit light, like stimuli, and these subjectively generated stimuli record on 
the retina and then travel to the brain. 
Of course Poe knew that Platonic optics, with its concept of an inward 
light emitting from the eye outwardly upon the world, was mistaken. But 
in treatises like Brewster's he could have found scientific authority to resort 
to Platonic optics, not as literal fact, but as symbolic of the person with a 
very active imagination, an imagination that generates images that are 
literally perceived by the retina. In this sense the imagination generates 
something like an interior luminosity behind the eyeball, and so Poe 
depicts the highly imaginative person as someone who evinces this interior 
light in large luminous eyes, eyes that therefore seem to emanate light from 
within. 
This meeting of scientific belief and aesthetic symbol in Poe's work has 
as one of its foundations Poe's firm belief that the true scientist is akin to the 
artist. As we noted as the start of this essay, Poe emphasized at least four 
times Kepler's use of the inner light of imagination or intuition (Poe's 
words) in combination with sense impressions of the corporeal eye in order 
90 American Literature and Science 
to arrive at an understanding of the laws of nature. In Poe's opinion, Kepler 
was not merely responding to sense impressions from the physical world; 
he was, like an artist, also responding to impressions derived from within 
his imagination. Kepler was interested not only in physics but also in 
"physico-metaphysics" (CW, 16:223). As Kepler's example suggested to 
Poe, "true Science ... makes its most important advances ... by seem-
ingly intuitive leaps" (W, 16:189). Only a complete perception by means of 
both the light of imagination and the light of nature can bridge the gap 
between viewer (subject) and viewed (object), the gap otherwise manifest 
in the behavior of the human eye. And, as we see in Eureka, this complete 
perception from within as well as from without, so apparent in a true 
scientist like Kepler or a visionary artist like Usher, suggests in microcosm 
something macrocosmic: Poe's belief finally in an essential Unity (an 
intrinsically luminous cosmic imagination, as it were) behind the phe-
nomenological fragmentation that is the natural universe.Z7 
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like to express a special note of thanks to Joseph Moldenhauer and Catherine Rainwater for 
sharing thoughts and books. 
6 
Fields of Investigation: 
Emerson and Natural History 
DAVID M. ROBINSON 
For poetry is science, and the poet a truer logician. 
-"Poetry and Imagination," The Complete Works 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, VIII, 39 
In an 1830 sermon at Boston's Second Church, Emerson singled out "the 
love of the natural sciences . . . beginning to spread among us the study of 
plants, of minerals, the history of beasts, birds, and insects" as a par-
ticularly hopeful sign of a shift in American society. Emerson praised this 
growing emphasis on natural science because he felt it was part of a general 
reorientation of American religious life that would result in a new focus on 
the cultivation of the self. The rise of interest in natural history "may have 
the effect to supplant in some degree the absorbing passion for wealth by 
supplying new measures of happiness & simpler and more spiritual pleas-
ures" (CS, 2:230). Emerson lived long enough into the Gilded Age to 
recognize that with regard to a fading love of wealth in America, he was no 
social prophet. But his conviction of the centrality of scientific thinking to 
any reconception of the religious and moral life was prophetic. Emerson 
came to intellectual maturity during the period when intellectual culture 
would begin to be tom away from religious culture. The development of 
the natural sciences, which he unreservedly commended as one of the 
means of spiritual improvement, would in large part dictate that split. Yet 
the Victorian crisis of faith, at least insofar as it concerned the perceived 
threat of scientific naturalism to religious belief, left Emerson untouched. 
He found in the rise of science no threat to the religious sensibility, but a 
new source of its nurture. Emerson remains valuable to us in part because 
of his exemplary faith in the congruence of scientific and religious knowl-
edge. Because of the state of science in his age, and because of his own 
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craving to understand nature in every possible sense, his scientific and 
philosophical quests work in a broad harmony. This chapter will therefore 
sketch the outlines of Emerson's principal statements on science and 
nature, and the key comments of later critics on them. As I hope the 
chapter will suggest, the subject is a rich one, and the possibilities for 
extended research are great. 
Scientific change was accelerating in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, fueled by the continuing work of botanical and zoological classi-
fication that had characterized the major advances of the century before. 
This process of classification continually raised questions about nature's 
order, development, and origin, which were, of course, crucial theological 
questions as well. While most scientists and theologians hoped and trusted 
that there was no conflict in the two enterprises, existing theories and 
boundaries of belief were constantly being pressed by the generation of 
new information. Moreover, the science of geology was adding new infor-
mation on the age and history of the earth, thereby demanding a new 
theological accounting. To many like Emerson, there was an unmistakable 
excitement in the air, as the secrets of nature seemed to be opening. To 
those who shared his orientation, scientific work was no threat but was in 
fact helping to advance metaphysical and speculative thinking. Emerson 
recorded his interest in science with his first public discourses, the sermons 
preached during his career in the Unitarian ministry from 1826 through 
1832. As a supply preacher, and then minister of the Second Church in 
Boston, he turned on a number of occasions to the study of nature as a 
support for his stance of moral aspiration. "Religion will become purer and 
truer by the progress of science" (YES, 171), he preached, and his develop-
ing theology of the culture of the soul was closely tied to his attention to 
the development of a theory of nature. In language reflective of his 
developing poetic gift, Emerson explained the religious value of the love of 
nature: "Yet the song of the morning stars was really the first hymn of praise 
and will be the last; the face of nature, the breath of the hills, the lights of 
the skies, are to a simple heart the real occasions of devout feeling more 
than vestries and sermon hearings" (YES, 171). 
The initial scientific assumptions underlying Emerson's praise of na-
ture were those of natural theology, which saw the natural world as a 
centerpiece of the revelation of religious truth to humanity. From this 
perspective, the knowledge of God was attainable through the careful 
observation and analysis of nature. In his groundbreaking study of 1931, 
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still the preeminent treatment of Emerson and science, Harry Hayden 
Clark showed how this tradition of natural theology, represented by Joseph 
Butler's The Analogy of Religion (1736) and William Paley's Natural Religion 
(1802), had a formative effect on Emerson's project of establishing the 
natural world as a spiritual and ethical analogy: to the human soul. 1 
Emerson's engagement with science centered upon his development of the 
implications of this analogy between nature and the soul. His absorption in 
science was not principally motivated by its methodologies; he formulated 
scientific questions in theological and philosophical terms, as part of a 
larger metaphysical and ethical speculation. 
Carl F. Strauch has noted that Goethe was Emerson's primary scien, 
tific model, suggesting to him the goal of a "poet,scientist who traverses 
the kingdoms of nature, science, and art." Emerson regarded Goethe, in 
the words of Gustaaf Van Cromphout, as "the major force behind the re, 
volt against the eighteenth,century mechanistic worldview." 2 The impor, 
tance of Goethe as a model for Emerson is an important reminder that his 
scientific interests and approach were speculative and holistic rather than 
empirical. As Clark explained, Emerson's approach to natural history was 
"essentially a priori, ethical, and deductive, like that of Plato, Schelling, 
Goethe, Kant, and Coleridge." 3 His frequent return to scientific sources, 
which he studied at some depth in the early 1830s, was always motivated by 
the cosmic concerns of his initial acquaintance with natural theology. 
Emerson had been steeped in natural theology in his Harvard training, 
and it was reinforced by the generation of Unitarian ministers who pre, 
ceded him and who extended a long line of Christian speculation by 
arguing that the works of the natural world, including humanity itself, 
were evidences of the existence of a benevolent God. Emerson not only 
breathed this air as a Harvard student and Unitarian minister but also 
found a chord within himself that responded deeply to nature. For him, the 
experience of nature and of religion could be almost interchangeable. In 
one sermon, he speculated that the union of the soul with God might result 
in an omniscience about nature itself: "It has been maintained by some 
Christians, that, as the soul became united to God, it would learn all the 
sciences, not by the tedious analysis now in use but by consciousness, 
because God is the source of all; all exist in him, and as the mind became 
participant of his nature, it would read them by its knowledge of him. 
These speculations are too sublime for the reach of our knowledge. But 
though they ought to be carefully limited, they have a foundation in truth" 
(CS, 2:36). The young poet, enamored of the pleasures of such imag, 
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inative flights, here struggles with the more soberly responsible minister. 
The young poet, though, is clearly ascendant. The passage tells us much 
about Emerson's penchant for speculation, his high valuation of scientific 
knowledge, and his impatience with the "tedious analysis" involved in the 
work of close observation, classification, and ordering. The passage also 
suggests one important form of his developing discourse on nature. If we 
can finally understand nature by understanding God, can we not under-
stand God by understanding nature? 
In 1829, Emerson preached that "objects of sense" are best seen as 
"occasions and materials of thought," as the expansion of our knowledge 
leads us to look beyond the object to the truth it represents. "Every object, 
besides that it is large, or soft, or of one or another color or taste, we find is 
a symbol of something else" (CS, 1:244-45). When the mind focused on 
the entire system of physical relations that we call nature, the result was 
the perception of nature itself as a vast symbol of divinity. This suggested 
to him that the whole existence of nature might be explained in terms of its 
role in the religious cultivation of the self. In an 1832 sermon that antici-
pates his first book Nature (1836), Emerson preached that "the whole 
course of Providence" was to "assist in the work of self-cultivation," that 
the whole world was adapted "to the formation & education of the human 
soul." 4 Thus nature's religious value was manifold. Rationally considered, 
it suggested the presence of the creator. Experienced in its beauty and 
harmony, it provided a spiritual uplift closely akin to, and causative of, 
religious ecstasy. And considered as the symbol of an underlying ideal, it 
stood as an educator in the moral culture of the soul. 
Emerson resigned his pulpit in 1832 and traveled to Europe. It was a literary 
and religious pilgrimage, but a scientific pilgrimage as well. The trip was 
marked by an important visit to the Jardin des Plantes and the Cabinet 
of Natural History in Paris, where Emerson encountered the botanical 
garden arranged by Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu. The visit had a powerful 
impact on Emerson. 5 Jussieu's work proposed to demonstrate a natural 
order of plant species in a continuous, harmonious chain. Emerson re-
sponded to the visit strongly in his journal: "I feel the centipede in me-
cayman, carp, eagle, & fox. I am moved by strange sympathies, I say 
continually 'I will be a naturalist'" UMN, 4:200). Emerson's resolution was 
serious, as his immediate future showed. He returned to America and made 
brief forays into botanical classification, pursuing the scientific activity 
that had impressed him the most. As Elizabeth A. Dant has recently 
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explained, the cabinet of natural history seemed to promise Emerson an 
"ordering principle" for his thought, and his desire to create a "world-
encompassing encyclopedic genre" was shared in the entire culture as the 
nineteenth century attempted to assimilate the explosion of facts gener-
ated by modem scientific investigation. Jonathan Bishop has pointed out 
that Emerson was attracted to scientific classification because its intellec-
tual process suggested a translation of "facts into the language of law," an 
essential example of how the particular, rightly seen, could become the 
universal. 6 
The series of four lectures on science that Emerson undertook in 
1833-34 (see EL, 1:1-83) are crucial texts in his long speculation on natural 
history. His fresh enthusiasm for science permeates the tone of "The Uses 
of Natural History," in which he pursued at length the advantages of 
scientific study and made public the declaration of his journal, "I will be a 
naturalist" (EL, 1:10). "The Relation of Man to the Globe" and "Water" 
are further immersions in the details of scientific study. "The Naturalist," 
however, marks a tum in Emerson's thinking, typified by his realization 
that he, like many others interested in science, can hope to attain only 
"quite superficial knowledge" (EL, 1: 70). Emerson was admitting, of 
course, what has been an increasingly worrisome problem in the modem 
world, the recession of scientific expertise from the public mind in an 
increasing necessity of specialization. He had discerned by then that it 
might be a "waste of time to study a new and tedious classification" (EL, 
1:70), and had begun to make peace with the fact that his own skills and 
inclinations were not those of an investigative, experimental, and em-
pirical scientist. 7 But the controlling purpose of his intellectual commit-
ment to science emerged in that lecture more clearly than anywhere in his 
career. His intellectual agenda was increasingly centered on the con-
ception of the unfolding of the innate power of the human soul, a power 
that was at once divine and natural. He found in his study of nature, with 
its continual recurrence to theories of development, a powerful confirming 
analogy to his conception of human nature. In particular, the preevolu-
tionary theories of natural development, as suggested by Goethe and 
Lamarck, which were then laying the groundwork for the Darwinian 
revolution, were of enormous importance to his self-culture project. The 
dynamism of nature cohered with his sense of the dynamism of the soul. 
Emerson's early exploration of science eventuated in a very speculative 
book, Nature. 8 Yet that book could not have been what it was without 
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Emerson's immersion in science. The book seems to undermine the 
empiricism of scientific procedure by pointedly questioning "whether 
nature outwardly exists." Does this not deny science its very subject? But 
far from threatening nature as a field of investigation, Emerson argues that 
his idealism vitalizes it: "It is the uniform effect of culture on the human 
mind, not to shake our faith in the stability of particular phenomena, as of 
heat, water, azote; but to lead us to regard nature as a phenomenon, not a 
substance; to attribute necessary existence to spirit; to esteem nature as an 
accident and an effect" (CW, 1:30). The whole book pivots on the 
distinction Emerson makes between nature as phenomenon and nature as 
substance. Seen as substance, nature was inflexible and dead. Seen as 
phenomenon, it was mutable and alive. To think of nature in terms of 
phenomena emphasized its quality of constant change, making it a model 
of growth and development. That mutability was for Emerson an essential 
part of its moral purpose. 
The idealism that Emerson propounded in Nature thus synthesized his 
stance of moral aspiration with his predilection for the study of natural 
history. Nature thus suggests the principal mode of analysis that he would 
bring to natural history and the principal avenue through which science 
would continue to affect him. He saw the laws of science-natural laws-
as analogies to the law of intellect, or of the spirit. As Sherman Paul noted, 
science "supplied him the terrestrial map for his spiritual explorations," 
helping him to generate "the material of new symbols and therefore the 
vehicles of perception" that would aid him in his philosophical specula, 
tion. 9 What Emerson called "the great analogical value of most of our 
natural science" UMN, 5:384 ), explained his principal reason for pursuing 
it. In Nature, Emerson expounded "this radical correspondence between 
visible things and human thoughts" (CW, 1:19), finding in it the Platonic 
and neo,Platonic basis of his ethical and literary assumptions: "There 
seems to be a necessity in spirit to manifest itself in material forms; and day 
and night, river and storm, beast and bird, acid and alkali, preexist in 
necessary Ideas in the mind of God, and are what they are by virtue of 
preceding affections, in the world of spirit. A Fact is the end or last issue 
of spirit. The visible creation is the terminus or the circumference of the 
invisible world" (CW, 1:22). While this doctrine relegates physical nature 
to a secondary status, Emerson felt that the highest lesson of science was 
always the precedence of theory, or the ideal, over observation, or the 
empirical. "Thus even in physics, the material is ever degraded before the 
spiritual. The astronomer, the geometer, rely on their irrefragable analy, 
100 American literature and Science 
sis, and disdain the results of observation" ( CW, 1:34 ). The essential fact, 
however, was that idealism connected nature to spirit inextricably. It thus 
provided an imperative for observing nature minutely. 
That Emerson meant the analogy of nature quite literally at this 
moment in his career has been recently confirmed in an important in~ 
terpretation of Nature by Barbara Packer. 10 Emerson's reading in science, 
Packer explained, was linked to his theological speculation in quite precise 
ways. Packer finds Emerson's odd but arresting description of the fall of 
man crucial to an understanding of his appropriation of scientific specula~ 
tion for broader issues. "The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis of 
things" (CW, 1:43), he wrote. Working from Newton's theory of the 
polarity of particles, descriptions of Newton's theories oflight and color as 
explained and amplified by David Brewster, and theories of the symbolic 
properties of light from Guillaume Oegger, Emerson came to an account of 
spiritual "vision" derived very closely from his understanding of physical 
"vision." As Packer put it, "Emerson conceived the startling idea of 
treating the 'inner light' of the radical Protestant tradition as though it 
behaved according to Newton's laws" (78). Emerson's working principle 
that "every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact" (CW, 1:18) was 
not hyperbole. 
A later lecture, "Humanity of Science," part of Emerson's "Philosophy 
of History" lecture series of 1836~ 3 7, introduced no new innovations into 
Emerson's scientific thinking, but the lecture does help us to see more 
clearly the way science fit into his developing intellectual project. The 
lecture series intended to demonstrate by history the common nature of 
humanity and was an important precursor to "The American Scholar" and 
Essays: First Series. "We are compelled in the first essays of thought to 
separate the idea of Man from any particular men. We arrive early at the 
great discovery that there is one Mind common to all individual men" (EL, 
2:11). To this end, the history of science was powerful evidence. Through 
its stress on the classification of various phenomena into more general 
categories, science demonstrated the fundamental unity of things, and the 
mind's constant tendency to search for that unity. Unity was exemplified 
in the discovery of scientific laws that showed through the predictability 
of events that there were properties common to different things. "This 
reduction to a few laws, to one law," he wrote, "is not a choice of the 
individual. It is the tyrannical instinct of the mind" (EL, 2:23 ). He argued 
that "the great moments of scientific history, have been the perception of 
these relations," citing Newton's analysis of gravity and Goethe's theory of 
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the universality of the leaf as instances (EL, 2:23 ). But such classifying was 
not the exclusive property of science, as the history of religion showed. 
"Calvinism, Romanism, and the Church of Swedenborg, are three striking 
examples of coherent systems which each organize the best,known facts of 
the world's history, and the qualities of character into an order that reacts 
directly on the will of the individual" (EL, 2:25). To understand science 
was to understand the act of classification or, in its broadest terms, the 
search of the intellect for unity. To understand classification was to 
understand religion, philosophy, and other fundamental attempts of the 
mind to order the world. 
The particular appeal of science, however, was the ready confirmabil, 
ity of its discoveries, which validated the mind's generalizing tendencies. 
Science was not the projection of an order onto things, as Emerson saw it, 
but the discovery of an existing order. Science was possible because "there 
is in nature a parallel unity, which corresponds to this unity in the mind, 
and makes it available" (EL, 2:25). Emerson's analysis of scientific classi, 
fication thus reconfirmed his doctrine of the correspondence of nature and 
the mind. The unity,seeking intellect and the unity,in,diversity of nature 
cohered, confirming the monistic unity at the basis of Emerson's vision. 
All his scientific investigation can be said to be crystallized in this defini, 
tion: "Science is the arrangement of the phenomena of the world after 
their essential relations. It is the reconstruction of nature in the mind" 
(EL, 2:27). 
Emerson emphasized these essentially religious and metaphysical 
conclusions in his lecture, finding essential unity in the cycle of life and 
death that nature reveals: "The permanence and at the same time endless 
variety of spiritual nature finds its fit symbol in the durable world, which 
never preserves the same face for two moments. All things change; moon 
and star stand still never a moment. Heaven, earth, sea, air, and man 
are in a perpetual flux, yet all motion is circular, so that, whist all parts 
move the All is still" (EL, 2:32). Emerson's language strains to encom, 
pass the paradox of movement within stillness, but his emphasis is 
clearly on the pervasiveness of change. He thus describes nature as one 
substance in a continual state of metamorphosis. That substance is 
related on the one hand to the human intellect, to which it corre, 
sponds, and on the other to an originating spirit. ''Nature proceeds from 
a mind analogous to our own" (EL, 2:33), Emerson concludes. "Hu, 
manity of Science" thus summarized positions that Emerson had worked 
toward in the early 1830s and set forth the agenda for later work, in 
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which he searched the literature of science for analogies to a theory of 
the spirit. 
By the early 1840s Emerson's initial enthusiasm for science was over, 
shadowed by two other aspects of his intellectual life. He felt a gradual, 
worrying diminishment of the religious or ecstatic experience that had 
been a significant part of his vision. That such experiences had often been 
connected with the natural world helped to render scientific thought 
secondary. He also felt a rising pressure for political commitment, as the 
antislavery cause and other reform movements increasingly controlled the 
discourse of New England's intellectuals. Emerson did not lose his sense of 
the metaphysical possibilities of science, but it would be his friend Henry 
David Thoreau who continued most profoundly Emerson's impulse to 
investigate nature.n 
Essays: First Series (1841) gives some indication of the ways in which 
science was being absorbed into broader philosophical questions for Emer, 
son. In "Compensation," for example, Emerson used the analogy of the 
natural law of compensating physical reactions to indicate a parallel moral 
law. The polar quality of nature was universal, manifesting itself in both 
the physical and intellectual realms. The range of physical phenomema 
that exhibit this dualism is wide: "in the inspiration and expiration of 
plants and animals; in the equation of quantity and quality in the fluids of 
the animal body; in the systole and diastole of the heart; in the undulations 
of fluids, and of sound; in the centrifugal and centripetal gravity; in 
electricity, galvanism, and chemical affinity" (CW, 2:57). These are the 
physical analogues of the moral principle that "every act rewards itself" 
(CW, 2:60), creating an appropriate reaction, positive or negative, on the 
moral nature of the actor. 
A later address of 1841, The Method of Nature, showed the influence of 
a new scientific source, John Pringle Nichol's Views of the Architecture of the 
Heavens (1840).12 Astronomy had always held a special place among the 
sciences for Emerson, and he had acquaintance with the writings of a range 
of astronomers from the beginning of his career. 13 Nichol's work, which 
extended Emerson's acquaintance with current theories of astronomy, led 
him to speculate on the vastness and energy of an endlessly changing 
cosmos. His initial reaction to Nichol's account of the enormity of the 
universe is not" unlike Ishmael's warning of the danger of the mast,head in 
Moby Dick. The "immense parade of arithmetic" of astronomy induces the 
same dizzying wish as "that dreadful GIRO at the top of the interior of the 
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Cupola of St. Peter's," to "throw [oneself] over the balustrade." But 
Emerson eventually comes to find in the unsettling fear of vastness also a 
promise of the energy of the universe: "We can point nowhere to anything 
final, but distinct tendency appears on all hands; the planet, the system, 
the firmament, the nebula, the total appearance is growing like a field 
of maize, or a human embryo, or the grub of a moth; is becoming some~ 
what else; is in the most rapid & active state of metamorphosis" (JMN, 
7:427~28). 
The confirmation that Nichol offered of this principle of metamor~ 
phosis was crucial to Emerson. In Nature, his "Orphic poet" had preached 
a concluding sermon on the "fluid" and "volatile" aspect of nature when 
perceived spiritually (CW, 1:44). "Circles" (1841) had been a prolonged 
meditation on flux or process in nature and thought, and on its connection 
with growth or progress. In "Experience" (1844 ), Emerson would call 
"Succession" one of the "lords of life" (CW, 3:47), a principle of rapid 
change or flux that was in some ways unsettling and in others salvific. But 
whether seen as inspiriting, as it usually was, or unsettling and chaotic, as 
he sometimes feared, this law of metamorphosis dominated Emerson's 
thinking in the 1840s. In fact, a conception of a cosmos of change and 
process was a widely held doctrine of Romanticism, arguably one by which 
Romanticism can be defined. 14 In The Method of Nature Emerson exam~ 
ined the possibility that natural processes, metamorphic in their essence, 
could be consciously seized upon as a guide for intellectual processes. He 
urged his audience to explore "the method of nature . . . and try how far it is 
transferable to the literary life" (CW, 1:123). He found that method to be 
metamorphosis, which he defined essentially as an active and vital ten~ 
dency. He went on to argue that this law or essence of nature had, by way of 
analogy, moral applications, flowing from the conception of nature as an 
open field of energy, organized by a tendency, or direction. IS 
Thus in the trajectory of Emerson's thinking, Nature's quality of 
metamorphosis, reinforced by the scientific indications of the vast ener~ 
gies of the universe, had increasingly become the focus of its analogical 
link to the soul. Certainly this explains his ready, even impatient, accep~ 
tance of developmental and evolutionary scientific theses. Joseph Warren 
Beach has argued that Emerson moved "by insensible degrees" toward the 
theory of natural evolution, proceeding from earlier "scale~of~being" theo~ 
ries of nature to modern "evolutionary" ones. Beach's analysis of Emer~ 
son's acceptance of evolutionary theory is modified in important ways by 
Strauch, who emphasized how closely intertwined scientific "evolution" 
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and neo-Platonic "emanation" were for Emerson.l6 Both Beach and 
Strauch find important clues to Emerson's conception of evolution in his 
reaction to Robert Chambers's controversial pre-Darwinian work of 1844, 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation-"the most elaborate statement 
and most plausible defense of the evolution theory that Emerson had ever 
encountered" (Beach, 339). Chambers's theories, like those of Darwin 
after him, were perceived in many quarters as a threat to the traditional 
idea of the creator God. 17 But as his journals reveal, Emerson was instead 
bothered by what he called Chambers's "polite bows to God," which 
seemed to mar the "courage" of the book. "Everything in this Vestiges of 
Creation is good except the theology, which is civil, timid, & dull" UMN, 
9:211). For Emerson, the concept of the evolutionary development of 
nature was itself a profound theological statement, giving powerful support 
to the conception of the creation as a field of dynamic energy. That energy 
reflected the dynamism of the soul. 
But final and stable conclusions are rare in Emerson's work. He 
himself had enunciated the law of perpetually breaking the bounds of past 
achievement by inscribing another "circle" of expansion. The very doc-
trine of metamorphosis itself, if applied to the process of thought, required 
that one attempt to push beyond it. And, with an extraordinary frankness, 
Emerson was prone to confess his doubts even of his own doctrines. Thus in 
his 1844 essay "Nature," he extended the idea of nature's metamorphosis 
into the realm of doubt. "Nature" must be read not only in the context of 
Emerson's previous speculation on science and nature, but as part of a book 
marked with a worrying but intellectually invigorating skepticism. "Exper-
ience" is the best known of these skeptical departures, but "Nature" also 
shares this doubt, making it a fertile extension of Emerson's work on 
natural history. 
The essay begins with an extended praise of the beauty of the natural 
world. 18 "It seems as if the day was not wholly profane, in which we have 
given heed to some natural object" (CW, 3:100-101). This worshipful 
praise is eventually explicated in terms of correspondence: "Nature is loved 
by what is best in us" (CW, III, 104). Indeed the landscape has an Edenic 
call: "Man is fallen; nature is erect, and serves as a differential ther-
mometer, detecting the presence or absence of the divine sentiment in 
man" ( CW, 3:104 ). Ultimately, Emerson moves from praise of what he calls 
"nature passive" or "natura naturata" to "Efficient Nature" or "natura 
naturans" (CW, 3:103-4), a principle of motion or energy that is the 
causative and creative force in nature. 19 "It publishes itself in creatures, 
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reaching from particles and spicula, through transformation on trans, 
formation to the highest symmetries, arriving at consummate results with, 
out a shock or a leap" ( CW, 3:104 ). Obviously, this creative force is the fuel 
of natural evolution, and Emerson relies on geology's record of natural 
change as evidence of this vast, lengthy, but inevitable process of develop, 
ment. "Geology has initiated us into the secularity of nature," he notes, 
teaching us much vaster measures of time, space, and change. "It is a long 
way from granite to the oyster; farther yet to Plato, and the preaching of 
the immortality of the soul. Yet all must come, as surely as the first atom 
has two sides" (CW, 3:104,5). 
But the assurance here is prelude to an eroding doubt. Emerson has 
portrayed nature as progressive power but now also finds "something 
mocking" in nature, "something that leads us on and on, but arrives 
nowhere, keeps no faith with us" (CW, 3:110). Nature's very energy 
destroys the present by perpetually promising the future. In this sense, the 
metamorphic energy that Emerson has celebrated becomes demoralizing 
and destructive. "Every end is prospective of some other end, which is also 
temporary; a round and final success nowhere" (CW, 3:110). Even Emer, 
son's beloved landscape has become unfulfilling. Surely the following 
confession of disappointment in nature, from one of the preeminent 
American nature writers, is one of the most surprising reversals in the 
history of American literature: "There is in woods and waters a certain 
enticement and flattery, together with a failure to yield a present satisfac, 
tion. This disappointment is felt in every landscape" (CW, 3:111). Nature's 
metamorphic energy leads to a kind of estrangement, in which the indi, 
vidual is distanced from the reality of nature. Emerson explains that "the 
poet finds himself not near enough the object," and nature becomes a 
forever receding goal: "The pine, tree, the river, the bank of flowers before 
him, does not seem to be nature. Nature is still elsewhere" (CW, 3:111). 
The estrangement from nature, the failure to grasp reality, is consonant 
with the report of numbed emptiness that begins "Experience." If Emerson 
had found a sense of power in his conception of evolutionary nature, a 
sense confirmed by the increasing evidence of evolutionary theories, he 
also realized that the energy of metamorphosis had an alienating side as 
well. 
Emerson recognizes that this "uneasiness . . . results from looking too 
much at one condition of nature, namely, Motion" (CW, 3:112,13). In a 
philosophical move characteristic of his later thought, he plays on the 
polarities of reality, urging that the opposite of nature's motion be per, 
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ceived as an answer to the experiential problems generated by meta, 
morphosis. "But the drag is never taken from the wheel. Wherever the 
impulse exceeds, the Rest or Identity insinuates its compensation" (CW, 
3:113). The "checks and impossibilities" are advantageous to us, as is 
nature's energy or motion, if they are used to balance the dizzying motion of 
the perpetual quest. "Let the victory fall where it will," Emerson suggests 
shrewdly, "we are on that side" (CW, 3:113). The question thus becomes 
one of perspective-and the pragmatic problem of making use of what we 
perceive. "Every moment instructs, and every object: for wisdom is infused 
into every form" ( CW, 3:113,14 ). So even in modifying his identification of 
nature's energy as its chief analogical and educative factor, he maintains 
his belief that nature's forms are infused with wisdom. The contribution of 
nature to the soul's culture can thus continue even despite the alienating 
qualities of its energy. 
While Emerson did not lose interest in science in his later work, the shape 
of his response to it had been formed and would not change substantially. 
There are interesting references to Swedenborg's scientific background in 
Representative Men (1850), and two later works, "Poetry and Imagination" 
and Natural History of Intellect-both of which reached final form in the 
1870s-contain substantial discussions of scientific issues. Beach cites the 
early section of "Poetry and Imagination" as the place at which Emerson 
expresses most clearly his understanding of evolutionary theories. 20 There 
Emerson does cite the phrase "arrested and progressive development" as "the 
poetic key to Natural Science, of which the theories of Geoffroy Saint, 
Hilaire, of Oken, of Goethe, of Agassiz and Owen and Darwin in zoology 
and botany, are the fruits" (W, 8: 7). That phrase suggests "the way upward 
from the invisible protoplasm to the highest organisms," an evolutionary 
vision that is important in the perception of the unity of nature and its link 
to intellect. The Natural History of Intellect, which was in some ways 
Emerson's failed or uncompleted masterwork, was ultimately a sketch of a 
plan to do for the mind and mental processes what the great classifying 
scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth century had done for botany, 
geology, and the other sciences. 21 
Emerson's later attention was, however, attracted to that beautiful but 
difficult child of science, technology. Leonard Neufeldt's detailed discus, 
sian of Emerson's reaction to the problems that technology posed to the 
human spirit reminds us of how contemporary Emerson can seem. Al, 
though positive in general about the possibilities of technological progress, 
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Emerson sounded important warnings later in his career about the com, 
bined threat of commercial and industrial society. Neufeldt suggests that 
his second tour of England in 184 7,48 was important in bringing him to 
check "his enthusiasm" for technological progress, eventuating in his 
attempt to accommodate technology to appropriate intellectual control. 22 
Neufeldt's treatment suggests many possibilities for further research and 
analysis, especially when we realize that it bears directly on Emerson's 
accommodation to modem American culture generally. Surely his view of 
technological progress is an important aspect of the question of the extent 
of his adversarial relationship to nineteenth,century American culture. 
Despite his sustained inquiries into science, Emerson's place is ulti, 
mately with the poets and religious thinkers, as he himself knew. "Science 
was false by being unpoetical," he said in "Poetry and Imagination." And, 
with some prophetic sense of the intellectual rift that would separate 
science and imaginative thought so decisively in our century, he warned 
that "Science does not know its debt to imagination" (W, 8:10). Emerson 
could speak with authority of such debts, being himself a lifelong debtor to 
science. The example of his intellectual project that integrated scientific 
knowledge with metaphysical curiosity stands as the principal value of our 
renewed and deepened understanding of Emerson's debt to natural history. 
He had the advantage of living at a moment when the worlds of science 
and literature were not separate ones, and he used that advantage fully. But 
he also witnessed the beginnings of that very rift. While his focus on 
nature as a metamorphic field of energy continues to be instructive, his 
own motivation as a thinker about science is as valuable. He turned to 
science because he needed its facts and its vision, and he was unafraid of 
any truth he might discover there. 
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Thoreau and Science 
ROBERT D. RICHARDSON, Jr. 
Thoreau's early zest for science is bright and uncomplicated. Three and a 
half months out of college, he writes in his new journal, "How indispensa-
ble to a correct study of Nature is a perception of her true meaning-The 
fact will one day flower out into a truth." 1 Thoreau's lifelong engagement 
with science begins early, with this positive and hopeful asserting of the 
connection between fact and meaning. Thoreau goes on in this entry to 
emphasize the difference between the "master workmen" of science and 
the "mere accumulators of facts." The young Thoreau begins with an 
immense respect for fact, an attitude that is always notched to his account, 
especially when he is compared to Emerson. But he also has a long-
running skirmish with the idea of fact as sufficient or sole truth. Facts could 
mirror truths, could lead to truths, could assemble into truths, could be 
irreducibly true as facts. But for most of his life, fact was mainly valuable to 
Thoreau when it led him on to greater things, to general truths about 
nature, to human truths, to laws, or to ideas. Facts, especially scientific 
facts, were always indispensable to Thoreau, but they were always means 
and never ends in themselves. And his frank self-questioning about the 
nature and use of fact does not, finally, represent major doubts about the 
value of science. It indicates rather the depth of Thoreau's interest in 
science and its claims. 2 
At the beginning of his intellectual life, Thoreau has an attitude of 
confident enthusiasm and openness to science. This is not surprising, as 
Transcendentalism in general and Emerson in particular were keenly and 
approvingly interested in science. Goethe, whose ethic of self-cultivation 
underlies so much of Concord thought, was also active in science, chal-
lenging Newton in optics, and making a still-valuable contribution to 
plant morphology. Kant, who is above all the intellectual founder of 
modem Idealism, of which Transcendentalism is the American branch, 
devoted his major work to revitalizing modem philosophy by trying to gain 
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for it the care for detail and the rigor that had made modem science so 
successful. Schelling's later development of Kantian principles results in a 
"naturphilosophie," a theory of nature's ultimate unity that still has cur-
rency in the search for a single basic underlying unit of matter or energy. 3 
For the German Idealists (excepting Schleiermacher) and for their Amer-
ican counterparts, the Transcendentalists, science had essentially replaced 
theology as the key to the nature of things. The Book of Nature now took 
precedence over the Bible as the true revelation, the true word of God. For 
Emerson and Thoreau both, the new interest in natural science had 
genuine religious urgency. 
For the young Thoreau, science is heroic. His early experimental essay on 
"Bravery," which he drafted in 1839, has a paragraph beginning "Science is 
always brave, for to know is to know good: doubt and danger quail before 
her eye. . . . Cowardice is unscientific-for there cannot be a science of 
ignorance." He is interested in the qualities of the "true man of science" 
and concludes that he "will have a rare Indian wisdom-and will know 
nature better by his finer organization. He will smell, taste, see, hear, feel, 
better than other men. . . . The most scientific should be the healthiest 
man." Later, in his first important essay review for the Dial, "The Natural 
History of Massachusetts" (1842), Thoreau will gather up and redirect 
these comments to the reader, adding others in his exclamatory enthusi-
asm. "What an admirable training is science for the more active warfare of 
life!" "The Natural History of Massachusetts" is, fittingly for a review of 
state-sponsored scientific surveys of local "resources," characterized by 
such exclamations, representing science not only as simple, modem, and 
good, but also as a heroic battleground, a field for noble striving. 4 
In 1845, while he is working on the first draft of what will become A 
Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, Thoreau turns again to the 
subject of science. His train of thought, toward the end of the "Thursday" 
chapter, leads from human art to nature's "more perfect art," to nature's 
perfect adaptation of means to ends ("She supplies to the bee only so much 
wax as is necessary for its cell") to the laws by which Nature operates. This 
last is indeed a major theme of the book as a whole. Thoreau goes on in 
this passage to explore the connection between these natural or scientific 
laws, and the moral law that should direct our lives. Thoreau argues that 
while natural laws, such as gravity, are "to the indifferent and casual 
observer ... mere science-to the enlightened and spiritual they are not 
only facts but actions-the purest morality-or modes of divine life." 5 
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This is the characteristic Idealist or Transcendental position, that the 
facts and laws of external nature have discoverable bearing on our moral 
lives, taking the word "moral" in its large Amoldian sense: that is moral 
that teaches us how to live. Yet it is characteristic of the young Transcen, 
dental Thoreau to lay his emphasis on the scientific or fact,respecting side, 
on the intelligibility of the natural world, and on the disciplined gathering 
and observing of facts. Echoing Emerson's comment in Nature that 
"undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable," 
Thoreau insists, "all nature invites to further acquaintance and abets the 
efforts of the honest inquirer-for by the visible form or shell truth is 
simply contained not withheld. "6 
Thoreau's respect for what William James calls "stubborn and irreduci, 
ble fact" is very high indeed in 1845. He insists that facts "must be learned 
directly and personally." He praises the collector of facts as possessing "a 
perfect physical organization." By comparison, the philosopher possesses a 
"perfect intellectual one." But it is, predictably, the poet, or as we would 
say, the writer, who now represents for Thoreau the evenly but myste, 
riously balanced combination of these two. In other words, Thoreau's 
current respect for fact and fact,collecting is so high in 1845 that he takes it 
as half of the mental process of the writer. 
During the winter and spring of 1846,4 7 Thoreau is revising and expanding 
his manuscript of A Week. In this draft, which is the one he published in 
1849, the "Friday" or last chapter contains an expanded reworking of his 
earlier comments on science and fact. It is, in effect, a short essay, running 
to about five printed pages and constituting Thoreau's most extended and 
in some ways his most important comments on science. His own life is 
beginning, but only beginning, to tum toward scientific pursuits. In 
February 184 7, he starts the first of what are to be many statistical studies of 
Concord's natural phenomena. In May 184 7 he will be collecting spec, 
imens for the great scientist Louis Agassiz recently arrived from Switzer, 
land. Thoreau's most thoughtful, certainly his most method,conscious, 
meditation on science stands on the threshhold of his own serious involve, 
ment in doing science, not just reading about it. 
He begins the science section of "Friday" with what is, for a moralist, a 
startling claim: "The eye which can appreciate the naked and absolute 
beauty of a scientific truth is far more rare than that which is attracted by a 
moral one." The comment underscores the importance science now plays 
in Thoreau's mature thought. He loves the clean, economical beauty of 
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physical law or principle and the elegance of mathematical proof. He says, 
and it reminds one of Poe, "the most distinct and beautiful statement of 
any truth must at last take the mathematical form." This is not just his 
customary hyperbole or paradox, it is the conceptual center of his lifelong 
interest in statistics that give us access to patterns or "laws" that are not 
apparent in individual cases. 7 
Thoreau continues to pursue the connection between the natural and 
the moral worlds. Indeed, he presses the connection now, phrasing it in his 
best assertive style as self,evident axioms: "All the moral laws are readily 
translated into natural philosophy. . . . The whole body of what is now 
called moral or ethical truth existed in the golden age as abstract science." 
He explicates this by reference to Stoic thought. "Or, if we prefer, we may 
say that the laws of Nature are the purest morality." He is not now troubled 
by the moral problem of nature's voraciousness, by the nature "red in tooth 
and claw," which will seem to the generations after Darwin a license for 
predatory violence. The point of his assertion about the link between 
natural (or scientific) truth and moral truth is not to play down science but 
to protest the separation of science from morals. 8 
Similarly, Thoreau will not separate science from the person doing the 
science. "The fact which interests us most," Thoreau writes, "is the life of 
the naturalist. The purest science is still biographical." Thoreau will 
remain interested in the personal, the biographical, the human approach 
to science. Like 6oethe, he is concerned with how things strike us, not 
just how things are, apart from human observation. This is an interest in 
the subjective aspect of science, but it is not therefore whimsical or 
idiosyncratic. Strictly speaking, the sky is not blue. Space is black-the 
blue is short wavelengths of light colliding with and dissipating into the 
atmosphere-but it is a universal subjective experience that the sky is 
blue. It is a subjective truth. Geography or astronomy teach us to regard 
the earth and the stars as apart from us. But there is enabling power, 
perhaps even for the scientist, in Emerson's observation that it is our own 
eye that makes the horizon, or in Thoreau's comment that "man's eye is the 
true star, finder, the comet,seeker. "9 
But even as he tracks science back to the scientist and recalls his 
earlier, Baconian belief that the "poet uses the results of science and 
philosophy, and generalizes their widest deductions," he goes on now to 
formulate his clearest understanding of the importance of method. Meth, 
od is, in Thoreau's eyes, a behavioral manifestation of the rule of law so 
evident in, say, physics or botany or astronomy. Thoreau is interested in 
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the process of scientific discovery, which he says, with customary and 
maddening coolness, "is very simple." The way it works, he explains, is 
that "an unwearied and systematic application of known laws to nature, 
causes the unknown to reveal themselves." With remarkable clearsighted-
ness, Thoreau the lifelong observer now notes that what matters most, 
even in observation, is method or system. "Almost any mode of observation 
will be successful at last, for what is most wanted is method. Only let 
something be determined and fixed around which observation may rally." 
As he will say elsewhere, we all look at the same things, but some see more 
than others. How to direct attention, focus observation, find and learn to 
trust a fixed point against which other things may be set for comparison, 
these are aspects of the process of discovery that now fascinate Thoreau. 10 
Thoreau maintains a steady, indeed a constantly deepening, interest 
in fact or data. Yet he can be dismayed at the prospect of the passive or 
mindless accumulation of data and is generally more interested in the 
process by which general laws emerge from facts. Thoreau's grasp of 
science and its procedures during the years 1846 and 184 7 is very much like 
Darwin's when the latter says that "science consists in grouping facts so 
that general laws or conclusions may be drawn from them." It is not quite 
so easy, of course. Thoreau is keenly aware of how "the power to perceive a 
law is equally rare in all ages of the world." 11 
He goes on to make a remarkably useful distinction about just what we 
mean when we talk about the advance of science. "Much is said about the 
progress of science," he observes, adding, "I should say that the useful 
results of science had accumulated, but that there had been no accumula-
tion of knowledge." The reason for this, he explains, is that knowledge "is 
to be acquired only by a corresponding experience." It does not count as 
knowledge when we do not experience it ourselves. "How can we know" he 
asks, "what we are told merely?" This central question, which occurs to 
anyone who finds himself obliged to accept on faith the results of a 
predecessor's work, has a special urgency for Thoreau. For science deals 
with what we know, and literature deals with what can be told. At present, 
Thoreau seems more inclined to trust experience than other people's 
accounts of experience. There is of course a limit to how much one can 
learn for oneself, but Thoreau's insistence on getting things at firsthand 
will serve him both in his science and in his writing. 12 
For he can also always see the value in the telling, the describing, of 
nature. It is a characteristic of his way of working that, whenever he 
becomes interested in a subject, such as botany or zoology, he will start 
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with current scientific work, fanning out quickly to read related current 
books and, at the same time, reading backwards toward the beginnings of 
the subject, coming ultimately to the classics. Thus he will study a subject 
and the history of that subject simultaneously. As he does this, he thereby 
gains a balanced outlook that can simultaneously appreciate (in this case) 
the modern scientist and the ancient naturalist. "Our books of science," he 
says, "as they improve in accuracy, are in danger of losing the freshness and 
vigor and readiness to appreciate the real laws ofNature, which is a marked 
merit in the oft-times false theories of the ancients." He observes-and it 
is true of his own work in relation to our modern science-that "the older 
naturalists are better qualified to appreciate than to discriminate the facts." 
As it is true of Aristotle, Aelian, Pliny, and others, so it is still true of 
Thoreau that "their assertions are not without value when disproved. If 
they are not facts, they are suggestions for Nature herself to act upon." 
More interesting than mere facts are the laws that arise from observed facts, 
and more interesting than either is the peculiar quality of focused attention 
that can find the process by which those laws arise.l3 
In retrospect, it is notable that these years from 1839 to 1842, marking 
Thoreau's most straightforward, least qualified admiration for science, are 
the years in which Thoreau least identifies his life and work with science. 
As he becomes more and more involved in science itself, his view of it will 
become correspondingly more complex. Still, his brave view of science 
remains essentially the same throughout the mid 1840s, as Thoreau passes 
through his late twenties and as he writes both drafts of A Week. 
In the spring of 184 7, just before his thirtieth birthday, Thoreau becomes 
involved in collecting local specimens for the classifying labors of Louis 
Agassiz, the great Harvard professor who is the single person most respon-
sible for the professionalization of American science during the middle of 
the nineteenth century. 14 Agassiz was an ebullient, energetic, entrepre-
neurial scientist who built and maintained a network of collectors all over 
the globe. There is some irony in Thoreau's working as a specimen 
collector for Agassiz. By Thoreau's own distinction, Agassiz would be the 
"master craftsman," the person seeking laws, synthesis, and ideas, while 
he, Thoreau, was the mere collector or accumulator. He can hardly have 
thought of himself at this time as seriously engaged in science. Indeed, at 
the end of September 184 7, when asked what his profession was, he 
answered by listing thirteen occupations, not one of which makes any 
mention of science or natural history. Yet his enthusiasm for science is as 
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high as ever. In a long paragraph of a letter to Emerson in November 184 7, 
Thoreau talks about the new astronomical discoveries and the powerful 
new telescope at Harvard. "It is true enough," he tells Emerson, in a rare 
burst of approval of his alma mater, "Cambridge college is really beginning 
to wake up and redeem its character and overtake the age. I see by the 
catalogue that they are about establishing a scientific school in connection 
with the University." 15 
During the late 1840s Thoreau's general interest in science was leading 
him ever more deeply into doing science itself. He begins now to keep 
detailed data on such things as the height of the Concord River. He takes a 
minute interest in identifying species accurately. In December of 1850, he 
is elected a corresponding member of the new and energetic Boston 
Society ofNatural History, and on most of his future trips to Boston he will 
make a stop at the society's rooms to consult their collections or their 
library. In January 1851, he reads Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle, taking notes 
that show he is beginning to share Darwin's interests in how plants and 
animals are dispersed over the earth, in the relation of geology to botany 
and zoology, and in such marvels of adaptation as the Tierra del Fuegians 
who sweat, naked, even when they are further from the fire than the 
clothed, shivering Europeans. 
The more serious Thoreau's involvement in science becomes, the 
more intense his questionings become. This January (1851) he notes that 
"Science does not embody all that men know, only what is for men of 
science." (It should be remembered that the word "scientist" was only 
coined in 1840. "Man of science" still did duty for several decades. Darwin 
calls himself not scientist but "a person interested in natural history.") 
After noting that a woodman "can relate his facts to human life," Thoreau 
continues with an elaborate image that is remarkably evenhanded. He 
writes, "The knowledge of an unlearned man is living and luxuriant like a 
forest, but covered with mosses and lichens and for the most part inaccesi, 
ble and going to waste: the knowledge of the man of science is like timber 
collected in yards for public works, which still supports a green sprout here 
and there, but even this is liable to dry rot." 16 
In 1851, Thoreau reads a good deal of botany, including, of course, the 
history of botany. He reads Bartram, Agassiz and Gould, Kalm (a disciple 
of Linnaeus), Cuvier (the teacher of Aggasiz), Loudon (apostle of the 
Linnean "artificial" system of botanical classification), Stoever (the biog, 
rapher of Linnaeus), Pultenay (another Linnaean), and, eventually, in 
February 1852, Linnaeus. (Later, Thoreau will read Lindley, Alphonse de 
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Candolle, and other defenders of the "natural" system.) By comparison 
with these scientific writers whom he openly admired and learned from, 
Thoreau finds the "Annual of Scientific Discovery" a "poor, dry compila~ 
tion," and he complains that "one sentence of perennial poetry would 
make me forget, would atone for, volumes of mere science." But he 
perseveres past the ill~natured comment to try to fix the source of the 
difference between interesting and dull science. "The astronomer is as 
blind to the significant phenomena, or the significance of phenomena, 
as the wood~sawyer who wears glasses to defend his eyes from sawdust. 
The question is not what you look at but what you see." A Darwin, a 
Cuvier, a Linnaeus looked at the same things everyone else did, but they 
saw more. 17 
This same August 1851, he notes the changes in his own thinking that 
had resulted from his renewed scientific interests. "I fear," he begins, "that 
the character of my knowledge is from year to year becoming more distinct 
and scientific; that in exchange for views as wide as heaven's cope, I am 
being narrowed down to the field of the microscope. I see details, not 
wholes nor the shadow of the whole. I count some parts and say 'I know.'" 
This is not a deprecation of scientific knowledge. It is more an acknowl~ 
edgement that scientific knowledge comes only at some considerable cost 
in other areas. And the next day sees Thoreau's enthusiasm back at its 
usual pitch. Now it is the language of botany which attracts him. "How 
copious and precise the botanical language to describe the leaves, as well as 
the other parts of a plant! Botany is worth studying if only for the precision 
of its terms-to learn the value of words and of system." 18 
Thoreau is delighted with the language for describing leaves. The 
special vocabulary extends the range of one's ability to translate the natural 
world into language, plant by plant, leaf by leaf, and down to the smallest 
detail. "The situation of leaves," says Sir J. E. Smith, author of an attrac~ 
tive, Linnaean Grammar of Botany, 
is either at the root, or on the stem, or branches; alternate, scattered, 
opposite, crowded, whorled, or tufted. Their insertion is either sessile or 
stalked; peltate, clasping, connate, perfoliate, sheathing, equitant, or decur-
rent. The margin of leaves or leaflets is either entire, wavy, serrated, jagged, 
toothed, or notched, in a simple or compound manner; naked, fringed, 
spinous, cartilaginous, glandular; flat, revolute (rolled backward) or involute 
(the reverse). Their surface is smooth, naked, glaucous, downy, hairy, woolly, 
warty, glandular, or prickly; even, rugged, or blistery; veiny, ribbed, or 
veinless; coloured, variegated, opaque or polished. Some leaves are fleshy, 
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cylindrical, semi-cylindrical, awlshaped, tumid, channelled, keeled, two-
edged, hatchet-shaped, solid or hollow. Others are membranous, leathery, 
rigid or almost woody. With respect to division, simple leaves are either 
cloven, lobed, sinuated, deeply divided, laciniated, or cut; palmate, pin-
natifid, pectinate, unequal (as in Begonia) lyrate, runcinate, fiddle-shaped, 
hastate, arrow-shaped. 19 
As Emerson notes in "The Poet," there is a liberating exhilaration 
when "the world is thus put under the mind for verb and noun." The power 
of precision to specify is not lost on Thoreau. He notes that Linnaeus 
thought that precise and adequate terms "have preserved anatomy, mathe-
matics, and chemistry from idiots; but the want of them has ruined 
medicine." Though he will later come to articulate a similar view of the 
function of scientific language, Thoreau now sees it as a great enriching of 
verbal expressiveness. Speaking about the writing of earlier naturalists, he 
writes, "Evelyn and others wrote when the language was in a tender, 
nascent state and could be moulded to express the shades of meaning; 
when sesquipedalian words, long since cut and apparently dried and drawn 
to mill-not yet to the dictionary lumber-yard, put forth a fringe of green 
sprouts here and there along in the angles of their rugged bank, their very 
bulk insuring some sap remaining; some florid suckers they sustain at least; 
which words, split into shingles and laths, will supply poets for ages to 
come." 20 
Eighteen fifty-two is a peak year for Thoreau. He is reading deeply in 
modern science and old naturalists (during an era in which this modern 
clarity of distinction is only dimly emerging). He has discovered William 
Gilpin and the power of the picturesque to educate the outdoor eye. He is 
working on the fifth revision of Walden, a major creative reshaping, and his 
journal is at its richest and fullest. His mood is up. He exults in the world. 
"This is my year of observation," he writes. 
In his botanical reading, he is caught up in the controversy between 
the natural and artificial systems of botanical classification. The artificial 
system was championed by Linnaeus; the natural by, among others, John 
Lindley. Over time, as he compares the systems, Thoreau comes to prefer 
the natural, which is particularly worth noting because Darwin later says, 
in The Origin of Species, in a reference to his view that speciation is the 
result of"descent with modification": "I believe this element of descent is 
the hidden bond of connexion which naturalists have sought under the 
term of the Natural System." 21 
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Thoreau in the early 1850s is naturally drawn to science, but he voices 
hesitancies. "The actual bee hunter and pigeon catcher is familiar with 
facts in the natural history of bees and pigeons which Huber and even 
Audubon are totally ignorant of. I love best the unscientific man's knowl-
edge; there is so much more humanity in it." In a journal entry for June 30, 
1852, he goes much further: "Nature must be viewed humanly to be viewed 
at all; that is, her scenes must be associated with humane affections, such 
as are associated with one's native place, for instance. She is most signifi-
cant to a lover. A lover of Nature is pre-eminently a lover of man. If I have 
no friend, what is Nature to me? She ceases to be morally significant." 
There would seem to be an unbridgeable gap between this way of viewing 
nature and the scientific approach, as we understand the latter now. 
Thoreau articulates both approaches, the moral and the scientific, and it 
would be a mistake to regard this last cited comment, and others like it, as 
reflecting a growing hostility to science. The problem is that Thoreau has, 
near the center of his thought, a strongly held idealist position. Idealism 
held, in Schelling's fine summary, that nature is externalized spirit (read 
"mind") and spirit is internalized nature. A.N. Whitehead observes in 
Science and the Modem World that idealism "has conspicuously failed to 
connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their idealist 
philosophies." This conflict is particularly severe for Thoreau during 1852 
and 1853. Just after his birthday in July ofl852 he writes to his sister Sophia 
a listless dispirited letter in which he complains, "I am not on the trail of 
any elephants or mastodons, but have succeeded in trapping only a few 
ridiculous mice, which can not feed my imagination. I have become sadly 
scientific." 22 
We should not put too much weight on that word "sadly," because it is 
contradicted by the fact, noted by every reader of Thoreau's journal, that 
Thoreau becomes increasingly interested in science as time goes on, taking 
pleasure in exactness and precision. His attitude toward science is now 
quite complex, indeed two-sided, because he is, from this time in his life 
onward, both a person interested in science and scientific methods-
interested in knowing nature-and a writer or artist whose main aim is to 
express, describe, or tell nature. The two aims are, strictly speaking, 
incompatible. That is, they cannot be exercised on the same material at 
the same time. The incompatibility of these views is an affront to the 
orderly mind, and Thoreau acknowledges the dilemma fully in a journal 
entry on March 5, 1853, in which he discusses a questionnaire he was 
asked to fill out for the Association for the Advancement of Science. The 
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key question had to do with "What branch of science I was specially 
interested in." His reflections on this deserve quotation in full: 
Now, though I could state to a select few that department of human inquiry 
which engages me, and should be rejoiced at an opportunity to do so, I felt 
that it would be to make myself the laughing-stock of the scientific commu-
nity to describe or attempt to describe to them that branch of science which 
specially interests me, inasmuch as they do not believe in a science which 
deals with the higher law. So I was obliged to speak to their condition and 
describe to them that poor part of me which alone they can understand. The 
fact is I am a mystic, a transcendentalist, and a natural philosopher to boot. 
Now I think of it, I should have told them at once that I was a transcenden-
talist. . . . How absurd that though I probably stand as near to nature as any 
of them, and am by constitution as good an observer as most, yet a true 
account of my relation to nature should excite their ridicule only. 23 
If we discount the slightly forced tone of disdain, Thoreau can be seen 
wanting it both ways. His transcendental aims are different (he suggests 
they are better) than those of science, but Thoreau is the first to poke 
fun at the opposite mentality, the overly transcendental approach, at the 
poor philosopher "grown insane with too large views," or the "sub limo-
slipshod" style of his walking friend Channing, who was a careless observer 
and almost completely impervious to fact. 
It had been Thoreau's early hope that the results of science would give 
the writer new material, that the facts so basic to science would also be 
illuminating to the poet. In "The Natural History of Massachusetts," and 
in his journal and letters down through the late 1840s, Thoreau seems to 
assume that Transcendentalism and science will both serve the writer. But, 
increasingly in his notes for the early 1850s, Thoreau writes as though 
scientific methods and aims were antithetical to and subversive of literary 
aims. Where he once rejoiced at the gain of descriptive power from the use 
of scientific language, he now complains that "one studies books of science 
merely to learn the language of naturalists,-to be able to communicate 
with them." Here Thoreau seems to agree with Linnaeus's view that 
technical scientific language serves to keep the uninitiated out. Further, 
when Thoreau now writes about expression, he does not talk about 
expressing what the scientist has found. He no longer assumes that the 
writer draws equally on fact-gathering and generalizing. He now thinks 
that the kind of writing he is interested in and the kind of work he 
understands as science are fundamentally opposed. 24 
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In an often-quoted passage, Thoreau writes on May 10, 1853, "He is 
the richest who has most use for nature as raw material of tropes and 
symbols with which to describe his life. If these gates of golden willows 
affect me, they correspond to the beauty and promise of some experience 
on which I am entering. HI am overflowing with life, am rich in experience 
for which I lack expression, then nature will be my language full of 
poetry-all nature will be a fable, and every natural phenomenon be a 
myth." By ominous contrast, nature now yields the scientist something 
quite different. Thoreau goes on to insist that "the man of science, who is 
not seeking for expression but for a fact to be expressed merely, studies 
nature as a dead language." To some extent, Thoreau is reacting to the 
immense bustle of fact and specimen-gathering touched off by Agassiz, and 
perhaps to Agassiz's own swelling self-importance and relentless promo-
tion of science, self, and fact. To some extent Thoreau's unhappiness with 
science is a displaced impatience with himself. But beyond all that can be 
said in extenuation, the above passage and others like it point to Thoreau's 
growing and unsettling awareness that the science to which he was so 
drawn was antithetical to the writer-transcendentalist-naturalist for whom 
nature is the raw material of expression. "I pray," he concludes, "for such 
inward experience as will make nature significant." 25 
From this time until his death ten years later, Thoreau never gives up 
looking for a way to resolve this dilemma, to combine the respect for fact of 
the scientist with the idealist conviction that there are important, indeed 
determining connections between inner nature and outer, between the 
human spirit and the phenomena of the world. But now, during 1852 and 
1853, in the white heat of a major reshaping of Walden, Thoreau records 
some of his sharpest, if not his best-reasoned, criticisms of science. Five 
years later, he is stiU voicing similar reservations. "I think that the man of 
science makes this mistake," Thoreau writes, "and the mass of mankind 
along with him: that you should coolly give your chief attention to the 
phenomenon which excites you as something independent of you, and 
not as it is related to you. The important fact is its effect on me." This is 
hardly a fair criticism, faulting science for what science doesn't try to do, 
but it does describe the writer's approach to the same material. Thoreau 
goes on, "He [the scientist] thinks that I have no business to see anything 
else but just what he defines the rainbow to be, but I care not whether my 
vision of truth is a waking thought or dream remembered, whether it is 
seen in the light or in the dark. It is the subject of the vision, the truth 
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alone, that concerns me." And trying now to fix the focal point with 
scientific precision, Thoreau concludes, "with regard to such objects, I 
find that it is not they themselves (with which men of science deal) that 
concern me: the point of interest is somewhere between me and them (i.e. 
the objects)." 26 
As his journals are filled increasingly with precise botanical nomen, 
clature, Thoreau also comes increasingly to see what such language does 
not do. "Our scientific names convey a very partial information only: they 
suggest certain thoughts only," he writes in 1858. "It does not occur to me 
that there are other names for most of these objects, given by a people who 
stood between me and them, who had better senses than our race. How 
little I know of that arbor,vitae when I have learned only what science can 
tell me! It is but a word. It is not a tree of life. But there are twenty words for 
the tree and its different parts which the Indian gave, which are not in our 
botanies, which imply a more practical and vital science. He used it every 
day. He was well acquainted with its wood, and its bark, and its leaves. No 
science does more than arrange what knowledge we have of any class of 
objects." 2 7 
Thoreau is no longer looking for the bravery of science, or scientist, no 
longer open to the scientist's new methods, new languages, and new 
discoveries. Instead he asserts that scientific language actually gets in the 
way of our understanding how the world relates to us. Thoreau has here 
pushed his characteristic fondness for paradox too far. Whatever one may 
say of the American Indian, he did not have a "more practical and vital 
science" than the European. Not even Thoreau's intimidating way with 
exaggeration and extravagance can carry that off. Even his closing gener, 
alization about science is a serious underestimate, though perhaps partly it 
is a reaction against an age then so obsessed with "mere" fact,gathering 
that the Scientific American could say, in 1852, "Science is but a collection 
of well,arranged facts." 28 
Even these occasional, quotable denigrations of science, untenable or ex, 
cessive as they appear to us, are the cavils of a man whose own enterprise 
was becoming ever more scientific, as he himself was well aware. In 1856, 
two years after the publication of Walden, he spots a plant on May 21, 
noting, "I am still in doubt whether it is a stellaria or cerastium. This is 
quite smooth, four to five inches high, spreading and forking, with a single 
flower each fork, on a long peduncle; square stemmed, oblong,lanceolate 
leaves, slightly ciliate and connate," and on the same day he writes a letter 
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to decline a lecture, saying "what I have is either too scattered or loosely 
arranged, or too light, or else is too scientific and matter of fact"; and he 
added, "I run a good deal into that of late." 29 
In the late 1850s, Thoreau's scientific interests are still growing ac-
tively. He fills an entire notebook with natural history extracts and notes; 
in 1859 he is appointed a member of the Harvard Visiting Committee in 
Natural History, charged with the annual evaluation of the college curricu-
lum. Even if the committee is largely a pro forma affair (though there is 
lively evidence that some of the visiting committees were active and 
influential groups who forced changes), Thoreau's presence on the com-
mittee suggests that he is by now considered a member of the science 
establishment. The committee includes six doctors, and such notables as 
Samuel Cabot (who befriended Edward Desor, who broke with Agassiz 
after 1848), Theodore Lyman (a former student of Agassiz's who raised 
money for him), James Eliot Cabot (who worked with Agassiz, corre-
sponded with Thoreau, and later wrote a life of Emerson), and Augustus 
Gould, who coauthored with Agassiz an important text called Principles of 
Zoology. 
The year 1859 is an active one for science in Boston and Cambridge, 
and Thoreau is taking an active part in it. It is the year in which Agassiz's 
new museum of Comparative Zoology opens, with considerable fanfare 
and a grant from the Massachusetts legislature. The natural history depart-
ment of the college, over which Thoreau is supposed to watch, is, on the 
other hand, under the direction of Asa Gray, the major American ally of 
Darwin's in the soon-to-come struggle with Agassiz over evolution. There 
is no direct proof that Thoreau is deeply involved in the work of the 
visiting committee, but we should remember that Thoreau undertakes 
nothing pro forma and that he allows himself to be reappointed the 
following year. It may also not be entirely a coincidence that Gray is 
teaching a course in vegetable physiology to the sophomores and a course 
in geographical and systematic botany to the juniors while Thoreau's 
reading for these years includes a great deal in these exact areas. 30 
On January 1, 1860, Charles Brace, a New York social worker and general 
intellectual, arrives in Concord with a copy of Darwin's Origin of Species, 
which he had picked up from Asa Gray. The book has only been out for a 
month, and Brace, Sanborn, Alcott, and Thoreau have dinner and dis-
cuss the book, which Thoreau soon gets hold of, reads, and makes notes 
from. (By contrast, John Torrey, a professional botanist and a colleague of 
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Gray's, waits more than three years to get around to reading Darwin.) As 
has been noted by several writers, Thoreau quickly picks up several of 
Darwin's main ideas, and these play an important part in Thoreau's late 
unpublished work. Thoreau even comes by himself, to accept Darwin's 
"developmental" hypothesis over Agassiz's theory of"special creation." It is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that by 1860, Thoreau has become the 
very "man of science" he had at first so admired, then later had so many 
doubts about. Though he might continue to say that such essays as 
"Autumnal Tints" are "not scientific," he no longer says it with hostility. 
Quite the contrary, when he delivers the talk on "The Succession of Forest 
Trees," in 1860, he describes it frankly at the outset as "a purely scientific 
subject." 31 
It would be rash to assert that Thoreau ever fully reconciled his 
interests in science and Transcendentalism. For one thing, the manu, 
script materials needed for a full assessment of Thoreau's late papers 
have never been published and have only recently been transcribed. 
Thoreau's Natural History Extract Notebook, and his two long manu, 
scripts on "Wild Fruits" and "The Dispersion of Seeds" are not only not 
published, they are in such a rough state as manuscripts that they have 
so far defeated all efforts to understand them. Only in the last decade 
have a few essays and chapters appeared concerning the late work, but 
even these must be considered as tentative and exploratory. There is, 
then, a mass of unarranged, undigested manuscript, incorporating much 
of Thoreau's best energies after Walden and bearing directly on his 
involvement in science, that has never been taken adequately into 
account.32 
Yet a few points about the late papers seem clear enough to empha, 
size. The "Dispersion of Seeds" and the "Wild Fruits" and the hundreds 
of meticulous charts Thoreau assembled to plot annual occurences of 
many hundreds of separate natural phenomena over ten years-these 
projects are the work of an energetic, disciplined, scientific mind. In a 
letter written on March 21, 1862, when Thoreau knows he is dying, 
he writes, "I have not been engaged in any particular work on Botany 
or the like, though, if I were to live, I would have much to report on 
Natural History generally." For all his interest in and sympathy with 
Darwin's work, Thoreau's own late work shows no real interest in the 
problem of speciation, which is the problem at the heart of The Origin 
of Species. Thoreau is much more interested in how plants are dis, 
persed, how one kind of plant succeeds another, and in applying this 
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knowledge to forest management. Thoreau's "The Succession of Forest 
Trees" is rightly considered an early founding text of modem technical 
ecology. 33 
At the end of the first chapter of Walden, Thoreau quotes the Persian 
poet Saadi saying, "they call none azad, or free, excepting the cypress, 
which bears no fruit." As the central issue of Walden is personal liberation, 
so the central issue in the late work is interconnectedness. The manuscript 
of "The Dispersion of Seeds" begins by citing the cypress again. But this 
time it is the Roman writer Pliny whom Thoreau quotes approvingly, 
saying that such trees as the cypress that bear no fruit are considered 
unlucky or unhappy. 
As Thoreau moves from the economy of individual freedom to the 
detailed study of New England field and forest, his methods become 
more and more those of the scientist. And perhaps the late projects try, 
once again, to bridge the chasm between scientist and Transcenden, 
talist, for Thoreau's methods pay attention to observation and detail, 
while his aim is nothing less than comprehensive: to describe the natural 
world, in a typical cross section called Concord. It is a world in which 
everything is interrelated, a world of change and process, a world that is 
above all and in all respects, alive. "The very earth is a granary," he says 
in the unpublished "Dispersion of Seeds," and by some people, including 
Thoreau himself, "its surface is regarded as the cuticle of one great living 
creature." 
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(Pseudo-) Scientific Humor 
JUDITH YAROSS LEE 
Scientific humor in America is older than the Republic. When Wash-
ington Irving lampooned Thomas Jefferson's scientific activities in Book 
IV of A History of New York . . . By Diedrich Knickerbocker (1809), 1 he 
followed the example of Connecticut Wits David Humphreys, Joel Barlow, 
John Trumbull, and Lemuel Hopkins, who had already ridiculed Jefferson 
in The Anarchiad (1786-87). When Samuel Clemens published his spoof of 
fossil finds "Petrified Man" (1862) a few months before becoming Mark 
Twain, 2 he joined the journalistic tradition of Richard Adams Locke, 
whose infamous moon hoax in the New York Sun of August 25-28, 1835, 
presented science fiction as fact. Near the end of his career, when Twain 
wrote "Three Thousand Years among the Microbes" (composed 1905), he 
had still not exhausted science as a subject for humor. 3 Nor have his 
successors. When he burlesqued the scientific report in "Oya Life These 
Days" (1975), 4 Garrison Keillor probably did not see his work of mock-
anthropology as part of a distinguished tradition, but in fact scientific 
issues and topics have attracted all our major comic writers since colonial 
days. 
Their humor offers an index to the spread of scientific ideas and a 
window on popular thinking about them. Shortly after Darwin's Origin of 
Species was published in 1859, for example, an old joke drew new life from 
an emerging scientific theory: "FACT IN NATURAL HISTORY. Passing 
up Carson street the other evening, we saw a donkey pick up a newspaper 
and deliberately swallow same, editorial, correspondence, items and all, 
without bolting a single statement. The circumstances clearly demon-
strated to our mind the identity of the two and four legged specimens of the 
species donkey." s Among the several reasons for singling out this bit of 
mock-biology, including its comic respect for science (rather than ridi-
cule), not the least is its source, the Virginia City Territorial Enterprise, 
Mark Twain's literary birthplace. When the item appeared, the emergence 
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of Mark Twain was still three years away, and the paper yet awaited the 
arrival of editor William Wright, who not only tutored Sam Clemens but 
also wrote humor himself and was for thirty years Nevada's premier editor 
and journalist. 6 But the joke hints at why the fledgling Enterprise even-
tually became the largest paper in the West of the gold and silver rushes: 
miners depended on scientific knowledge, and even the humor of the 
paper treated that knowledge with respect. 
Such affection has been in short supply in American humor because 
writers have lacked the expertise for the task. Genres of scientific humor 
reflect the writer's own learning and his or her assessment of the audience's 
knowledge. Writers with technical expertise tend to parody scientific 
discourse, play with scientific ideas, or experiment with science fiction. 
Their humor may debunk individual scientists or projects, but learning 
itself retains its positive value. By contrast, humorists without technical 
backgrounds-that is, amateurs-tend to ridicule science and the scien-
tist as one. 
Many more writers belong to the second group than to the first. 
Indeed, until Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo began writing comic 
fiction in the 1960s and 1970s, 7 only two major American humorists based 
their scientific humor on professional-level knowledge: George Horatio 
Derby (1823-1861), a U'.S. Army engineer trained at West Point, and 
William Wright (1829-1898), editor of the Virginia City Territorial Enter-
prise and the West's most able writer on mining. Derby and Wright both 
belong to the tradition known as Literary Comedy, which embraced a large 
number of mid-nineteenth-century pseudonymous humorists. Along with 
the fame of the other so-called Phunny Phellows, the reputations of "John 
Phoenix" (Derby) and "Dan De Quille" (Wright) were rapidly surpassed by 
the success of their student "Mark Twain"; yet for a time Phoenix and De 
Quille were also stars. Twain himself called Phoenix the father of Amer-
ican humorS and wrote a laudatory preface to De Quille's History of the Big 
Bonanza (1876), composed in Twain's Hartford home and issued by his 
publisher. 9 Sales of Phoenixiana (1855), Derby's first collection of sketches, 
exhausted eleven printings in its first year and remained in print through-
out the nineteenth century; a new edition in 1903 was important enough 
to include illustrations by E. W. Kemble and an introduction by John 
Kendrick Bangs.IO For his part, De Quille reached newspaper readers from 
San Francisco to New York for more than thirty years (1859-1895), but 
because he never collected his humorous sketches into a book he is almost 
unknown today;11 what reputation he has rests on The Big Bonanza, the 
130 American literature and Science 
definitive though not particularly comic history of Nevada's Comstock 
Lode. Many of Phoenix's and De Quille's works deserve obscurity as 
ephemera of the past. But for their scientific sketches, Phoenix and De 
Quille merit resurrection as progenitors of two affectionate traditions of 
scientific humor-learned wit and the hoax-and they stand together as 
nineteenth-century exceptions to the dominant anti-intellectual tradi-
tion, the vernacular humor of the amateur. 
This familiar scientific humor exploits the conventional democratic 
values of the American vernacular tradition, which lumps science with 
other learned targets of comic ridicule (such as theology and grammar) and 
takes particular pleasure in knocking down authorities from their positions 
of respect. The usual charge is irrelevance, as in the anonymous report on 
"Meleagris Gallopavo-The American Turkey" (1872): "Audubon and 
other scientific bushwackers having discribed [sic] the habits, manners and 
personal appearance of this distinguished fowl, as it exists in native 
thickets, I shall say little or nothing of the Wild Turkey of the Plateau and 
the cover; but confine my remarks mainly to the Tame Turkey of the 
Platter and the Dish. In this connection, I will take leave to say, that the 
untraveled barnyard Ornithologist enjoys better opportunities for studying 
and digesting the subject than usually falls to the lot of his peripatetic 
confreres." 12 Fifty years later even so momentous a scientific contribution 
as Einstein's theory of relativity evoked from an amateur much the same 
comic condescension. The hero of archy and mehitabel (1927), a poet 
reincarnated as a cockroach who communicated with Don Marquis by 
hopping on typewriter keys, observed that the physicist's discovery 
changed nothing on earth: 
old doc einstein has 
abolished time but they 
haven t got the news at 
sing sing yet13 
Nor are these isolated examples. The topicality of scientific subjects 
continues to attract the mainstream of American humorists, always ready 
to deflate the nearest controversy. 14 Among contemporary humorists, Jim 
Davis's comic strip "Garfield" gives the pugilistic cat the last word on 
creationism ("I stay out of drafts"), 15 while James Stevenson's "Fossil 
News" (1987) burlesques the quandary over hominid evolution as embod-
ied in the conflict between Richard E. Leakey's Homo erectus skull and 
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Donald C. Johanson's "Lucy" find, Australopithecus afarensis. 16 Topical 
jokes like these generally subordinate science to other rhetorical con, 
cerns-Garfield's self,possession, for instance, or the indignity of scholars 
beating each other, smashing their specimens, and then sustaining the 
dispute in "a private race to see which one might obtain the larger grant for 
research into orthodonic reconstruction of australopithecine jaw and 
molar fragments." 17 Similar ridicule dots the history of American comic 
writing, portraying scientists and scientific issues as a lot of sound and fury 
over nothing. 
Mark Twain's "Some Learned Fables for Good Old Boys and Girls" 
(1875) provides an ideal example of the vernacular assumptions behind 
this anti,intellectual tradition of scientific humor. The narrative conven, 
tions of vernacular humor developed to celebrate American democratic 
values.18 Just as the volunteer militiamen of the American colonies 
outfought the professional soldiers of their British fatherland, so in 
American humor vulgar young men have consistently outwitted their 
elders, public authorities, and social superiors. Time and again in Amer, 
ican comic narratives, British and American traits come into symbolic 
conflict, and democratic virtues trounce aristocratic pride: common 
sense proves wiser than book learning, for in this context the vernacular 
speech of common men and women signals their innate sincerity, virtue, 
and heroism. These durable comic conventions shape the scientific 
humor of Twain's "Learned Fables" and its description of "How the 
Animals of the Wood Sent Out a Scientific Expedition." The tale 
consistently elevates the lowly Tumble,Bug from the dung heap that he 
normally inhabits and makes him the hero of the tale. Hired to pitch 
camp and dig specimens, the Tumble,Bug proves that a little common 
sense is worth a great deal more than the erudition of the all the 
expedition's professors combined. So of course Twain grants him the priv, 
ilege of evaluating every episode in the tale and announcing the moral at 
the end: "science only [needs] a spoonful of supposition to build a moun, 
tain of demonstrated fact out of." 19 
Usually seen as an example ofT wain's literary debt to Phoenix, 20 the 
story actually satirizes contemporary scientific activities, 21 especially the 
Yale Scientific Expeditions of 1870,1874 led by Othniel Charles Marsh 
(1831,1899). The burlesque reduces "the very greatest among the learned" 
(MT 127) to Professor Woodlouse, Professor Snail, and Professor Mud 
Turtle, in addition to the leader, Professor Bull Frog, a caricature of the 
pug,faced and notoriously tenacious Marsh. The professors' knowledge of 
132 American literature and Science 
"the Mastodon, the Dodo, and other dead languages" (MT 130) does not 
help them decipher mysterious inscriptions like "Boats for Hire Cheap," 
much less prevent them from interpreting railroad tracks as "parallels of 
latitude" (and revising all astronomical tables accordingly), nor from 
mistaking the headlight of the midnight express for the transit of Venus 
(a major event of 1874). The Duke's insistence "for we have SEEN it!" 
(MT 131) sums up the story's attack on empiricism, not so much because 
the remark stops all dissent within the expedition about whether Venus 
crosses the earth or the sun as because this tale equates professors with 
dukes and, with typical democratic prejudice, attacks the aristocracy of 
intellect. 
Throughout the tale, Twain takes up vernacular values first and 
science second-a tendency typical of scientific humor by the scien, 
tifically inexpert. His comic targets, including the allusions to contem, 
porary scientific activities, suggest that he cared more about making 
jokes than about evaluating scientific ideas. For instance, irutead of 
implying any particular opposition to evolutionary theory or Darwin's 
four,year,old The Descent of Man (1871), 22 Twain simply has fun with 
his reversal of "the mysterious law of Development of Species" (MT 
138), especially the animals' discovery of "the long extinct species of 
reptile called MAN," formerly considered "a myth and a superstition" 
(MT 141). 
So well sustained is this reversal that it has obscured the tale's most 
pointed satire. Involving the group's discoveries in paleontology, the satire 
aims straight at O.C. Marsh, who in 1871 discovered the pteranodon, 
America's first specimen of the flying reptile pterodactyl. The humorist, 
who moved to Hartford that same year, was well aware of the Yale 
paleontologist, who first won notoriety in 1869 for his exposure of the fossil 
fraud known as the Cardiff Giant. Years later, in the first chapter of "A 
Horse's Tale" (1906 ), Twain poked fun at Marsh quite explicitly, as Buffalo 
Bill's horse recalls, 
When Professor Marsh was out here hunting bones for the chapel of Yale 
University he found skeletons of horses no bigger than a fox, bedded in the 
rocks, and he said they were ancestors of the father. My mother heard him say 
it; and he said those skeletons were two million years old . . . Professor Marsh 
said those skeletons were fossils. So that makes me part blue grass and part 
fossil; if there is any older or better stock, you will have to look for it among 
the Four Hundred, I reckon. I am satisfied with it. And am a happy horse, 
too, though hom out of wedlock. 23 
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This little joke demonstrates that Twain knew at least the bare outlines of 
Marsh's great work on fossil horses in the 1870s; the paleontologist's reports 
appeared in 1874 when the humorist was at work on his "Learned Fa-
bles." 24 Twain satirizes Marsh more indirectly in "Learned Fables" than in 
"A Horse's Tale," however. Professor Bull Frog sends Engineer Spider up a 
telegraph "tree" on reconnaissance, and the spider identifies the telegraph 
wires as "a web hung there by some colossal member of his own species": 
"for he could see its prey dangling here and there from the strands, in the 
shape of mighty shreds and rags that had a woven look about their texture 
and were no doubt the discarded skins of prodigious insects which had 
been caught and eaten" (MT 136). As Marsh had reconstructed the 
pteranodon's twenty-foot wingspan on the basis of a single six-inch fossil 
bone, so the naturalist of the animal expedition "built a beautiful model of 
the colossal spider, having no need to see it in order to do this, because he 
had picked up a fragment of its vertebrae by the tree, and so knew exactly 
what the creature looked like and what its habits and its preferences were, 
by this simple evidence alone. He built it with a tail, teeth [like Marsh's 
toothed birds25], fourteen legs and a snout, and said it ate grass, cattle, 
pebbles and dirt with equal enthusiasm. . . . The conference ended with 
the naming [of] the monster after the naturalist, since he, after God, had 
created it" (MT 136). Twain could hardly be more contemptuous of the 
naturalist, but the grudging praise for his godlike creativity is also telling. 
The inconsistency between this irreverent reference to God and the 
Tumble-Bug's devout resolution "not [to] go prying into the august secrets 
of the Deity" (MT 148) suggests that in the "Learned Fables" Twain cared 
more about satirizing Marsh than about examining scientific principles. 
Indeed, Twain's scientific humor is most notable for the convenience 
and conventionality of its targets: true to vernacular values, he would 
ridicule whatever learned authority he could and apparently trusted his 
audience to take pleasure in the iconoclasm along with him. Ten years 
before "Learned Fables," Twain's "A Full and Reliable Account of the 
Extraordinary Meteoric Shower of Last Saturday Night" (1864) lampoons 
his own scientific pretensions along with those of the noted Yale scientist 
Benjamin Silliman, Jr., (1816-1885) and his influential American]oumal of 
Science. Adopting the comic pose of the Simpleton, Twain offers ("for the 
good of Science") the observations he made "with the very best apparatus I 
could find wherewith to facilitate my labors": "I got a telescopic glass 
tumbler, and two costly decanters, (containing eau de vie and Veuve 
Clicquot to wash out the instrument with whenever it should become 
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clouded,) . . . I then poured about a gill of liquid from each decanter into 
the telescopic tumbler and slowly elevated it to an angle of about ninety 
degrees. I did not see anything. The second trial was also a failure, but I 
had faith in that wash." 26 Twain's weakness for the easy attack on science 
also shows in Roughing It (1872), although it proclaims quite different 
attitudes toward scientific knowledge. The semiautobiographical story of 
his life in the West has a structure often described as "the transformation of 
a tenderfoot," 27 a variation of the Bildungsroman in which the Mark Twain 
character throws off useless kinds ofbooklearning (aptly symbolized by his 
unabridged dictionary, which doesn't even make a good pillow and 
eventually becomes a dangerous projectile on the stagecoach); then he can 
immerse himself in the science of mining, among other necessary facts of 
western life. Despite this implicit approval of science, the humorist devotes 
the entire preface to debunking knowledge anyway. He adopts a comic 
pose of weary resignation as he apologizes for putting so much information 
into the book, which, he assures his audience, aims "rather to help the 
resting reader while away an idle hour than afflict him with metaphysics, 
or goad him with science."28 
Multiplied in one example after the next, this tropelike condemnation 
of science and abstract philosophy shows Twain's reliance on conven, 
tions of vernacular humor. Twain ridicules science as he debunks other 
aspects of genteel culture: with the irreverence and the distance of an 
outsider. That remained his preferred comic perspective for most of his 
career, though the point of view occasionally showed some signs of strain 
after literary success brought the wild westerner of The Innocents Abroad to 
the eastern inner circle of William Dean Howells. But no matter how am, 
bivalent his relation to the American cultural establishment, the largely 
self,taught Clemens would always remain an outsider to science, depen, 
dent for his knowledge on the popularizers of the lecture circuit and reports 
in the press. To be sure, as Sherwood Cummings demonstrated in Mark 
Twain arul. Science, fairly sophisticated ideas about science emerge in 
Twain's more serious writing, 29 and his scientific sketches certainly show 
the humorist keeping abreast of the issues of his day; in fact, his "Brace of 
Brief Lectures on Science" (1870) originally appeared over quotations 
from the scientific volume he parodied in it. 30 But over the course of 
Twain's career, from "Petrified Man" (1862) to "Three Thousand Years 
Among the Microbes" (1905), his humor looks askance at science from the 
secure perspective of the amateur, the same perspective behind most 
scientific humor today. 
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Among nineteenth,century American humorists, however, none 
stands in stronger contrast to this amateur scientific comic tradition than 
George Horatio Derby, whose expertise shaped a very different humor 
based on learned wit. A member of the exceptionally distinguished West 
Point class of 1846, Derby enjoyed perhaps the finest technical education 
available in pre-Civil War America. He studied chemistry, natural phi, 
losophy, astronomy, calculus, and civil engineering, and he graduated 
seventh in his class-just three places behind George B. McClellan of 
Pennsylvania and well ahead of two future military giants from Virginia, 
Stonewall Jackson (seventeenth) and George E. Pickett (fifty,ninth, the 
bottom of the class).31 For his outstanding record, Derby received a 
commission in the Topographical Engineers, which eventually took him to 
California. There he began in 1850 to publish the comic cartoons and 
witticisms for which he was already notorious among his fellows, whose 
education allowed them to appreciate even the more erudite examples of 
his scientific humor. 
Derby is barely known today, but Americans in the mid,nineteenth 
century doted on his japes on astronomy, paleontology, dentistry, and 
surveying, in addition to his spoofs of inventions and the patent process. 
Signed first with the pseudonym "John P. Squibob" and then (after 
Squibob's "death and spirit resurrection") as "John Phoenix," Derby's 
literary sketches appeared in major upper,class periodicals on both 
coasts-including the Knickerbocker, the Spirit of the Times, and the 
[California] Pioneer. Illness forced him to stop writing in 1857, two years 
after the publication of Phoenixiana, his major collection; he died in 1861, 
before his second, The Squibob Papers (1865), 32 was published. Even after 
his death, Derby's humor remained so well known that in 1864 Ulysses S. 
Grant, worried that his Union troops might not get through Georgia, 
grumbled that "they can keep the enemy off General Sherman a little, as 
Derby held the editor of the San Diego Herald" 33-that is, with his own 
nose between the adversary's teeth. The image conveys the audacity of 
John Phoenix, Derby's comic persona. Among his other distinctions, 
including a gentleman's distaste for vernacular values, Phoenix took pride 
in displaying his technical expertise. 
Nonetheless, even his scientific humor does not always avoid anti, 
intellectual tropes. In fact, Twain almost certainly derived part of the anti, 
intellectualism of "Some Learned Fables" from Derby's "Official Report" 
(1855), which satirizes contemporary government surveys as mainly bene, 
fiting the reputation and purse of the leader, in this case, the zany John 
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Phoenix, A.M., Chief Engineer and Astronomer, S.F.A.M.D.C.R. For 
this survey of the proposed central route for a railroad between San 
Francisco and Mission Dolores (a distance of a mere two and a half miles), 
Phoenix has assembled a "scientific corps" including a geologist, natu, 
ralist, botanist, ethnologist, and a dentist, as well as two assistant astrono, 
mers, seven other members of the Phoenix family, and nearly two hundred 
laborers-the whole lot equipped with sidearms and a mountain howitzer 
in addition to the regulation load of technical apparatus. All these re, 
sources notwithstanding, the expedition has one failure after another in 
the ten,day survey of Kearney Street and environs. The chainmen forget 
to measure the sidewalk. The precaution of attaching a "Go,it,ometer," a 
pedometer that Phoenix invented, 34 turns to naught when its bearer 
detours to a saloon and (after five beers) performs a four,mile jig. Scientific 
research fares little better. The geologist observes "that red,headed chil, 
dren appear to grow spontaneously" (P 25), while the specimens accumu, 
lated by the botanist's party after a day of independent exploration number 
"a box of sardines, a tin can of preserved whortleberries, and a bottle of 
whisky" (P 29). John Phoenix, A.M., and his assistant are the direct 
ancestors of Twain's pompous incompetents. 
But although both Twain and Phoenix mock the pretensions of scien, 
tific expeditions by emphasizing the participants' intellectual incom, 
petence,35 the two stories depend on different comic and narrative 
techniques expressing very different attitudes toward science. Whereas 
Twain belittles science and scientific methods, Phoenix inflates his scien, 
tists' dubious accomplishments, described in great technical detail. This 
comic technique effectively praises science even while ridiculing the 
scientists, who in this case is none other than Phoenix himself 
The first,person narration of "Official Report" focuses attention on 
the eccentricities and vested interests of an engineer who has nothing 
respectable to show for ten days and $40,000 of work-and who wouldn't 
show it if he could, since the supporters of a competing route have offered 
to buy his silence. In contrast to Twain's third,person fable, in which the 
humorist smirks at contemporary figures from above and the Tumble, Bug 
sneers at learned fools from below, Phoenix's first,person narrative exudes 
good cheer throughout, thereby defusing his critique. Selkongratulation 
and self,interest dominate the burlesque report, which opens with a brash 
"Having notified that Honorable Body of my acceptance of the important 
trust confided to me, in a letter, wherein I also took occasion to congratu, 
late them on the good judgment they had evinced" (P 14) and closes with a 
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breezy "I remain, with the highest respect and esteem for myself and every 
body else" (P 30). In between, the engineer's bravado reveals abuse of 
funds-"1 drew ... the amount ($40,000) appropriated for my peculiar 
route, and ... invested it securely in loans at three per cent a month 
(made, to avoid accident, in my own name)" (P 14)-and parades his 
professional ineptitude. First-person narration and indeterminate satiric 
targets give this earlier story a much more slapstick, much less negative 
tone than Twain's. Making fun of oneself precludes the sort of nasty 
reproof possible when ridiculing someone else. Phoenix's theme is wide-
spread incompetence and madcap corruption in government as well as in 
science and technology-without any sobering moral whatsoever. 
As a result, the satire in "Official Report" takes a backseat to the 
scientific imagination creating it. Chief Engineer Phoenix calculates the 
distance between Fort Point and Saucelito (sic) according to his own 
"entire new system of triangulation": the mean of 1,867,434,926,465 
triangles defined by spreading the feet of a tripod (to be exact, the feet of 
184 tripods) as widely as possible. A mathematical solution of exactly 324 
feet, instead of a number approximating ten miles, cannot upset his 
confidence: "I will stake my professional reputation on the accuracy of 
our work," he insists in a moment of delicious irony, "and there can, of 
course, be no disputing the elucidations of science, or facts demonstrated 
by mathematical process, however incredible they may appear per se" (P 
18). The procedure is so ridiculous that we can overlook its burlesque of 
Simeon Borden (1798-1856), the Massachusetts engineer who devised the 
standard method of triangulation for surveyers and who had recently 
written A System of Useful Formulae, Adapted to the Practical Operations of 
Locating and Constructing Railroads (1851).36 Nor do we care about the 
assistant's faulty solution to a problem of byzantine complexity when 
solved by pencil and trigonometric table. These elements of satire become 
irrelevant because the rhetoric of this sketch calls for displays of learning, 
not attacks on it. 
Therefore, rather than debunk science itself, Phoenix prefers to lam-
poon scientific language, in the manner of the Literary Comedians, whose 
preference for verbal wit distinguishes their tradition. A very large group of 
pseudonymous comic writers flourishing mainly between 1860 and 1900, 
the Literary Comedians, or Phunny Phellows, included Artemus Ward 
(Charles F. Browne), Petroleum V. Nasby (David Ross Locke), and Mark 
Twain (Samuel L. Clemens), as well as John Phoenix and Dan De Quille. 
These writers alternated poses of superiority and inferiority depending on 
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the subject at hand; their pseudonyms stood as comic signatures, not 
coherent literary personae. 37 As a result, they wrote fewer tall tales and 
mock~oral yams, devices of an earlier humor of character, and wrought 
more verbal and literary jokes instead. Infamous as misspellers, the 
Phunny Phellows played with language, tone, and scene as they bur~ 
lesqued literary and oratorical forms. They delighted in misquotation and 
illogic and adored deadpan narration by an "amiable idiot"38_like Chief 
Engineer and Astronomer John Phoenix. 
Derby's burlesques involving scientific language range from the 
strained to the inspired. In a humorous book review, for example, the Lit~ 
erary Comedian seizes upon an infelicity in an explanation of the gyro~ 
scope's motion ("by developing and neglecting the powers of u superior to 
the square") with the sort of literalism that made S.J. Perelman famous a 
century later: "Allow us to inquire the object of developing the powers of u 
provided they are to be subsequently neglected? ... Or, how do we know 
that u, or its powers, are superior to the square, which, as every school~ boy 
knows, is next to the sphere, the most perfect of figures?" 39 The puns in 
this passage are exceptionally erudite, one reason for the disputed au~ 
thorship of the sketch, but a similar impulse to promote mathematics over 
words also lies behind "A New System of English Grammar" (1854 ), which 
Phoenix promises will make its users "at once an exact, precise, mathe~ 
matical, truth~telling people" (P 39). His example of how literature should 
benefit from his new grammar proves the point: "As a 19 young and 76 
beautiful lady was 52 gaily tripping down the sidewalk of our 84 frequented 
street, she accidentally come [sic] in contact-100 (this shows that she 
came in close contact) with a 73 fat, but 87 good~humored looking gentle~ 
man, who was 93 (i.e. intently) gazing into the window of a toyshop" (P 
39). The humor of this sketch exploits the presumed incompatibility of 
numbers and words, that is, of quantitative and qualitative language. But 
the joke here falls equally on mathematics and language. It's just as silly 
to presume that language lacks precision as to consider numbers incom~ 
patible with words. Even more to the point, considering how this sketch 
acts out what would later become the controversy between C. P. Snow 
and F.R. Leavis over the so~called "Two Cultures," the comic incon~ 
gruities prove that numbers and words can combine productively, if 
unconventionally. Certainly it is no coincidence that the sketch also 
illustrates Phoenix's characteristic portrayal of science and technology as 
benevolent activities: generally useful, definitely not harmful, and fun, to 
boot. 
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That affection shows most clearly in Phoenix's absurd machines that 
nonetheless serve a useful function, occasionally even correcting the flaws 
in other machines. These stand in strong contrast to Rube Goldberg's 
unnecessarily complicated inventions, which criticize the technological 
imagination as high,blown and bombastic. 40 Derby was an accomplished 
cartoonist, and offered "Sewing Machine-Feline Attachment" (1857) as 
a mock,patent, complete with illustration. Probably the most inspired of 
Phoenix's inventions, the Feline Attachment runs the sewing machine on 
cat,and,mouse power, thereby avoiding any injury to the seamstress from 
operating the hand crank and foot treadle (S 62A). A similar comic respect 
extends to the scientific mind in the idea that triangulation by tripod can 
rescue a mission that has lost, misused, or broken all its other equipment. 
In this sense, even when he isn't proposing inventions, Phoenix celebrates 
intellectual inventiveness. Such attitudes form the cornerstone of a humor 
based on learned wit. 
The two "Lectures on Astronomy" (1854) demonstrate not only Der, 
by's own intellectual dexterity, but also the way his humor demands and 
flatters an equally educated audience. The relatively small size of that 
group, especially in comparison to the audience for the anti,intellectual 
humor of amateurs, may explain why learned wit receives less attention 
than vernacular scientific humor. Indeed, the "Lectures" make fun of the 
lay public and the debased science they acquired through the various 
public lecture series enjoying success in the 1840s and 1850s, when, 
following the discovery of several planets and satellites, public interest in 
astronomy ran high. In a postscript between the two installments of his 
burlesque, Phoenix indicates his contempt for the intellectual level of 
popularizers and their listeners as he describes how previous audiences had 
foiled his plan "to exhibit and explain to the audience an orrery, accom, 
panying and interspersing his remarks by a choice selection of popular airs 
on the hand organ" (P 66): these folks just wanted to eat the planets and 
sun, represented by apples spaced on wires around an orange. His con, 
tempt for the ordinary citizens who flocked to such demonstrations indi, 
cates how far Derby's intellectual humor stood from the vernacular assump, 
tions of Twain's scientific sketches, and what a different conception of his 
audience Phoenix held. 
Derby may have considered himself the ideal reader of the "Lectures," 
which, instead of offering a narrative, invite the reader to untangle the 
facts, irrelevancies, and puns mingled in a sophomoric survey of the solar 
system: 
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Copernicus (who was a son of Daniel Pemicus, of the firm of Pemicus & Co., 
wool-dealers, and who was named Co. Pemicus, out of respect for his father's 
partners) ... started the idea of the present Solar System. [P 54] 
In consequence of the rapid movement ofJupiter upon his axis, his form 
is that of an oblate spheroid, very considerably flattened at its poles, and the 
immense centrifugal force resulting from this movement (26,554 miles per 
hour), would, undoubtedly, have long since caused him to fly asunder, were it 
not for a wise provision of nature, which has caused enormous belts or hoops, 
to encircle his entire surface. 
These hoops, usually termed belts, are plainly visible through the tele-
scope. They are eight in number, and are supposed to be made of gutta 
percha, with an outer edge of No. 1 boiler iron. [P 239] 4l 
These examples represent some of the more accessible details in the 
"Lectures," whose erudition must have puzzled more than a few readers. Of 
course, the audience of the Pioneer, an avowedly intellectual monthly that 
originally published the sketches, would have enjoyed the advice to "our 
old friend and former schoolmate, Mr. Agassiz, ... [who] by closely 
observing one of these [sun] spots with a strong refracting telescope, ... 
may discover a new species of fish" (P 58). Similarly, the section on 
Neptune could rest on residual publicity from the planet's discovery just 
eight years earlier, in 1846.42 But other sections contain technical jokes 
that probably excited enthusiasm only among Lieutenant Derby's col-
leagues in the Topographical Engineers, who doubtless shared his opinion 
about "a light course of reading" including texts on "Deferential and 
Integral Calculus" [sic], optics, and astronomy (P 248). 
The "Lectures" parade Derby's learning, but an earlier sketch, "The 
San Francisco Antiquarian Society, and California Academy of Arts and 
Sciences" (1851), stands even further from the anti-intellectual tradition 
by making fun of other people's ignorance. 43 Here, instead of serving 
vernacular values, the various misspellings, mispronunciations, gram-
matical errors, and malapropisms all ridicule the intellectual pretensions 
and philanthropy of the self-made and self-educated B.S. Bags (get it?), 
who volunteers to fund the new society: "He had not the advantage of an 
early education . . . but he read a good deal, and liked it; and he dare say 
now, that if the truth had been found out, he knowed a great deal more 
than some of those filosifers at the east. . . . By reading the papers daily, 
particularly the 'Alta California,' he found all sorts of new matters which 
he supposed give him considerable idea of'New Mattix."' (P 141). Phoe-
nix's visual humor typically involves cartoons and comic typography, not 
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illiterate misspellings, 44 although other Literary Comedians so exploited 
their love of cacography that they became known as the Misspellers. But 
here in "The San Francisco Antiquarian Society" he sneers unbecomingly 
at democratic ideas about education and self, improvement, since even the 
Society's more conventionally qualified leadership, including two doctors 
and M. Quelque Chose, fall below the humorist's intellectual standards. 
Assigned to write a constitution for the new San Francisco Antiquarian 
Society and California Academy of Arts and Sciences, the executive 
committee declares, "The objects of this Society shall comprise inquiries 
into every thing in the remotest degree scientific or artful" (P 143 ). Derby's 
disparagement of the scientific society follows the same procedure as his 
ridicule of the pamphlet on the gyroscope's motion: he deflates pretensions 
of learning while parading his own superior knowledge. 
This tradition of wit continues today in the humor of Journal of 
Irreproducible Results (1962, ), published quarterly by Blackwell Scientific 
Publications. For example, a 1991 research report, "Aging: A Contagious 
Disease," presents epidemiological data from nursery schools to support its 
hypothesis: both aging and slow viral diseases "show late onset," "[are] 
difficult to diagnose," and "have lethal outcome. "45 Stress Analysis of a 
Strapless Evening Gown (1963 ), which spoofs the technological imagina, 
tiqn, and The Journal of Polymorphous Perversity, a quarterly lampoon of 
psychology and psychiatry, 46 also sustain Derby's brand of learned wit. 
For the most part, however, Derby did not write the sort of scientific 
humor that aims directly at the audience's ignorance: the hoax. This third 
tradition of American scientific humor has a long, if not particularly 
honorable, history that continues today primarily in science fiction. 
Walter Blair and Hamlin Hill have traced the American comic hoax all the 
way back to tracts extolling the extraordinary flora and fauna of the new 
world, 47 but the genre received a boost from the nearly continuous stream 
of scientific discoveries in the mid,nineteenth century. The great moon 
hoax of Richard Adams Locke in 1835 featured British astronomer Sir John 
Herschel in a report, ostensibly reprinted from the Edinburgh Journal of 
Science, on the flora and fauna of the moon. 48 The gold rush and railway 
construction excited interest in rock,collecting and other forms of amateur 
geology and mineralogy, and descriptions of fictitious fossils began to 
constitute a subgenre. 49 For his only excursion into the genre, John 
Phoenix became Dr. Herman Ellenbogen, M.D., whose "Remarkable 
Discoveries in Oregon and Washington Territories" (1855) firmly estab, 
lished the guyascutus and the prock in the American bestiary. so Other 
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tales offered greater astonishments. In a geological and mineralogical vein, 
for instance, Dr. Friedrich Lichtenberger's "Extraordinary Account of 
Human Petrifaction" (1858) detailed the geological action producing 
semiprecious gemstones from petrified blood and arteries. 51 Mark Twain's 
"Petrified Man" (1862) took similar advantage of contemporary interest in 
fossils, although it didn't imitate scientific journalism but simply gave 
proof to the folk myth that a foolish grimace can become permanent. 52 
These and similar stories satisfied the hunger of readers from California to 
New York for tales of America's natural wonders. But for all their popu-
larity, none of these reports took in both lay readers and professional 
scientists as did the various hoaxes perpetrated by William Wright (1829-
1898). 
Under his nom de plume Dan De Quille, Wright wrote hundreds of 
factual and imaginative newspaper sketches, expecting readers to distin-
guish truth from hoax. His stories about the Comstock, America's silver-
mining capital, appeared nationwide. He wrote for the New York Sun 
(America's best-selling daily) and the New York Herald (as Nevada corre-
spondent) in addition to the Virginia City Territorial Enterprise and its 
sister publication, San Francisco's Golden Era; his work also appeared 
regularly in a variety of smaller and more specialized publications, includ-
ing the Overland Monthly, Engineering and Mining Journal, Mining and 
Scientific Press, and the journals of the Lorborn Publishing Company of 
Baltimore. 53 Most of his journalism falls into familiar categories: local 
news, popular science and technology, adventure narratives. His humor-
ous sketches often recall the early works of Mark Twain, who seems to 
have taught the local editor as much as the editor taught him. De Quille 
contributed to the mid-century's conventional stock of petrification lore 
with "Petrified or the Stewed Chicken Monster" (1863), his first exagger-
ated tale, a dream of having eaten so much stewed chicken that his own 
body petrified as a result. 54 But beginning two years later with his first real 
tall tale, "A Silver Man" (1865), and continuing with other stretchers, De 
Quille exploited scientific subjects in a tone so authentic that some 
German scientists apparently resented the secrets withheld by "Herr Dan 
De Quille, the eminent physicist of Virginiastadt, Nevada." 55 That 
Wright could pass as a physicist (much less be accused of eminence) 
demonstrates not only how much he knew about science and how expertly 
scientific lies came from his pen but also how differently experts and 
amateurs have fun with science. The hoax takes humor beyond the inside 
jokes of learned wit and leads to the realm of the practical joke. 
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"Dan was a good deal of a geologist and something of a mineralogist," 
C.C. Goodwin recalled, and no less an authority than the zoologist and 
paleontologist Edward Drinker Cope (1840, 1897), editor of the American 
Naturalist, sought De Quille's aid in describing the "mountain alligator." 56 
But just where Wright acquired his expertise remains a mystery. In contrast 
to the extensive biographical material available for Derby, including rec, 
ords of his academic work at West Point, Wright's biography consists 
mainly of snippets in books by or about his more famous friends from the 
Comstock Lode, especially Mark Twain and Wells Drury. 57 Few facts exist 
about Wright's life before 1862, when he joined the staff of Virginia City's 
Territorial Enterprise a few months ahead of Samuel Clemens, and fewer 
still before 1857, when Wright left his wife and their three living children 
near what is now West Liberty, Iowa,. to begin prospecting in California. 58 
Doubtless he learned much of his science on the job, since even unsuc, 
cessful miners like him acquired a rudimentary knowledge of mineralogy 
and geology; if he had any formal education in Knox County, Ohio (where 
he was born in 1829 and lived until1849), it was probably fairly basic when 
he matriculated at the poor man's Harvard-that is, the newspaper office. 
He had already published more than fifty sketches in Golden Era by 
the time Joe Goodman signed him up for the Enterprise, 59 but once there 
his opportunities for self,education, particularly in mineralogy, expanded 
greatly. While the western press followed the example of eastern sheets in 
reprinting public lectures and reporting scientific discoveries, editors in 
the mining districts knew that their readers had especially hearty appetites 
for science with a local angle: western geology and the newest procedures 
for locating, identifying, and purifying minerals. The weekly Golden 
Era-"the most important journal ever published on the Pacific slope," 
according to Franklin Walker60-set the formula. In the late 1850s and 
early 1860s, the Golden Era won readers well beyond San Francisco by 
running regular deparments on mining and ~griculture alongside literary 
contributions by staff writer Bret Harte and Nevada correspondents De 
Quille and Twain. Following suit, the Overland Monthly (founded 1868) 
not only published local,color tales like Harte's sentimental "Luck of 
Roaring Camp" and De Quille's mining stories but also featured nonfic, 
tional writing like geologist Clarence King's harrowing accounts of moun, 
tain climbing in the Sierra Nevada and John Muir's speculations on glacial 
erosion. 6l The daily Territorial Enterprise enjoyed at least as much success 
with the formula as its two more literary city cousins: in his local news 
column, a feature rather like the New Yorker's "Talk of the Town," De 
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Quille covered the news of the mines, including new techniques and 
discoveries, and filled any remaining space with fiction, leaving it to his 
readers to separate fact from fancy. He had every reason to expect that they 
would. The Territorial Enterprise could joke about "two and four legged 
specimens of the species donkey" nearly a month before the American 
edition of On the Origin of Species appeared because its readers kept up with 
scientific news. 
The newspaper clippings in De Quille's personal papers demonstrate 
that he followed technical publications as well as the popular press. But 
regardless of the source of his knowledge, his authority was widely re-
spected. He contributed to mining journals, Myron Angel's History of 
Nevada (1881), and the Encyclopedia Britannica (lOth ed., 1884 ). Although 
his reputation as a humorist has suffered because he did not publish a 
volume of comic sketches, his reputation as a science journalist has been 
well served by the two books he did write: A History of the Comstock Silver 
Lode Mines (1889), a volume of popular science and local lore aimed at rail 
travelers, and The Big Bonanza (1876), the authoritative history of mining 
science, technology, and society on the Comstock Lode. 
De Quille exploits this expertise in his scientific humor quite dif-
ferently from either Phoenix or Twain; he lacked Twain's irreverence for 
science as surely as he spumed Phoenix's contempt for the self-taught. 
Folklorist C. Grant Loomis, who judged De Quille's scientific tales "a 
departure from the usual tradition of lying," 62 traced their unusual powers 
of deception to two factors: readers had become accustomed to astonishing 
tales of scientific discovery, while the writer had chosen topics within the 
range of the probable. 63 But the narratives themselves reveal two addi-
tional, perhaps more important factors. Dan De Quille knew enough 
science to fill his tales with incredible facts as well as convincing fantasies. 
In consequence, the stories conveyed an authentic respect for scientific 
knowledge in general and a persuasive pride in his own explanation of the 
"truth." 
All these factors animate "A Silver Man" (1865), De Quille's most 
elaborate pseudo-scientific tale, although his first hoax. Headlined "The 
Wonder of the Age," the sketch masquerades as a news item describing a 
human body that became "a mass of sulphuret of silver, slightly mixed with 
copper and iron (in the shape of pyrites)" (Q 38). First, De Quille puts his 
yam in the journalistic tradition of fossil-finds when he observes that the 
miners who discovered the body originally considered it "a most remark-
able petrifaction" (Q 38) and only later realized that it was actually 
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"mineralized." Then he carefully places it within the realm of the possible 
by detailing the practical aspects of its discovery and excavation. But both 
of these tactics, far from being unique either to De Quille's humor or to 
scientific yarns, fall within the standard narrative devices of the tall tale. A 
tall talker typically piles realistic details onto fantasy, offers irrelevant 
examples, and cites evidence unavailable for inspection; De Quille follows 
the formula. He details the excavation of the silver man (facts especially 
convincing to an audience of miners), proposing the "very reasonable" 
opinion of how the man got into the cave (he was looking for shelter) and 
glossing over the lack of hard evidence (the silver man is already disin~ 
tegrating from contact with the atmosphere! ). Like many another western 
yarnspinner who tricked his listeners a while and thus eventually brought 
them within the circle of the initiated, De Quille flatters his audience a bit 
when he describes his news source, one Peter Kuhlman, as "not only a good 
practical miner, but an excellent chemist and mineralogist" (Q 38). Along 
with the miners who also came to accept the reality of the silver man, 
Kuhlman serves as a rhetorical role model for the audience. 
More revealing of De Quille's originality, however, is the respect for 
science implicit in the appeal to his readers' vanity. He suggests that only 
the ignorant would reject the report as fantastic. "All who have the least 
knowledge of palaeontology," he admonishes, "know that all those won~ 
derful remains of fishes, animals, etc., found in limestone and other rocks, 
and about which so much is said and written, are not the creatures 
themselves, but merely their shapes replaced by mineral substances" (Q 
40). The boldness of this passage sustains a tone established in the first two 
sentences, which seem charmingly coy to the initiated but assert an 
intimidating authoritativeness to the naive: "Everybody, no doubt, has 
heard of the discovery of the wonderful 'Silver Man,' found in a mine 
between Esmeralda and Owen's River. Everybody, however, has not heard 
the full particulars of the discovery, and many will hoot at the idea of any 
such discovery ever having been made. They will at once say that it is 
impossible for a human body to be changed to silver ore. Let them have 
their say!" (Q 37). Indeed, far from laughing at science and scientists, De 
Quille's hoax delights in learning and ridicules those too ignorant to enjoy 
his game. He does not resort to nonsense terms or neologisms, for example, 
when he wants comic jargon. On the contrary, he celebrates scientific 
learning by reaching for the highest available diction-real scientific 
terminology-to describe "the argentiferous homo ... held by an ac~ 
cumulation of pyritous concretions" (Q 39). 
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Respect for science also influences the narrative structure of "The 
Silver Man." Rather than citing authorities and facts at the beginning of 
the story and then building upon them, as in a conventional yam, De 
Quille reserves them for the end. Placed there, his appeals to authority not 
only gain strength from the rhetorical power of the ending but also distract 
the reader from the questionable silver man to verifiable scientific curi, 
osities. In the process, De Quille shifts the focus of the tale from the 
imaginary to the real. To similar effect, he does not entirely populate the 
tale with fictitious experts like the miner Kuhlman but refers to genuine 
scientific authorities, as well. He cites the German mineralogist J.F.A. 
Breithaupt (1791,1873) and the French physicist Henri Hureau de Senar, 
mont (1808, 1862) for evidence of related phenomena, a human body 
turned to iron and artificial crystal formation, respectively. 64 
Such mixing of the historical and the imaginary has become com, 
monplace in American comic fiction, for example in Thomas Pynchon's 
Gravity's Rainbow (1973) and Philip Roth's The Great American Novel 
(1973), both of which construct what Roth has called "a passageway from 
the imaginary that comes to seem real to the real that comes to seem 
imaginary. "65 Compared to these twentieth,century writers and their self, 
conscious narration, De Quille uses the technique rather prosaically. His 
scientific explanation of the silver man comes only after all his various 
appeals for belief, and he reasons mainly from three facts: that fossils of 
mineral,rocks develop inside the earth, that mine gases have preserved 
human remains for up to sixty years and have even allowed iron pyrites to 
fossilize human form, and that under certain circumstances new mineral 
deposits continuously replace worked,out veins. But this blending of the 
real and the imaginary was rare for 1865. 
So he must have taken great pleasure in the apparently universal belief 
in his story of "The Traveling Stones ofPahranagat Valley" (c. 1865,66)-
at least before matters got out of hand. The sketch announced the 
discovery of round stones with such strong magnetic properties that they 
would travel to each other within a radius of five feet. In addition to the 
jealous German scientists, no less a skeptic than P. T. Barnum seems to 
have been taken in by the tale (rumor has it that he offered De Quille ten 
thousand dollars for a set), 66 and of course ordinary citizens fell for it too. 
In 1872, six years after the original story, a request for five pounds of the 
stones prompted De Quille to hint at the truth when he announced in 
the Enterprise, "We have none of said rolling stones in this city at present 
but would refer our Colorado speculator to Mark Twain, who probably 
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still has on hand fifteen or twenty bushels of assorted sizes. "67 But the 
tale, reprinted a few years later in The Big Bonanza, continued spreading 
until 1879, when after fifteen years the humorist decided he'd had 
enough. Adopting the pose of the Sufferer familiar to readers of Mark 
Twain, De Quille complained that "this thing . . . is becoming a little 
monotonous": 
Letter after letter have we opened from foreign parts in the expectation of 
hearing something to our advantage-that half a million had been left us 
somewhere or that somebody was anxious to pay us four bits a column for 
sketches about the mountains and the mines-and have only found some 
other man wanting to know all about those traveling stones. . . . We are now 
growing old, and we want peace. We desire to throw up the sponge and 
acknowledge the com; therefore we solemnly affirm that we never heard of 
any such diabolical cobbles as the traveling stones ofPahranagat-though we 
still think there ought to be something of the kind somewhere in the world. If 
this candid confession shall carry a pang to the heart of any true believer, we 
shall be glad of it, as the true believers have panged it to us, right and left, 
quite long enough." 68 
None of De Quille's other sketches had quite the same longevity as 
"The Traveling Stones of Pahranagat Valley," but one story did inspire 
similar belief, the tale of how inventor Jonathan Newhouse froze to death 
in the desert on the trial run of his air,conditioning apparatus. Generally 
known as "The Solar Armor," it was originally published in two stages in 
the Territorial Enterprise, first as a brief item headed "Sad Fate of an 
Inventor" (1874) and later as an elaborate sketch titled "A Mystery 
Explained" (1874).69 The development of De Quille's tale demonstrates 
his pleasure both in displaying scientific knowledge and in blending fact 
with fantasy. The various second,hand versions of the tale, on the other 
hand, which caught the public imagination, clarify the difference between 
De Quille's affectionate humor of science and the anti,intellectual tradi, 
tion of the amateurs. 
The first version follows the formula of"A Silver Man": the Territorial 
Enterprise summarizes a report, ostensibly from a gentleman elsewhere in 
the state, of an unusual finding. With deadpan restraint, the one, 
paragraph item simply describes the apparatus devised by Jonathan New, 
house, "a man of considerable inventive genius" (Q 33). The armor 
consisted of a hooded jacket made of sponge that was connected by a tube 
to a rubber water,sack under one arm, and the contraption kept the wearer 
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cool by bathing his skin with water, supplied when he squeezed the sack 
with his upper arm. "Thus, by the evaporation of the moisture in the 
armor," De Quille explains, "it was calculated might be produced any 
degree of cold" ( Q 34 ). The nub of the story concerns the condition of the 
inventor when he was found dead two days after he left town for a trial in 
the desert: "He was dead and frozen stiff. His beard was covered with frost 
and-though the noonday sun poured down its fiercest rays-an icicle 
over a foot in length hung from his nose. There he had perished miserably, 
because his armor had worked too well, and because it was laced up behind 
where he could not reach the fastenings" (Q 34). With his typical respect 
for science, De Quille places the failure of the trial in the context of two 
successes: of the operation of the apparatus itself and, more important, of 
the underlying scientific principle of cooling by evaporation. Indeed, he 
implies that complete success requires only the minor matter of redesigned 
fastenings for the jacket. 
The second version of the tale exploited public interest in the story, 
which in two months had spread to London, where to its credit the Daily 
Telegraph cautioned, "we should require some additional confirmation 
before we unhesitatingly accept it" (Q 35). After summarizing the original . 
account and its treatment in the English press, De Quille begins an 
elaborate hoax with a tweak at the British: "glad that the Telegraph has 
given us the opportunity, long awaited, of publishing in detail the sequel to 
the curious affair," he immediately points to an error in the Telegraph, 
which placed Virginia City next to Death Valley, and only then proceeds 
with the full report of "one David Baxter ... Justice of the Peace and ex, 
officio Coroner of Salt Wells, a station in In yo County, California, situated 
at the head of the Sink of Amargosa River, at the north end of Death 
Valley" (Q 35). Such careful identification of geographical location, like 
the details of excavating the Silver Man, belies his other liberties with 
truth as he corrects "our first brief and imperfect account of the affair" 
(Q 35). 
The water,cooled apparatus of the first version develops a more com, 
plex thermodynamics in the second. The site alongside the inventor's 
corpse is now revealed to have been littered with various vials-liquid 
ether and carbon bisulphide, and various salts of sodium and am, 
monium-and these chemicals are now believed to have produced ex, 
treme cold through various unspecified chemical reactions as well as 
simple evaporation. Very high diction enhances the pseudo,scientific 
explanation: "the frost and icicle found on the beard and depending from 
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the nose of the deceased were formed &om the water mingled with the 
more volatile fluids comprising the frigorific mixture" (Q 36). The evi~ 
dence in this tale is as elusive, however, as it was fragile in "A Silver 
Man"- as scarce as a snowball in hell or ice in Death Valley. In addition to 
the testimony (secondhand) of the men who reported that their fingers 
nearly froze as they handled the corpse, the evidence in this case consists of 
the armor itself. But examining it will prove difficult: as the men struggled 
to load the corpse onto a horse, "the freezing moisture oozed out of the 
spongy armor upon their hands and gave them intense pain. Finally-after 
they found they could handle the body in no other way-they were obliged 
to cut the lacings to the armor. When, after an infinite deal of pain to their 
hands and fingers, the armor was peeled off the body and left lying in the 
desert, where it probably still remains" (Q 36). With the familiar coyness 
of the tall talker, De Quille feigns bewilderment at the failure of the San 
Francisco Academy of Sciences to comment on Newhouse's chemicals, 
but he does not joke about the meaning of the inventor's death: "he fell 
victim to a rash experiment with chemicals with the nature of which he 
was but imperfectly acquainted" (Q 37). In other words, Newhouse died 
because he knew too little about science. 
Although De Quille consistently locates the solar armor in a context of 
respect for science, most of its secondary versions belong to the dominant 
anti~intellectual tradition. De Quille's near~contemporary Wells Drury 
comes close to the spirit of the original story when he reports, incorrectly, 
that the inventor had filled the apparatus with too much ammonia, "with 
the most unhappy results." 70 But DeLancey Ferguson's account, in which 
"the inventor froze to death . . . because a valve had stuck and he couldn't 
turn off the power," 71 turns the simple apparatus into a dangerous, autono~ 
mous machine and illustrates in the process the Luddite assumptions of 
conventional American humor. These stand out even more sharply when 
Ivan Benson tells the tale in Mark Twain's Western Years (1938); the 
original sponge~and~sack apparatus of 1874 has metamorphosed into a 
portable air conditioner complete with "a small air compressor[!] and a 
battery," though the first practical dry cell was not invented until 1888, 
nearly fifteen years after De Quille's story. But more important than the 
technical improvements on the apparatus are the implications arising from 
them. The autonomous invention outwits its inventor, and a voracious 
science demands human sacrifice: "With his rubber suit on, the wearer 
could turn on the compressor, which was concealed within. One button 
started the compressor; another turned it off. . . . The daring inventor had 
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given his life for science. He had started the compressor but had been unable 
to tum it off, and had frozen to death. The machine was still running when 
the body was found." 72 In the slightly more than half a century between 
De Quille's version and Benson's, a tale elevating scientific knowledge over 
ignorance became a fable of dangerous science and technology. Whatever 
the reason for the transformation-surely influenced by sources ranging 
from Twain's A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889) to Mus-
soHni's invasion of Abyssinia-the damage to De Quille's "quaint," as he 
termed this sort of yam, underscores how fragile has been respect for 
science in American humorous literature. 
The fragility offers a clue to the conflict between the enthusiasm for 
technology running through most of Connecticut Yankee and its apocalyp-
tic, Luddite ending: Twain's admiration could not withstand the contempt 
implicit in his vernacular narrative conventions. Even more important, 
the transformation of "The Solar Armor" helps explain why the amusing 
and historically important proscientific humor of Dan De Quille and John 
Phoenix has receded from public view. The utter dominance of the anti· 
intellectual tradition has obscured it. The obscurity has proved doubly 
unfortunate for Dan De Quille, since his small place in American literary 
history already rests primarily on his silence. It was after all De Quille's 
absence from the Territorial Enterprise, whose local news department then 
fell to Clemens, that gave birth to Mark Twain. Yet Phoenix's reputation 
has fared only a little better. Attention has focused almost exclusively on 
the atypical "Official Report," the satire on government scientists that 
Twain easily turned into an attack on science itself. Indeed, so pervasive 
are America's anti-intellectual comic conventions that one critic recently 
asserted, despite all the evidence of Derby's intellectual snobbery, that 
Phoenix deserved greater attention because his "scientists' methods . . . 
provided an apt symbol for the tyranny of reason." 73 Such misunderstand-
ing is not at all surprising, given the general prejudice against science in 
American humor. But it is disappointing nonetheless, for it cheats George 
Horatio Derby and William Wright of their genuine significance in Amer-
ican letters. In contrast to amateurs like Mark Twain, Phoenix and De 
Quille knew enough about science to laugh with it as friends. 
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Traveling in Time 
with Mark Twain 
H. BRUCE FRANKLIN 
We all travel in time every day. The sun rises and sets, our bodies age, the 
world changes, and our minds move backward with memory and forward 
with anticipation. After a night's sleep, we wake into a different world. But 
time travel means something different from all these common experiences. 
Time travel is a peculiarly modem form of exploration. 
Historical time, at least in Anglo-European culture, used to be mere 
chronology-a sequence that arranged genealogy, the reigns of kings, 
famous battles, natural disasters, and other notable events. But when 
science and technology began to induce changes in material existence so 
rapid that people could perceive them in a single lifetime, the fundamental 
conditions in other "times" began to seem qualitatively different from 
those of the present. These ever swifter changes effected by science and 
technology led inevitably to the remembrance of time past and the 
anticipation of future time when life was and would be different from the 
present-in ways determined by science and technology. 
Indeed, "the future" is itself a modem concept. The first fictions set in 
a human (rather than religious) future appeared in the middle of the 
seventeenth century. 1 But it was not until the Industrial Revolution and 
the concurrent emergence of revolutionary ideology that fiction began to 
project a future changed radically by science and technology. Perhaps the 
earliest unequivocal example is Louis-Sebastian Mercier's 1770 VAn 2440, 
which dreams of a scientifically organized utopia eight centuries hence 
when youth receive their "first communion" through the telescope and the 
microscope. 
During the nineteenth century, time was continually being redefined 
by new instruments of observation and measurement, new modes of 
industrial organization, and new means of transportation, communica· 
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tion, and even lighting. Industrial capitalism transmuted the units of time 
that mark the planet's rotation and history, substituting the workers' punch 
clock for the sun and extending the age of the earth back beyond the 
carbonaceous fossils consumed ever more voraciously by the fires of rna~ 
chines. Science conceptualized cosmic time, within which it located 
geological time, within which it established a macrohistory of organic 
species, within which it designed a history of the human species. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the scientific design of 
that human history had become clear to the leading thinkers of Europe and 
the United States. It seemed sequential, linear, progressive, and defined 
by the level of science and technology. Historical time is thlls arranged in a 
spatial hierarchy. Each age is categorized by its prevailing technology, and 
"ahead" in time means more technologically, and therefore more socially, 
advanced. (The Bronze Age is "ahead" of the Stone Age, but "behind" the 
Iron Age.) Forward and backward in time become directions with an 
unequivocal meaning. 
Time travel literature could now have profound social significance. A 
striking example is Edward Bellamy's 1888 Looking Backward, which be~ 
came an instant best~seller and changed the consciousness of Americans 
more than any other novel of the century except for Uncle Tom's Cabin. 
The following year appeared a true masterpiece of time travel fiction, Mark 
Twain's A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. 
When in 1906 Twain thinks back on what he was trying to do in A 
Connecticut Yankee, he draws upon the predominant model of historic 
time: "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court was an attempt to 
imagine, and after a fashion set forth, the hard conditions of life for the 
laboring and defenseless poor in bygone times in England, and inciden~ 
tally contrast these conditions with those under which the civil and 
ecclesiastical pets of privilege and high fortune lived in those times. . . . 
I was purposing to contrast that English life . . . of the whole of the 
Middle Ages, with the life of modem Christendom and modem civiliza~ 
tion-to the advantage of the latter, of course." 2 But then he notes two 
anomalies in the conventional model of historical progress: "That advan~ 
tage is still claimable and does creditably and handsomely exist every~ 
where in Christendom-if we leave out Russia and the royal palace of 
Belgium." The case of Belgium seems to refute the linkage between 
technological and moral progress, as Twain next dramatizes in an elo~ 
quent denunciation of King Leopold's genocidal imperialism in the 
Congo, which makes the miserable conditions of the poor in the Middle 
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Ages seem like "heaven itself as compared with those which have ob, 
tained in the Congo." Twain concludes his reflections on A Connecticut 
Yankee by using the conventional spatial directions of time to show how 
Russia under the czar radically distorts the whole structure of human 
history: 
I have mentioned Russia. Cruel and pitiful as was life throughout Christen-
dom in the Middle Ages, it was not as cruel, not as pitiful, as is life in Russia 
today. In Russia, for three centuries, the vast population has been ground 
under the heels, and for the sole and sordid advantage, of a procession of 
crowned assassins and robbers who have all deserved the gallows. Russia's 
hundred and thirty millions of miserable subjects are much worse off today 
than were the poor of the Middle Ages whom we so pity. We are accustomed 
now to speak of Russia as medieval and as standing still in the Middle Ages, 
but that is flattery. Russia is way back of the Middle Ages; the Middle Ages are 
a long way in front of her and she is not likely to catch up with them so long as 
the Czardom continues to exist. 
Historical time is also distorted by the time travel in A Connecticut 
Yankee itself, which leads to complexities and difficulties, often attributed 
by critics to Twain's carelessness. Of course Twain was not a neat and tidy 
artist, but some of the novel's most apparently problematic aspects in fact 
constitute part ot its highest achievement. For A Connecticut Yankee is 
probably the first fiction to explore philosophical and political paradoxes 
inherent both in the very conception of time travel and in Anglo, 
European perceptions of time relationships in nineteenth, and twentieth, 
century history. To comprehend the novel's scope, it is helpful to approach 
it through a somewhat simpler time travel work by Twain, "From the 
'London Times' of 1904." 
In the spring of 1898, Mark Twain met Jan Szczepanik, the famous 
inventor from Cracow who had devised a "telelectroscope" for transmitting 
televised images by wire. 3 Twain referred to the invention in a brief essay 
about Szczepanik, published as "The Austrian Edison Keeping School 
Again" in the October Century Magazine. The following month, the 
Century Magazine somehow was able to reprint the subsequent history of 
the telelectroscope, originally published in the London Times of 1904 in the 
form of correspondence by Mark Twain, datelined Chicago, April1, 5, and 
23, 1904. Remember that this story, supposedly from 1904, actually ap, 
peared in November 1898, just as the United States was fulfilling its new 
"Manifest Destiny" of becoming a global empire. 
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On the surface, "From the 'London Times' of 1904"4 is a rather 
ingenious but puzzling little squib. But compressed into its few pages are 
coiled mechanisms designed to make shocking connections. The story 
gives a small sample of Twain's innovative use offictive time travel as a. 
vehicle for dramatizing perceptions into the interplay among science, 
technology, the nature of time, causality, and social change. 
The opening scene takes place after midnight on March 31, 1898. 
"War was at that time threatening between Spain and our country," 
the author reminds his 1904 readers. The inventor Szczepanik ends up 
in a fistfight with Lieutenant Clayton, a U.S. Army officer who had 
baited him with the taunt that the telelectroscope would never "do a 
farthing's worth of real service for any human being." The two men 
meet and fight again in the fall of 1901, after the telelectroscope has 
been connected with the "limitless~distance" telephone systems of the 
whole world, thus making the daily doings of the globe "visible to 
everybody." 
Then Szczepanik vanishes. In December 1901 a corpse, "easily identi~ 
fied as Szczepanik's," is discovered in Clayton's cellar. The man had died 
by violence. Clayton is convicted of the murder and sentenced to be 
hanged. After all reprieves are exhausted, the execution time is fixed 
ineluctably for 4 A.M., March 31, 1904. 
An hour before he is to go to the gallows on this stormy night, 
Clayton, wishing to see the sun once again, calls Peking. The fictive Mark 
Twain of 1904, who is sharing the doomed man's final hours, is "strangely 
stirred" and muses: "To think that it is a mere human being who does this 
unimaginable miracle-turns winter into summer, night into day, storm 
into calm, gives the freedom of the great globe to a prisoner in his cell, and 
the sun in his naked splendor to a man dying in Egyptian darkness! " This 
paean to the wonders of science seems to materialize in the image that 
floods into the cell, described by Clayton's exclamations in the telephone 
conversation: 
"What light! what brilliancy! what radiance! ... This is Peking?" 
"Yes." 
"The time?'' 
"Mid~aftemoon." 
"What is the great crowd for, and in such gorgeous costumes? What 
masses and masses of rich color and barbaric magnificence! And how they 
flash and glow and bum in the flooding sunlight! What is the occasion of it 
all?" 
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In the melodramatic context, with the bell tolling "another age" with each 
passing hour, it is easy to read right over the significance of the answer 
evoked by Clayton's excited question: "The coronation of our new em, 
peror-the Czar." 
The story hurries on to its melodramatic happy ending without linger, 
ing over this revelation. With the halter around Clayton's neck and only an 
instant before the fatal lever is to be pulled, "Mark Twain" sees Szczepanik's 
televised image at the Czar's Chinese coronation. Clayton is instantly 
pardoned and freed. "The kings and queens of many realms" buzz around 
Szczepanik, who explains that he had assumed a false identity so that he 
could "wander about the earth in peace" without being constantly lionized 
for his scientific miracle. So "Twain" concludes the tale that began on 
March 31, 1898, and "came near ending as a tragedy" on March 31, 1904. 
An April 5 sequel seems to be just a cute postscript that underscores the 
happy ending. 
But on April 23, 1904, "Twain" communicates an alternative, very 
nasty, conclusion. People begin to murmur: "But a man was killed, and 
Clayton killed him." Others try to excuse this oversight by pointing out 
that "we have been led away by excitement" (here is a hint to readers about 
their own responses). Then, "under the new paragraph added to the 
Constitution in 1899," the prohibition against double jeopardy has been 
repealed and the case is heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The new chief justice, named Lemaitre, points out: "By the decision of the 
French courts in the Dreyfus matter, it is established beyond cavil or 
question that the decisions of courts are permanent and cannot be re, 
vised." Since Clayton "has been fairly and righteously condemned to 
death for the murder of the man Szczepanik," he must be hanged. Ad, 
dressed as "your Excellency" -another hint that more has changed in this 
1904 America than inattentive readers might realize-Lemaitre dismisses 
the argument that Clayton has been pardoned for that murder: "The 
pardon is not valid, and cannot stand, because he was pardoned for killing 
a man whom he had not killed. A man cannot be pardoned for a crime 
which he has not committed; it would be an absurdity." Equally irrelevant 
is the fact that Clayton did kill another man: he must -and does-hang 
for killing Szczepanik. The final words of the tale are: "All America is 
vocal with scorn of 'French justice,' and of the malignant little soldiers 
who invented it and inflicted it upon the other Christian lands." 
Some critics find "From the 'London Times' of 1904" to be "confused" 
or "chaotic," or ascribe puzzling details, such as the identification of the 
162 American Literature and Science 
corpse as Szczepanik, to Twain's purported carelessness.s To be under-
stood, this story must be read as a specimen of modem time travel 
literature, with some sense of the history, assumptions, and special para-
doxes of this subgenre of science fiction. 
Since travel into the future is travel "forward" into a time tech-
nologically ahead of the present, the future scenes projected in fiction 
from the late eighteenth century through Looking Backward were domi-
nated by visions of social progress associated with the advance of science. 
Even the anti-utopian reactions to these optimistic scenarios tended to 
blame the unpleasant futures they foresaw not so much on present social or 
technological trends but on supposedly intractable human nature, as in 
Notes from the Underground, Dostoyevsky's 1864 response to the utopian 
socialism of Chemyshevsky's What Is To Be Done? Some future-scene 
fiction even imagined the world happily transformed by a single invention, 
especially one leading to swifter or broader communication (since, of 
course, all human problems come from a failure of communication). By 
the late 1880s, such wondrous inventions were commonplace in the most 
popular literary form in the United States-the dime novel. 
On one level, "From the 'London Times' of 1904" is a response to such 
naive enthusiasm for technology. Within a mere six years, the entire 
planet has been linked together by the "limitless-distance" telephone 
network, wondrously enhanced by Szczepanik's telelectroscope. Yet 
Clayton wins his bet that the telelectroscope would never "do a farthing's 
worth of real service for any human being" ; at the end, even his miraculous 
rescue by the marvelous invention is undone. Despite spectacular tech-
nological progress, the world of 1904 apparently has gone "backward" from 
the world familiar to the story's 1898 readers. American jurisprudence 
(headed by Chief Justice "Lemaitre") now slavishly follows the precedent 
set by France in the Dreyfus case. The Russian czar, regarded by Twain as 
the incarnation of everything evil and reactionary, is being crowned 
emperor of China. 
As soon as Clayton learns what he is witnessing, this strange dialogue 
ensues: 
"But I thought that that was to take place yesterday." 
"This is yesterday-to you." 
But according to our conception of time, this should be tomorrow, not 
yesterday, for the United States is a day behind the lands west of the 
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International Date Line. So in this alternative future, daily time, as well as 
historical time, actually seems somehow to be running backward. 
But is this "backward"? That depends on the definition of temporal 
directions. If technological advance nourishes the growth of alien forces 
such as dictatorship and imperialism, then the tyranny encroaching on the 
nation and world in "Twain's" 1904 might be what is encountered when 
traveling forward in time, into the twentieth century. 
"From the 'London Times' of 1904" envisions a possible future in 
which runaway technological progress offers diverting entertainment 
while the forces of empire are snuffing out the democratic and republican 
ideals of America. Although most of the story is set during April1904, its 
subtext relates to events taking place during April1898, in the days after its 
opening scene on March 31, when war was "threatening between Spain 
and our country." That war, declared in mid~April, ended in the triumph 
of imperialism and militarism. Though the corpse in Lieutenant-later 
Captain-Clayton's house may not be Szczepanik's, the representative of 
the U.S. Army officer corps has apparently killed, perhaps even more than 
the unidentified body in his basement. Readers who focus only on the 
personal melodrama miss the historical drama raging in the background. 
The corpse may be Szczepanik's or not, Clayton may be reprieved or 
hanged, China may or may not be annexed by the Russian czardom, 
French protofascism may or may not master American jurisprudence, the 
telelectroscope and other exciting technology may or may not be of "real 
service" to human beings-for this story is a subtle example of alternative~ 
future fiction. Any change in what did happen in the past-and Twain's 
March 31, 1898, is an alteration from the actual events-can logically 
produce any conceivable course of future events. By changing the past, the 
time traveler changes the present, which includes the actual history that 
led to it. 
Modem science fiction is replete with stories and novels dancing 
through these paradoxes. What happens to the present if you journey into 
the past and accidentally snuff out a little prehistoric creature integral to 
the course of evolution (as in Ray Bradbury's "A Sound of Thunder")? Or 
kill Columbus before he discovers America (as in Alfred Bester's "The Men 
Who Murdered Mohammed")? Or conceive yourself (as in Robert A. 
Heinlein's "All You Zombies-")? Or introduce late~nineteenth~century 
technology and ideology into a preindustrial society-as in both A Con~ 
necticut Yankee and the world it mirrors? 
The conventional model of historical time places the age of industrial 
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capitalism ahead of all preindustrial ages. Therefore according to this 
model, time travel was actually occurring in the late nineteenth century, as 
industrial societies encountered, and colonized, feudal and prefeudal so-
cieties in Asia and Africa. Another form of time travel was the eruption of 
industrial capitalism within a preindustrial society-such as the transition 
taking place in nineteenth-century America. A man like Thomas Alva 
Edison, bearing the technology of the future, could then be considered 
"the Wizard of Menlo Park," single-handedly transforming the world with 
his genius. Or Jan Szczepanik, whom Twain labels "the Austrian Edison," 
might herald a strange new century. What might happen, Twain asks in A 
Connecticut Yankee, if a man embodying the latest technology and ideology 
of late-nineteenth-century America could instantly be transported to a 
feudal, slave society? And what if this preindustrial society were the 
ancestor of modern England, the dominant imperialist power of the 
nineteenth century, which was then ruthlessly colonizing as many prein-
dustrialist societies as it could? And what if the time traveler's special area 
of expertise were the industrial development of modern weapons? 
An erstwhile foreman of a modern Connecticut gun factory, Hank 
Morgan has command of the technology of his times. Dropped into sixth-
century England, this knowledge makes him a lone genius, a "magician" 
single-handedly capable of organizing an industrial revolution that trans-
forms a feudal society into the material semblance of a modern industrial 
society. In other words, he thus becomes the heroic archetype of late 
nineteenth-century capitalist culture. 
Hank also incarnates the ideology of industrial capitalism. So in his 
mind there is no contradiction between his social and personal goals: 
remaking feudal England into a replica of late-nineteenth-century Amer-
ica while establishing himself as "the Boss." Although he hopes that 
changing society's technological base will lead to democratic culture and 
polity, he is by no means convinced that transforming the mode of 
production will automatically transform the cultural and political super-
structure. Indeed, he recognizes that without a thoroughgoing political 
and cultural revolution, his industrial revolution may not take root, much 
less achieve the democracy supposedly generated by industrial capitalism. 
In three separate passages (in chapters 13, 20, and 40), including one 
that coined the term "New Deal," Hank explains that his method of 
"peaceful revolution" would be unique in history. For "the ungetarounda-
ble fact" is that "all gentle cant and philosophising to the contrary 
notwithstanding, no people in the world ever did achieve their freedom by 
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goody~goody talk and moral suasion: it being immutable law that all 
revolutions that will succeed, must begin in blood, whatever may answer 
afterward. If history teaches anything, it teaches that. What this folk 
needed, then, was a Reign of Terror and a guillotine, and I was the wrong 
man for them."6 
Thus Hank's voyage backward in time creates a double set of con~ 
trafactual paradoxes. The past he enters thereby becomes radically dif~ 
ferent from the actual past of the present: among other things, he 
introduces an industrial revolution twelve centuries before it took place. 
Furthermore, he brings about historical change in ways contrary to the 
apparent laws of history. Twain plays these paradoxes out to their logical 
conclusions with astonishing ingenuity and originality, creating within A 
Connecticut Yankee what may be the first fully~developed alternative~future 
fiction, and then having this alternative future self~destruct from its own 
internal contradictions. 
In the alternative future, Hank does achieve his dream of a modem 
industrial political economy in the sixth century: "Slavery was dead and 
gone; all men were equal before the law; taxation had been equalized. The 
telegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the type~writer, the sewing 
machine, and the thousand willing and handy servants of steam and 
electricity were working their way into favor. We had a steamboat or two 
on the Thames, we had steam war~ships and the beginnings of a steam 
commercial marine; I was getting ready to send out an expedition to 
discover America" (443~44). Then the actual past and the laws of history 
reassert themselves, leaving only these remnants of the sixth~century 
industrial republic: a bullet~ hole in a suit of armor, the narrative itself, and 
Hank's dying dream, in which nineteenth~century America is only a 
dream. 
Hank's industrial republic is destroyed by three main forces: the 
Church; finance capitalism; and modem warfare. Without a political and 
thorough cultural revolution, human nature remains shaped by feudalism. 
So the Church is able to mobilize the aristocracy and the commoners to 
overthrow the capitalist polity established by the Boss. But these organized 
forces of feudalism get their opportunity from the self~destructive contra~ 
dictions of finance capitalism itself. When Hank returns from France, his 
youthful protege Clarence explains how everything would have gone along 
fine if it hadn't been for "one of your modem improvements-the stock~ 
board" (459). In other words, capitalism would follow its own ideals if it 
were not for capitalism. This paradox takes shape in an obvious satire on 
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the contemporaneous robber barons. The feudal knights played their role 
as capitalists only too well, with Sir Launcelot driving his rivals to 
desperate measures: 
"When you left, three miles of the London, Canterbury & Dover were 
ready for the rails, and also ready and ripe for manipulation in the stock 
market. It was wildcat, and everybody knew it. The stock was for sale at a 
give-away. What does Sir Launcelot do, but-" 
"Yes, I know; he quietly picked up nearly all of it, for a song; then he 
bought about twice as much more, deliverable upon call." [459] 
When Launcelot calls for delivery, the train of events leads to civil war and 
the unleashing of the Church. This in turn opens the gates for the most 
destructive of all forces-scientific, technological warfare. 
Modern warfare-the war of the factories and machines and organiza-
tion inevitably generated by the Industrial Revolution-had burst upon 
the actual world between 1861 and 1871 in the U.S. Civil War and the 
Franco-Prussian War. From the repeating rifle, primitive machine gun, 
observation balloon, submarine, and steam-powered ironclad warship of 
the Civil War would evolve the twentieth-century juggernaut capable of 
devastating the planet. In the final three decades of the nineteenth 
century, the great colonial empires-armed with ever more potent weap-
ons, driven by the forces of their own economies, and increasingly 
equipped for global activities-were carving up all that remained of the 
preindustrial world. A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court presents 
this deepening historical crisis of the age as grimly comic and finally 
catastrophic. 
As Twain wrote, American culture was generating a contradictory 
vision of the relations between industrial capitalism and modern warfare, 
one that exalted weapons technology as the path to peace and progress. 
American popular fiction was shaping the cult of the superweapon-an 
invincible product of American ingenuity that would defeat all the back-
ward and evil forces of the planet, thereby ending war and bringing about a 
global Pax Americana. 
Take, for example, Frank Stockton's The Great War Syndicate, pub-
lished the same year as A Connecticut Yankee. When war breaks out 
between England and the United States, twenty-three "great capitalists" 
form themselves into a "Syndicate, with the object of taking entire charge 
of the war." 7 The Great War Syndicate develops and demonstrates the 
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"Motor Bomb," which has the explosive force of a thermonuclear warhead. 
When England surrenders without a fight, it is permitted to join as a junior 
partner in what becomes the "Anglo,American Syndicate of War" (180). 
Because warfare in the future would lead to "battles of annihilation" (191), 
the world submits to the enlightened rule of the Anglo, American Syndi, 
cate. In the final words of the novel: "all the nations of the world began to 
teach English in their schools, and the Spirit of Civilization raised her 
head with a confident smile." 
It is in this spirit that Hank prepares for the final showdown between 
progressive Yankee capitalism and preindustrial darkness. Left with only 
fifty,three boys he personally has trained and indoctrinated to be tech, 
nocratic lads of his own historic age, Hank intends to employ his "deadly 
scientific war material" to eradicate the dark forces of feudal superstition, 
ignorance, and oppression. As the embodiment of modem technological 
genius, Hank will use the most scientifically advanced weapons to inaugu, 
rate the reign of reason and progress. 
The culmination of A Connecticut Yankee in "the Battle of the Sand 
Belt" has long been cited as an eerie forecast of the trench warfare of World 
War I. But it is an even more uncanny projection of the ultimate war, in 
which the victors end up as victims of the universal death they have sown. 
Beyond that, it probes to the very core the ideology of warfare that was 
emerging in the late nineteenth century, to cast its spreading shadow over 
the planet for at least more than the next hundred years-as we know all 
too well. 
As brilliantly conceived by Twain, Hank and his young proteges are 
thorough pragmatists who hook "secret wires" to dynamite deposits under 
all their "vast factories, mills, workshops, magazines, etc." and connect 
them to a single command button. This is "a military necessity" so that 
nothing can stop them "when we want to blow up our civilization" (466). 
When Hank does finally initiate this instantaneous push,button war, his 
rationalization is appallingly ominous for late,twentieth,century readers: 
"In that explosion all our noble civilization,factories went up in the air and 
disappeared from the earth. It was a pity, but it was necessary" (476). For 
the readers of 1889, this devastating electric impulse had a different 
context. 
Electricity-quasi,magical and usually invisible, used as thunderbolts 
by ancient gods and rapidly transforming daily life in the late nineteenth 
century-was bound to generate visions of dynamic weapons and light, 
ning wars, with victory bestowed by electric submarines or electric airships 
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or electric beams. The apotheosis of the religion of electrified warfare was 
Edison. 
When it suited his purposes, Edison capitalized on this worship, 
frequently proclaiming his command of terrible electric superweapons. 
But in playing this role, he was mainly advancing and protecting his far~ 
flung commercial enterprises. Neither the public nor various government 
bodies were convinced that electricity was safe, so any emphasis on its 
death~dealing capacities might interfere with sales, and Edison was noth~ 
ing if not a master salesman. However, the main threat to sales of Edison's 
inventions and direct~current system was not public caution but a formida~ 
ble rival-the altemating~current system largely devised by Nikola Tesla 
and being successfully marketed by George Westinghouse. Hence, Edison 
spent much energy trying to tum public apprehension about electricity 
into terror of alternating current. 
The "war of the currents" broke out in 1886. Edison had staked all his 
investments in electric~power distribution on a direct~current system that 
was restricted by the available technology to low voltage incapable of 
transmission beyond a few miles. Tesla's polyphase altemating~current 
system, on the other hand, allowed for stepping up the voltage to very high 
levels for long~distance transmission and then stepping it down for safe use. 
Equipped with Tesla's inventions, Westinghouse was rapidly displacing 
Edison's ~with the AC system that was to become standard in the United 
States. Edison's response was a frenetic campaign to prove that alternating 
current is intrinsically lethal. 
In addition to articles, pamphlets, and rumors, Edison and his agents 
staged public demonstrations in which cats, large dogs, and even horses 
were electrocuted with AC. Simultaneously, a powerful movement had 
developed in New York state against capital punishment, a movement that 
focused on the excruciating agony of hanging. Seizing this opportunity, 
Edison's lieutenants in 1889 bought three Westinghouse generators, resold 
them to three New York state prisons, and engineered the first use of the 
"electric chair." Edison also began proposing even more dreadful uses for 
alternating current, including an assortment of increasingly preposterous 
weapons. a 
Twain was well aware of the war of the currents, and, unlike Edison, 
was unambiguous about the advantages of AC. On November 1, 1888, he 
recorded in his journal the belief that the alternating current "electrical 
machine lately patented by a Mr. Tesla & sold to the Westinghouse 
Company . . . will revolutionize the whole electric business of the world": 
"It is the most valuable patent since the telephone. " 9 
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The second grand electric weapon in A Connecticut Yankee seems to 
poke slyly at Edison's campaign against the dangers of AC. But its primary 
role is to dramatize Twain's insights into the relations between industrial 
capitalism and modem war. It is a fence designed in his absence by Hank's 
well-trained boys. Consisting of twelve large circles of wire powered by a 
direct-current generator, this death machine is designed to annihilate 
whole armies. (It may have inspired Edison in 1892 to conjure up an 
invincible alternating-current device that would allow a mere twenty-five 
men to defend a fort against an army. 10 ) As Hank and his faithful 
lieutenant Clarence discuss technical improvements in their electric 
fence, they become vehicles for Twain's savage satire on the crass mate· 
rialism and pragmatism of modem industrialized war: 
"The wires have no ground-connection outside of the cave. They go out 
from the positive brush of the dynamo; there is a ground-connection through 
the negative brush; the other ends of the wire return to the cave, and each is 
grounded independently." 
"No-no, that won't do!" 
"Why?" 
"It's too expensive-uses up force for nothing. You don't want any 
ground-connection except the one through the negative brush. The other 
end of every wire must be brought back into the cave and fastened indepen· 
dently, and without any ground connection. Now, then, observe the economy 
of it. A cavalry charge; hurls itself against the fence; you are using no power, 
you are spending no money, for there is only one ground-connection till those 
horses come against the wire; the moment they touch it they form a connec· 
tion with the negative brush through the ground, and drop dead. Don't you 
see-you are using no energy until it is needed; your lightning is there, and 
ready, like the load in a gun; but it isn't costing you a cent till you touch it off. 
Oh, yes, the single ground-connection-" 
"Of course! I don't know how I overlooked that. It's not only cheaper, but 
it's more effectual than the other way, for if wires break or get tangled, no 
harm is done." [467] 
Beyond the electrified fence, these modem lads have prepared what 
Clarence rhapsodically calls "the prettiest garden that was ever planted," a 
belt forty feet wide entirely covered by concealed glass-cylinder dynamite 
torpedoes. When the first wave of many thousands of knights charges into 
this belt, the resulting explosion has disturbingly modem reverberations: 
"As to destruction of life, it was amazing. Moreover, it was beyond 
estimate. Of course we could not count the dead, because they did not exist 
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as individuals, but merely as homogeneous protoplasm, with alloys of iron 
and buttons" (478). 
But the most sensational part of the victory comes when Hank and his 
boys trap the rest of the feudal army inside the circles of their electric fence. 
Hank electrocutes the first batch: then a flood is released on the survivors 
as the boys man machine guns that "vomit death" into their ranks: "Within 
ten short minutes after we had opened fire, armed resistance was totally 
annihilated, the campaign was ended, we fifty-four were masters of Eng· 
land! Twenty-five thousand men lay dead around us" (486). The con· 
querors themselves are conquered by "the poisonous air bred by those dead 
thousands." All that remains of this first experiment in industrialized 
warfare is a scene of total desolation, devoid of human life and marked by 
gigantic craters. 
Hank's apocalyptic weapons resolve the paradoxes of time travel by 
destroying everything that the nineteenth century has anachronistically 
introduced into the dark ages. But this resolution itself is paradoxical. The 
science and technology that mark progress, that distinguish forward from 
backward in time, become the means to annihilate all that humanity has 
created. Thus they display their potential to transform the future into the 
prehuman primeval past, that is mindless oblivion. 
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Hart Crane and John Dos Passos 
JOSEPH W. SLADE 
[Of post-World War I American writers] only Hart Crane, in his 
heroic cycle of poems The Bridge, and John Dos Passos, in 
the trilogy ending with The Big Money, tried to measure themselves 
against the great poets or novelists of other ages. 
-Malcolm Cowley, After the Genteel Tradition1 
During the 1920s, America was mutating at speeds accelerated by rampant 
industrialization, political upheaval, revolutions in communication and 
transportation, population migrations, economic cycles, corporate reor-
ganization, artistic ferment, and intellectual advance. All this activity 
generated new information of enormous volume and diversity; the question 
was not merely whether it could be comprehended, but when. One 
popular response was to defer interpretation, in the hope that the next 
generation would eventually sort matters out when still more information 
became available. The lingering trauma associated with the Great War and 
the hedonism of the Jazz Age that followed doubtless also encouraged 
procrastination. Political activists converted information into ideology, 
convinced that disorder in the present would soon produce a classless 
society in a rational utopia. Artists revelled in the chaos, some juxtaposing 
bits of information at random in Dada compositions, while others turned 
Futurist, hoping to anticipate meaning that was yet to emerge. The culture 
was on a roll toward the future. 
The principal propellant was the growing authority of science, whose 
sources of knowledge and tools of interpretation held seductive promise for 
the years to come. Hart Crane and John Dos Passos both characterized 
science as the new religion of their time. Neither thought that faith in 
science was necessarily misplaced, but they were worried about its dimen-
sions. 2 To construe science as a conjuring of imminent marvels, Crane 
said, was to avoid the responsibilities of the moment: "I think that this 
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unmitigated concern with the Future is one of the most discouraging 
symptoms of the chaos of our age, however worthy the ethical concerns 
may be," he wrote; "it seems as though the imagination had ceased all 
attempts at any creative activity-and had become simply a great bulging 
eye ogling the foetus of the next century." 3 Dos Passos considered the 
tendency especially damaging to the writer. As "dependence on the 
future" displaced dependence on the past, he claimed, American literature 
had become "a rootless product. "4 
The accumulations of data were frightening because of the prolifera, 
tion of terms and concepts, a babel at once existential and metalinguistic. 
In his essay "General Aims and Theories," Crane conceded the "terrific 
problem that faces the poet today-a world that is so in transition from a 
decayed culture toward a reorganization of human evaluations that there 
are few common terms, general denominations of speech that are solid 
enough or that ring with any vibration or spiritual conviction."S To his 
friend Waldo Frank, Crane wrote, "beginning with Spengler and Wells, 
this age seems too typically encyclopaedic. This may assist the artist in 
time-by erecting some kind of logos, or system of contact between the 
insulated departments of highly specialized knowledge and enquiry [sic] 
which characterize the times-God knows, some kind of substantial 
synthesis of opinion is needed before I can feel confident in writing about 
anything but my shoestrings. "6 The poet had to learn new vocabularies, 
master new images, fashion new metaphors; his Bridge would function as 
an "unfractioned idiom" 7 of his time. 
Dos Passos shared Crane's anxiety concerning the explosion of infor, 
mation and like him deplored fragmentation: "Life in our changing indus, 
trial world has become so cut up into specialized departments and 
vocabularies, and has become so hard to understand and to see as a whole 
that most people won't even try." 8 The novelist had to describe the 
dynamics of an America reshaped by science, trace economic power along 
paths complicated by new technologies, annotate the rhythms of an 
environment whose artifice was increasing. For both Crane and Dos Passos 
the flood of new information had to be accomodated by expanded literary 
forms, difficult though that would be. They both aimed to assimilate and 
reshape, but their approaches differed. Crane attempted to narrow theories 
to images, to invest the physical character of the world with a secular 
numinosity. Dos Passos dealt with the flow of information itself, not its 
precise content, and revealed it as a public, collective phenomenon. 
Behind the aesthetics of Crane and the sociology of Dos Passos, 
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however, lies a common metaphysics. Crane believed that, in shifting the 
emphasis of Western civilization away from traditional religion, science 
had altered the nature of poetry as well: "Analysis and discovery, the two 
basic concerns of science, became conscious objectives of both painter and 
poet. A great deal of modem painting is as independent of any representa-
tional motive as a mathematical equation; while some of the most intense 
and eloquent current verse derives sheerly from acute psychological analy-
sis, quite independent of dramatic motivation."9 The poet could restore 
drama, and, more important, a sense of the spiritual to a secularized world, 
a world whose artificiality and rationality-whose humanness, in short-
had to be acknowledged. Crane aspired to be "the Pindar for the dawn of 
the machine age," 10 he wrote Gorham Munson, to whom he confessed 
two weeks earlier that he intended The Bridge to express "our scientific 
hopes." 11 Similarly, where for Crane the analysis and discovery associated 
with science had become the province of poets, for Dos Passos art and 
science were bound by "half-opposed ideals" that "overlapped": "One is the 
desire to create; the other the desire to fathom. Intangibly mixed up with 
them is a sense of beauty, quicksilver-like, three times dangerous to argue 
about, to dogmatize on, by which, somehow, we veneer the crudeness of 
the world and make it bearable-far more than bearable." 12 
While they minimized traditional cleavages, neither tried to gloss over 
crucial distinctions. Crane could be blunt: "Science (ergo all exact knowl-
edge and its instruments of operation) is in perfect antithesis to poetry. 
(Painting, architecture, music as well.) It operates from an entirely op-
posite polarity, and it may equate with poetry, but when it does so its 
statement of such is in an entirely different terminology. I hope you get this 
difference between inimical and antithetical, intended here. It is not my 
interest to discredit science, it has been as inspired as poetry,-and if you 
could but recognize it, much more hypothetically motivated." 13 And Dos 
Passos wished to preserve for literature the writer's special values, despite 
their close resemblance to those rigorous virtues frequently associated with 
the scientist. The writer has to recognize, he said, that "the living material 
out of which his work is built must be what used to be known as the 
humanities: the need for clean truth and sharply whittled exactitudes, 
men's instincts and compulsions and hungers and thirsts." 14 
Even so, in their various manifestoes Crane and Dos Passos insisted 
that the writer had to map culture, the domain of meaning and the ground 
of literature, across the entire range of the present. 15 What made their 
assessments unique was the assumption that science was not merely an 
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essential ingredient in national life but part of what it meant to be human 
and American. If Crane and Dos Passos were not quite certain that science 
was central to culture, they knew it was not alien. It is clear in retrospect, 
however, that they misjudged the reactions of their colleagues, especially 
those writers who thought of science as hostile to letters. Thirty years after 
the two wrote their masterpieces, the historian of science Gerald Holton 
suggested that one of the most urgent tasks stiU facing Americans was that 
of redefining culture so that "the sciences are not automatically thought to 
be a disturbing component." 16 Ironically, then, considering their mistrust 
of visions of the future, they were ahead of their time in their efforts to 
integrate science and the information it created. 
To make a place for science, Crane's The Bridge and Dos Passos's three 
novels called U.S. A used two overlapping strategies. The first was to fold 
the revelations of science smoothly into these works, to treat the informa-
tion produced by investigation and discovery from a perspective that 
neither inflated nor diminished it. The second, more discretely literary, 
was to fabricate metaphors sufficient to encompass the vast quantities of 
information that were characteristic of every sector of American endeavor. 
Although these strategies were not revolutionary in themselves, the novel-
ty with which they were executed has gone largely unremarked. 
One reason is fairly obvious. For Crane and Dos Passos to invite 
comparison with great predecessors, as Cowley suggests in the statement 
quoted at the beginning of this essay, was to invite misunderstanding, 
particularly when so many of their contemporaries saw literature as embat-
tled.17 American writers in the third and fourth decades of this century 
faced cultural competition from industrial designers transforming auto-
mobiles and plumbing into objects of beauty, visual artists abstracting 
a modernist aesthetic from images of turbines and smokestacks, and 
physicists graphing field discontinuities that appeared to extend into 
consciousness itsel£ 18 The Poetic Renaissance, which began in 1912, 
reinvigorated American poetry to a certain extent but could not recapture 
territory lost over a quarter-century of creative sterility. Engineers had 
permanently displaced autocrats of the breakfast table in popular esteem, 
while scientists had acquired even greater standing. The authority of 
scientists appeared to rest on knowledge acquired by methods that-to 
some humanists, at least-appeared arrogant if not downright inhuman. 
Moreover, nearly everyone conflated science with technology and believed 
that scientific knowledge was readily convertible to materialism. Although 
neither Crane nor Dos Passos endorsed the worrisome social effects of the 
176 American Literature and Science 
"bastard children" of science, l9 as Dos Passos called industrialization and 
mechanization, they knew that agendas for America were being set on 
blackboards and in laboratories as well as in factories. They thought that 
practical and artistic reasons compelled the writer to address that fact. 
Thus, in one of the supreme acts of moral and aesthethic faith in 
American letters, Hart Crane asserted the fundamental unity of all forms 
of human creativity, whether manifest as science, technology, or art. More 
important, unlike other artists who might pay lip service to such asser~ 
tions, Crane meant it. And in a radical revision of the American novel, 
John Dos Passos demonstrated that fictional narratives could code a 
culture's scientific messages despite their incomprehensibility to the lay~ 
man. U.S. A is perhaps the first novel of the information age. Yet when 
Crane and Dos Passos opened their literature to science, and to the 
technology they understood as allied to science, they opened themselves to 
accusations that still surface today. Put simply, their reputations have been 
undermined precisely by their attempts to incorporate in their work a 
science regarded by literary critics as either artistically foreign or politically 
suspect. 
Even a sympathetic critic like Hyatt Waggoner, for example, while sure 
that Crane translated science into poetry more brilliantly than any other 
poet of his time, faults The Bridge because it suffers by comparison with "the 
great religious and mythic poems" of the past. zo The standard view of 
Crane is that he was an untutored genius, the most junior in talent of the 
small group of modernists that includes Pound and Eliot. The latter's 
reactionary disdain for science and for the information explosion ("Where 
is the knowledge we have lost in information?" Eliot asks in The Rock) has 
long set the tone for criticism, so that Crane's lack of hostility toward 
science and his embrace of the virtues of machinery still make humanists 
uneasy. Because Crane himself emphasized his affinities with the Roman~ 
tics, a connection reinforced by his fairly lurid personal life, some literary 
historians charge him with betraying that tradition when he exalted the 
aesthetics of technology. Typical is the sneer of Derek Savage: "Crane 
accepted without question the centralized, top~heavy industrial environ~ 
ment, tagging along behind the racketeers and financiers whose creation it 
all was." 21 
Drawing that conclusion from The Bridge requires prejudices that the 
apolitical Crane lacked, and requires also a blindness to the poem's comic 
passages linking "SCIENCE-COMMERCE and the HOLYGHOST" in 
"The River" section. Culturally it was quite impossible to distinguish 
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science from technology, nor did Crane wish to. He did try to separate 
technology from industrialization, not to free it from sin but to differenti, 
ate tool,making as an aesthetic and moral activity from managerial, 
commercial, and political contexts. He was socially naive perhaps, cer, 
tainly by comparison with Dos Passos, and historically naive as well, but 
he was consistent in his account of what was, after all, the spiritual 
evolution not so much of a nation as a continent of consciousness, a 
progression, moreover, set against a cosmic background. In the "Cape 
Hatteras" section of The Bridge, he sketches the history of the American 
continent in images of upwelling geological strata: 
Imponderable the dinosaur 
sinks slow, 
the mammoth saurian 
ghoul, the eastern 
Cape ... 
While rises in the west the coastwise range, 
slowly the hushed land-
Combustion at the astral core-the dorsal change 
Of energy-convulsive shift of sand . . . [88] 
That is cosmological time, not history, the precess of nature, not human 
endeavor, observation as rapture, not analysis. Crane's vision of science is 
mystical, beginning with "the immaculate sigh of stars" that opens the 
poem. 
Numerous critics have identified The Bridge's theme as one common to all 
great literature and science: the dynamic between order and chaos. But 
despite the religious aspects of the poem, Crane chose to represent neither 
natural chaos or urban confusion nor corporate order or political control as 
evil. Knowledge is neither good nor evil; his is an exercise in physics rather 
than social comment. Whatever else could be said of science, Crane knew, 
it had changed the consciousness and the environment of Americans. 
That was why he called for poetic "readjustments incident to science and 
other shifting factors related to that consciousness" 22 of integrated experi, 
ence. 
Dos Passos's receptivity to science and technology has not helped his 
standing either. Jean,Paul Sartre, aware that a fascination with science 
permeates Dos Passos's work, says that the American's novels "are to the 
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classic works of Flaubert and Zola what the non-euclidian geometry is to 
the old geometry of Euclid." 23 But most critics, judging him inevitably by 
the predecessors Dos Passos himself sometimes invoked, think of him 
precisely as a failed Zola, convinced that he was a naturalist who lacked 
the. courage to make his novels wholly deterministic. The stock view of 
Dos Passos is that he was really a journalist, the originator of several bril-
liant narrative techniques, but at base a closet conservative who dissipated 
his energies in writing patriotic histories of the nation's founding fathers. 
Worse, some critics will not forgive Dos Passos for what they believe is his 
betrayal of a different kind of "science," the Marxist historical analysis to 
which he was attracted in his youth, despite his mature arguments that 
such analysis was inadequate to deal with evolving capitalist structures. 
Generally speaking, Dos Passos was sympathetic to social programs 
formulated on the political left, but he thought literature could be sub-
orned by ideology: "At this particular moment in history, when machinery 
and institutions have so outgrown the ability of the mind to dominate 
them, we need bold and original thought more than ever. It is the business 
of writers to supply that thought, and not to make of themselves fig-
ureheads in political conflicts." 24 In another essay (in which he also said 
that "art is an adjective not a noun"), he claimed that becoming a socialist 
was like drinking near-beer. 25 Dos Passos came to believe that Marxism's 
pseudo-scientific "objective reality" was essentially a nineteenth-century 
anachronism. Far more sophisticated about economics than the average 
Marxist, Dos Passos realized that information was becoming the real 
capital of corporate America, and that the most valuable information was 
that derived from genuine scientific achievement. For Dos Passos, science 
interacted with culture chiefly in the marketplace, the reason that he said 
"it's about time that American writers showed up in the industrial field 
where something is really going on, instead of tackling the tattered 
strawmen of art and culture." 26 At the very least, literature had to enlarge 
its focus, even though this placed heavy demands on the writer. 
The writer of the twenties and thirties who wished to acknowledge 
that science was an engine of culture faced several difficulties in translating 
scientific abstractions into literary representations. The first had to do 
with the legitimacy of his role. From the 1890s well into the 1930s, 
hundreds of books and essays interpreted the discoveries of science and 
their cultural impact for wide American audiences.27 It is easy to find 
mainstream writers who joined in the popular enthusiasm. Even Edith 
Wharton, whose social terrain seems improbable ground for such ebul-
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lienee, could burble about "the wonder-world of nineteenth century 
science" that overwhelmed "our little geocentric universe," 28 but what 
made nineteenth-century science so wondrous to Wharton and others like 
her was their own unfamiliarity with it. Retrograde scientism actually 
precluded genuine consideration of what science was about in the twen-
tieth century, or so it appeared to those impatient with writers of high 
literature. Perhaps the most explicit attack came from Max Eastman, 
whose The Literary Mind: Its Place inanAgeofScience (1931) charged poets 
and novelists with deliberate misunderstanding of scientific developments. 
Yet literature had its defenders, sometimes on the opposite side of the aisle. 
The most articulate was Alfred· North Whitehead, whose Science and the 
Modem World (1925) was extremely influential. That Hart Crane read it is 
certain;29 Dos Passos doubtless knew it also. In that volume, Whitehead 
announced a thesis that has since become familiar: that the Romantic 
Movement had been essenMally a reaction against overly rational concepts, 
especially their configuration into a mechanistic model of the universe, 
and that the new insights of physics had confirmed the writer's preference 
for more organic constructs. What Whitehead did, said Edmund Wilson in 
his gloss on the philospher's text in Axel's Castle, was to restore to the 
writer a metaphysical legitimacy, for it was clear that modem physics had 
rejected mechanical models as well. The Romantic poets stood validated 
as upholders of reality after all, heroes of intuition; to use a political term 
later employed by the left, William Blake and his colleagues had been 
"premature anti-fascists" of the metaphysical realm and were now rehabili-
tated by scientific orthodoxy. In short, Whitehead implied, poets and 
novelists were entitled to comment on the work of scientists. 
A second difficulty facing the writer convinced that he must assimilate 
science involved expertise. Despite the imprimatur Whitehead gave to 
writers, neither Crane nor Dos Passos engaged science directly. Dos Passos, 
born three years earlier than Crane, lived three decades longer, and thus 
had more time to comprehend the changes that science wrought on 
America; one of the novelist's more astute essays was a 1952 ,interview with 
J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Science Under Siege," in which Dos Passos 
acknowledged that the process of discovery would always force the revalua-
tion of culture itself. 30 Unlike Crane, who never went to college and 
envied acquaintances who had, Dos Passos attended Harvard, where he 
ranked a course in the history of science as highly as one on Chaucer.31 
Even so, his familiarity with scientific matters was essentially that of an 
undergraduate. 
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In this regard, Crane and Dos Passos can be contrasted with Henry 
Adams, who actually read scientific texts, conversed as an equal with 
Willard Gibbs, easily followed statistical arguments, and could apply the 
laws of thermodynamics to history. Yet the examples of Crane and Dos 
Passos are reminders that a writer, so long as he is sensitive to the total text 
of his culture, has .no special obligation to read lab reports or scientific 
documents. That Crane and Dos Passos in their works drew conclusions of 
more enduring relevance than Adams may rest on the relative merits for 
the poet or novelist of broad cultural versus specific scientific literacy. Dos 
Passos could see, for instance, that Adams had overdramatized the cultural 
disruptions of science. In 1921, on board ship to Europe with e.e. cum-
mings, Dos Passos read The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, edited by 
Henry's brother, Brooks Adams, and, "because it went against the Walt 
Whitman-narodnik optimism about people I've never quite lived down," 
spent part of his voyage trying to refute the historian's thesis. 3Z Dos Passos 
could be optimistic if only because it was clear that civilization had 
survived global catastrophe as well as the lesser types of entropy that 
Adams feared. 
Dos Passos's reference to Whitman is a reminder of the constant 
consciousness of past masters that Malcolm Cowley discerned in the 
ambition of both Dos Passos and Crane. Again and again Crane apos-
trophizes Whitman ("My hand I in yours, I Walt Whitman- I so-") in 
The Bridge, invoking his syncretic vision. Like Crane and Dos Passos, the 
good gray poet had addressed the whole of American culture, had tried to 
reconcile science and religion, industrialization and idealism, Roman-
ticism and rationality. The poetic polarities of order and chaos in The 
Bridge only superficially resemble those explored by Adams in Mont St. 
Michel and Chartres and The Education; Crane is far more indebted to 
Whitman's "Passage to India" and even to "Song of Myself'' both of which 
coded enormous quantities of information in verse form. For all his scien-
tific literacy, Adams could not anticipate the historical process by which 
the insights of thermodynamics would begin to flower into an information 
theory that would account for his multiplicities. Through experimentation 
with meter and with metaphor, Crane sought to expand the storage and 
display capacity of poetry to accomodate multiple bits of information, 
while Dos Passos would make similar multiplicities into the stuff of fiction. 
A third difficulty had to do with what sort of subject matter, exactly, 
the writer sympathetic to science was supposed to try to assimilate! Here 
Crane and Dos Passos understood something important about science that 
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most of their literary colleagues did not: that science is not monolithic. 
Although both often construed "science" in conventional generalized 
terms, more or less as objective method or hard-edged rationality, they 
were aware that scientific hierarchies were being realigned. The major 
disciplines were fluctuating against one another in terms of their relative 
standing within the scientific community and within the larger context of 
American culture. 
For example, developments in physical chemistry held considerable 
relevance for a wide range of other sciences, but organic chemistry was 
almost entirely industry-driven, with American corporations frenetically 
competing with German combines to patent dye and polymer formulas. 
The industrialization of chemistry meant that Americans felt its effects 
chiefly as consumers. It was scarcely possible to speak of the discipline 
without reference to the physical technologies that created its compounds 
and the corporate technologies that distributed its products. 33 Such asso-
ciations virtually ensured that no writer would deal with chemistry, for to 
do so meant that he had to dirty his hands with a tainted industrialism. 34 
In other words, chemistry was basic and powerful, but its lack of theoreti-
cal glamour denied it high rank among scientists and the lay public. 
Whitehead and other arbiters gave primacy among the sciences to the 
"new" physics, whose paradoxes were cosmologically intoxicating, es-
pecially since they were identified with the awesome intellect of Albert 
Einstein, who was to become one of the country's chief cultural deities. 
Einstein's public image was that of a loveable fuddy-duddy who just hap-
pened to be another Isaac Newton; Crane referred to him as the grandson 
of Spinoza, 35 wise and pantheistic. 36 But the cultural accession of physics 
took place at the expense of biology, whose influence on American 
literature over the last fifty years had been profound. Although he was 
friendly with the Harvard bacteriologist Hans Zinsser, 37 and although he 
wrote an exceptionally sympathetic review of James Whalen's Green 
River, 38 a narrative poem based on the career of the great naturalist 
Constantine Raffinesque, Crane made little use of biology in his own 
work. In fact, he construed modem science chiefly as physics. The fiction 
of Dos Passos, on the other hand, provides perspective on the shifting 
status of biology and physics. That different disciplines influenced the two 
men had something to do with their respective educations but even more 
with their choice of literary genres; poets as a group are probably less 
interested than novelists in biology. 
Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) was the last major scientific text 
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fully accessible to the average man, a factor that explains not only the 
longevity of debate over evolution but also the popularity of Social Dar~ 
winism. Social Darwinism, in tum, grew out of the confl.ation of an 
evolutionary scheme extrapolated from Darwin with thermodynamic prin~ 
ciples extrapolated from Joule, Helmholtz, and Kelvin. While biologists 
themselves usually sidestepped questions of determinism, Herbert Spencer 
and popularizers of Social Darwinism like John Fiske and Edward Youmans 
in America did not. Spencer applied deterministic schemes not only to 
biology but also to sociology and psychology, 39 and Freud would later 
enshrine thermodynamic concepts in his steam~engine model of the 
psyche, with a superego governor regulating the energies of the id. Ronald 
Martin has traced the outlines of what he calls "the universe of force" by 
studying the accretions of metaphor in the works of Herbert Spencer, 
Henry Adams, and various novelists. Metaphors of force fueled the fiction 
of Norris, London, and Dreiser in particular and American literary natu~ 
ralism in general. 40 Naturalism waned, however, as animal morphology 
gave way to cytology and as thermodynamics lost ground to more glam~ 
ourous particle research. By 1900, with the rediscovery of Mendel's work 
on genetics and its confirmation of evolutionary theory, biology became 
thoroughly professionalized, and the opinions of amateurs-writers or 
otherwise-soon ceased to affect the discipline. Geneticists closed their 
laboratory doors, and their research receded from public view, save for 
occasional bulletins from the Ernest Haeckels and J.B.S. Haldanes.41 
When not diverted by flamboyant ministers still fighting evolutionist~ 
creationist battles already lost, Americans now thought of biology chiefly 
in terms of the succession of new botanical products that appeared from the 
greenhouses of Luther Burbank. 
Luther Burbank figures (in one of the "biographies") in U.S.A, as 
does Rockefeller's funding for departments of anatomy, botany, neurology, 
physiology, and zoology at the University of Chicago. But Dos Passos did 
not fully grasp the significance of such developments. Rather, his nar~ 
ratives reflect the lessening influence of nineteenth~century models of 
social force: numerous critics have noted that his fiction seems informed by 
a residual literary naturalism rather pale beside Dreiser's or Farrell's. For 
Dos Passos, forces are the usual ones: childhood traumas and family 
obsessions, sexual drives, repressive educational and religious institutions, 
cleavages of class and disparities of income, politicized un~ons and greedy 
corporations. Those forces do influence the lives of the characters in 
U.S.A., but not in classically causal ways; they do not so much extrude 
personalities as add dimension to them. 
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Indeed, Dos Passos in the trilogy sketches biological and social forces 
crudely, even impatiently, because he is himself uncertain of their weight. 
When the inarticulate Joe Williams complains that the wealthy exploit the 
workers, or when Mac writes pamphlets for the I. W. W. attributing politi-
cal and economic control to corrupt alliances between business and gov-
ernment, they are mouthing slogans that are largely reflex; the slogans 
hold truth, but constitute no platform for social change. In fact, most of 
the characters are aimless, alienated, their opinions impoverished by lack 
of conviction. They drift mentally as well because they are unable to locate 
the sources of power-for liberation· or oppression-in any concrete 
institution or agency; if anything, there are too many targets for their 
resentment. In their atomistic world, behavior is probable, not deter-
mined-statistically predictable, not certain. One critic has applied the 
term "Brownian motion" to the erratic behavior of Dos Passos's characters 
in Manhattan Transfer, 42 and it is an even more accurate description of the 
pathways in U.S.A 
In the early twentieth century, statistical methods, like those gener-
ated by study of Brownian motion and refined by their application to 
thermodynamic processes, proved even more useful in their application to 
particle research. As Planck, de Broglie, and Schrodinger quantized 
energy, their successors calculated probabilities. The emphasis on proba-
bility, in tum, undermined concepts of determinism, and-at a cultural 
distance-revised notions of character in fiction. If to the Greek dramatist 
character had been destiny, to the nineteenth-century novelist character 
was biology: personality was the product of heredity and an environment 
of measurable vectors. But to the twentieth-century novelist like Dos 
Passos, the individual was far more problematic, his consciousness more 
diffuse, his responses less dependent on specific stimuli, his actions more 
random. Gauged against older fictional standards, a modem character 
seems attenuated, his surfaces smoothed by the friction of a highly frag-
mented culture. Increasingly, he occupies multiple states. He will intersect 
with one character but deflect another because of their different masses 
and speeds. But the cultural ground is different too. Where classic literary 
naturalism constructs an environment out of forces, Dos Passos builds an 
environment of mediated messages. Corporations and institutions oper-
ate-and oppress-as much through their manipulation of information as 
through the traditional inequities of production. 43 
While Dos Passos could hardly have anticipated that thermodynamics 
would furnish the statistical tools for measuring information and for de-
ciphering languages of all kinds (including the genetic code) in the forties 
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and fifties, he was extraordinarily sensitive to the volume of messages 
carried by various media. Marshall McLuhan patronizes Dos Passos by 
accusing him (among other things) of holding a Frank Capra view of life, 
comes close to saying that the most noteworthy feature of U.S.A. is the 
sheer mass of information that no other "American had ever been able to 
master," and then, as might be expected, diverts his attention to the 
"cinematic velocity of images" in the novel. 44 McLuhan learned more 
than he knew from Dos Passos, especially from Dos Passos's use of"discon, 
tinuity as a means of enriching artistic effect."45 
The discontinuities are brilliant and numerous-a dozen major nar, 
ratives intercut with sixty,eight "Newsreels," twenty,seven "Biographies," 
and fifty,one "Camera Eye" segments. Aside from providing information 
as bits of jargon, ideologies, gossip, slogans, cliches, headline, pictures, 
radio broadcasts, recordings, comic strips, movies, and popular songs, they 
underline the pervasiveness of communication technologies as they filter 
messages, restructure the environment, and shape cultural and personal 
awareness. Dos Passos understood, as have few American writers before or 
since, that the surges of information through channels of mass media like 
radio, movies, and newspapers literally rewrote American culture every 
morning. Science was only one source of information, part of the flood 
conveyed by media that were becoming the new corporate structures of 
America. Manhattan Transfer deals at length with the prostitution of the 
press and the "making" of news. 46 Among the most important characters 
in U.S.A are journalists whose idealism sours to cynicism, and J. Ward 
Moorehouse, a public relations agent for corporations who manipulates 
the media and deals in information as a commodity. This traffic becomes 
Dos Passos's metaphor for modern American capitalism, grafted onto and 
gradually replacing industrial models. 
Biology, then, led Dos Passos by a circuitous route to information 
technologies. Crane followed a somewhat different path from physics. One 
effect of the new physics on novelists was to revise their conception of 
character and motion. The effect on poets was to force their confrontation 
with the nature of language and with metaphor. In a way, the influence of 
biology encourages a literary focus on inner, subjective experience, as a 
ground for the external forces operating outside the individual. By con, 
trast, the influence of physics fosters an expressionistic concentration on 
external energies that are understood as correlatives of inner states, all of 
which are colored by semantics. To poets like Crane, William Carlos 
Williams, and Wallace Stevens, the paradoxes of Werner Heisenberg and 
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Niels Bohr restored a sense of mystery if not to the world then at least to 
language. Late~nineteenth~century positivists like Poincare, Mach, and 
Pearson had tried to purge language of metaphor; the Principles of Com-
plementarity and Indeterminacy affirmed the indispensability of meta~ 
phor. Seeking precision, postivists measured phenomena on a gray scale of 
rationalism; balked by the limitations of measurement, quantum physicists 
demanded an electromagnetic spectrum of many shades. Poets like Wil~ 
Hams chose to interpret these new priorities in physics as an endorsement 
of the poet's subjectivity. As Lisa Steinman has pointed out, however, 
Williams and other poets of Crane's period made only token efforts to 
assimilate science and seemed motivated more by an envy of the salaries of 
engineers and the glamour of the laboratory. 47 
Unlike them, Crane was attracted principally by the aesthetics of 
physics. Both Dos Passos and Crane were less interested in acquiring the 
sanction of science for what they wrote than they were of placing science 
itself in a proper context. Crane's goal in writing The Bridge, he told his 
patron Otto Kahn, was to "enunciate a new cultural synthesis of values in 
terms of our America,"48 and he chose a technological symbol that 
represented "the conquest of space and knowledge." 49 Although at first 
the Bridge in its very spatiality seems to hearken back to Newtonian 
cosmology, it is clear from the "Cape Hatteras" section of the poem that 
Crane's allegiance is to Einstein, and that the Bridge is curved by the 
dynamics of a relativistic world: 
But that star-glistered salver of infinity, 
The circle, blind crucible of endless space, 
Is sluiced by motion,-subjugated never. [89] 
That he also meant the Bridge to embody human knowledge can be 
understood from his discussion of the "logic of metaphor" included in his 
essay, "General Aims and Theories." Metaphor, he said there, is "the 
genetic basis of all speech, hence consciousness and thought-extension." 
The poet was especially equipped to deal with new knowledge because he 
was an expert in language, the most primal of all technologies and the one 
common to all arts and sciences: "New conditions of life germinate new 
forms of spiritual articulation. And while I feel that my work includes a 
more consistent extension of traditional literary elements than many 
contemporary poets are capable of appraising, I realize that I am utilizing 
the gifts of the past as instruments principally; and that the voice of the 
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present, if it is to be known, must be caught at the risk of speaking in 
idioms and circumlocutions sometimes shocking to the scholar and histo, 
rians of logic. Language has built towers and bridges, but itself is inevitably 
as fluid as always." 50 
Such passages are crucial to assessing the lasting value of The Bridge 
because they reflect Crane's understanding of language as a technology. It 
is easy to be diverted by the machine images of the poem. Somewhat 
ironically, Crane aspired to be "the Pindar of the machine age" just as the 
machine age was beginning to close, to be superseded by the information 
age. 5l Victor Ferkiss has described the transition from one age to another 
in terms that Crane would have found comprehensible: 
[In the new era] energy is still utilized, but increasingly it is used to affect 
states of consciousness rather than to move physical objects. Though rna, 
chines abound, there is a sense, not clearly grasped by all prophets of the new, 
that the age of mechanization is over. Not levers and pulleys exerting force but 
sounds in the air, lights flashing on the dial of the computer, are the 
archetypal symbols of the new era, and electronics rather than mechanical 
physics is supreme. . . . For the instruments of the new technology are like 
the human body in having few rigid moving parts; as in the biological 
organism, what is most important is not forces but process. 52 
Another way of understanding that process is as energy-in this case, 
energy defined as communication within systems. It would be silly to claim 
that Crane fully foresaw the dimensions of that shift in metaphor. His 
notion of process and organicism, noted by many critics, was derived 
mostly from Whitehead, with significant additions from the mystic 
Ouspensky. 53 But his intuition was faultless. He conceptualized energy as 
language, as in this passage: 
The nasal whine of power whips a new universe . . . 
Where spouting pillars spoor the evening sky, 
Under the looming stacks of the gigantic power house 
Stars prick the eyes with sharp ammoniac proverbs, 
New verities, new inklings in the velvet hummed 
Of dynamos, where hearing's leash is strummed . . . 
Power's script-wound, bobbin,bound, refined-
Is stropped to the slap of belts on booming spools, 
spurred 
Into the bulging bouillon, harnessed jelly of the stars. [90] 
Hart Crane and John Dos Passos 187 
For Crane, as Frederick Hoffman has remarked, "power's script" is a 
lower-case language. 54 In that respect, Crane's use of technological imag-
ery seems to embody John Kouwenhoven's thesis that the design and 
fabrication of machines have traditionally constituted an American ver-
nacular. 55 In any case, there is no question that Crane saw technology as 
did McLuhan a few decades later, as "the extensions of man," nor that he 
bestowed iconographic status upon machines. In The Bridge, technology 
serves as a demotic plane where art and science can meet, a vernacular 
where spirituality can converge with everyday secular life, a non-Latinate 
version of the Mass. Things can bear intellectual and emotional weight 
because they are elements in Crane's poetic language. Moreover, arching 
over the more prosaic acetylene torches, subways, elevators, jackhammers, 
steam engines, and so on is the great Bridge itself, which Crane conceived 
as a communications medium, a literal passageway and route of transporta-
tion, but also a symbol of human interchange, its linkages multiplied by 
other transmission technologies: 
The last bear, shot drinking in the Dakotas 
Loped under wires that span the mountain stream. 
Keen instruments, strung to a vast precision 
Bind town to town and dream to tickling dream. [64] 
And messages are everywhere, forming an environment: 
I think of cinemas, panoramic sleights 
With multitudes bent toward some flashing scene 
Never disclosed, but hastened to again 
Foretold to other eyes on the same screen. [45] 
In his introduction to U.S.A., Dos Passos, like Crane, focused on 
metaphor and language, the tools of the writer and the stuff of his work: 
U.S.A. is the slice of the continent. U.S.A. is a group of holding companies, 
some aggregations of trade unions, a set of laws bound in calf, a radio network, 
a chain of moving picture theatres, a column of stock-quotations rubbed out 
and written in by a Western Union boy on a blackboard, a public library full of 
old newspapers and dogeared historybooks with protests scrawled on the 
margins in pencil. U.S.A. is the world's greatest rivervalley fringed with 
mountains and hills. U.S.A. is a set ofbigmouthed officials with too many 
bank accounts. U.S.A. is a lot of men buried in their uniforms in Arlington 
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Cemetery. U.S.A. is the letters at the end of an address when you are away 
from home. But mostly U.S.A. is the speech of the people. 56 
Dos Passos was even more explicit about the writer's technology. He drew 
parallels between the scientist and the writer, and suggested that both 
"produced" knowledge and interpretations that were commercial com, 
modities as well as art or science: "The professional writer discovers some 
aspect of the world and invents out of the speech of his time some 
particularly apt and original way of putting it down on paper. If the product 
is compelling enough, it molds and influences ways of thinking to the 
point of changing and rebuilding the language, which canalizes the mind 
of the group. The process is not very different from that of scientific 
discovery and invention. The importance of a writer, as of a scientist, de, 
pends on his ability to influence thought." 57 
His acceptance of a technological role for the writer does not necessar, 
ily mean that Dos Passos construed his novels as machines, nor his 
characters as interchangeable parts, as Cecilia Tichi has recently main, 
tained. 58 To call him an engineer,novelist, as Tichi does, is to overstate. A 
poet like William Carlos Williams could toss off a line such as "a poem is a 
machine made of words," 59 but deep down, Williams hated technology, or 
what he thought of as technology, and he used the line in part because it 
was inappropriate; there is a vast difference between mechanical models 
and linguistic technologies. The structure of Dos Passos's narrative was 
metaphorically based on information,processing rather than industrial 
machinery. As we have seen, Dos Passos was intensely sympathetic to 
socialist critiques of corporate capitalism, but he was already impatient 
with the hackneyed cliches that charged industrialization with turning 
humans into "cogs in a machine" or making of them "interchangeable 
parts on an assembly line." Dos Passos understood that technology-
defined as simple tool, complex machine, as management, production, 
distribution, advertising, or selling of products-essentially embodied 
knowledge. He had no quarrel with technology per se, but he chafed at the 
greed that transformed it: he reacted against privileged information, such 
as that held by corporations. His critique of capitalism was directed at 
proprietary knowledge as opposed to shared. That is why he could so 
admire the great inventor,scientist Steinmetz: Steinmetz's mathematics 
"was a closed garden, free from corruption and death as the New Jerusalem 
of the early Christians, where he was absolute god and master. If he'd been 
a less warm,blooded man, that would have been enough, but he wanted 
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real life, too. So it was inevitable that he should become a social revolu, 
tionist. . . . He was of the race of those who do not cash in." 60 When he 
translated this portrait into The 42nd Parallel, he added that "Steinmetz 
was the most valuable piece of apparatus General Electric had I until he 
wore out and died." General Electric had "let him be a Socialist and 
believe that human society could be improved the way you can improve a 
dynamo, and they let him be pro,German and write a letter offering his 
services to Lenin because mathematicians are so impractical who make up 
formulas by which you can build powerplants, factories, subway systems, 
light air, sunshine, but not human relations that affect the stockholders' 
money and the directors' salaries" (335, 334). But that did not make 
Steinmetz a cog. If General Electric owned Steinmetz's research, still his 
knowledge was "purer" than that of the company's founder, the inventor, 
entrepreneur Thomas Edison (also the subject of "biography"); the two 
were different. Similar corporate strategies had already turned literature, 
including Dos Passos's own, into a commodity, 6l and he probably realized 
that corporations in an information age tolerated his social ideas much as 
they tolerated Steinmetz's, but Dos Passos, like the rest of us, discriminated 
between messages and ideas, despite the ultimate commercialization of all 
of them. Despise capitalism though he might, Dos Passos respected its art. 
Not that he had much choice. After U.S. A, Dos Passos spent much of his 
career trying to unravel what had gone wrong, turning backward to 
Jefferson and to Jefferson's hope that knowledge could be shared, not 
patented or made profitable, in books like The Head and Heart of Thomas 
Jefferson (1954) and his series of volumes on the Founding Fathers. 
Their grapplings with language and their perceptions that language is 
reality do not make Crane and Dos Passos postmodernists, although they 
were remarkably prescient. They understood not only that messages artie, 
ulate an environment but also that the speed and the volume of channels 
of communication mediate that environment. 
That environment was increasingly defined by the messages embodied 
in science and technology, and to understand them was to understand the 
culture. Crane articulated this point in a letter to Harriet Monroe: "Hasn't 
it often occurred that instruments originally invented for record and 
computation have inadvertently so extended the concepts of the entity 
they were intended to measure (concepts of space, etc.) in the mind and 
imagination that employed them, that they may metaphorically be said to 
have extended the original boundaries of the entity measured? This little 
bit of 'relativity' ought not to be discredited in poetry now that scientists 
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are proceeding to measure the universe on principles of pure ratio, quite as 
metaphorical, so far as previous standards of scientific methods extended, 
as some of the axioms in Job. "62 Crane's own instruments extended the 
curve of heaven. His is a universe beautiful in the knowledge that informs 
it, its outlines mirrored in the artificiality of a technological landscape, 
rendered by a technician of the sacred. For all that Dos Passos's symbolism 
seems more compelling, he remains a chronicler while Crane speaks as a 
prophet. The U.S. A trilogy explores a spectrum of life in the United 
States fully three decades wide because he chose as his metaphor informa~ 
tion technologies acting less over space than over time. Literary historians 
are only now beginning to understand just how severely a rapidly changing 
science challenged the literary and political assumptions of the twenties. 
What invests these two writers with lasting value is the urgency of their 
need to respond, to experiment, and to achieve in an age of cultural 
transition. Those qualities-and their honesty-make it possible for 
modern audiences to read their texts as documents for their own time, but 
also for the future they feared. 
Notes 
1. Malcolm Cowley, After the Genteel Tradition: American Writers 1910-1930 (Car-
bondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1964), 182. 
2. See, for example, John Dos Passos, "A Humble Protest," Harwrd Monthly 62 
(June 1916): 116; Crane's numerous references to science as religion require no citation. 
3. Hart Crane to lsidor Schneider, Mar. 28, 1928, The Letters of Hart Crane, 
1916-1932, ed. Brom Weber (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1965), 222. 
4. JohnDosPassos, "AgainstAmericanLiterature,"NewRepublic8(0ct.14, 1916): 
270. 
5. Hart Crane, The Complete Poems and Selected Letters and Prose of Hart Crane, ed. 
Brom Weber (New York: Liveright, 1966), 218. 
6. Hart Crane to Waldo Frank, Mar. 4, 1928, in Letters, 319. 
7. Hart Crane, "The Bridge," in Complete Poems, 46; all subsequent references to 
this edition of The Bridge will be cited parenthetically in my text. 
8. John Dos Passos, "A Question of Elbow Room," in Occasions and Protests (New 
York: Henry Regnery, 1964), 62. 
9. Hart Crane, "Modem Poetry [1930]," in Complete Poems, 261. From time to time, 
Crane voiced fears that science would diminish the human spirit. As he wrote in a book 
review, "science, grown uncontrollable, has assumed a grin that has more than threatened 
the supposed civilization that fed it; science has brought light,-but it threatens to destroy 
the idea of reverence, the source of all light. Its despotism recognizes no limits" (Ibid., 201 ). 
10. Hart Crane to Gorham Munson, Mar. 2, 1923, in Letters, 129. 
11. Hart Crane to Gorham Munson, Feb. 18, 1923, in Letters, 124. 
Hart Crane and John Dos Passos 191 
12. Dos Passos, "Humble Protest," 116. 
13. Hart Crane to Gorham Munson, Mar. 17, 1926, in Complete Poems, 225-26. 
14. John Dos Passos, "The Writer as Technician," in Henry Hart, ed., American 
Writers Conference (New York: International Publishers, 1935), 82. Crane said pretty 
much the same thing in his essay "Modem Poetry," when he remarked that "human 
values remain essentially immune from any of the so-called inroads of science," in 
Complete Poems, 261. 
15. In the recent (Feb. 28, 1988) PBS broadcast of "Hart Crane," one of the series 
called "Voices and Visions," the poet Derek Walcott spoke of" 'the conditional' of Eliot and 
Pound-the 'what should be,'" as opposed to Crane's practice of speaking "of what is now." 
16. Gerald Holton, "Introduction," in Gerald Holton, ed., Science and Culture: A 
Study of Cohesive and Disjunctive Forces (Boston: Beacon, 1967), viii. 
17. Alan Trachtenberg calls Crane "embattled" in his introduction to Hart Crane: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1982), 12. 
18. Recent works to address this cultural matrix are Cecelia Tichi's Shiting Gears: 
Technology, Uterature, Culture in Modernist America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1987), and Lisa Steinman's Made in America: Science, Technology, and American 
Modernist Poets (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1987). For general background, see also 
Stephen Kern's The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1983). The influence of technology, and, to a lesser extent, science, on the 
culture at large was traced by the fall1986 exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum called "The 
Machine Age in America 1918-1941"; for a review of that exhibit see Phil Patton, "How 
Art Geared Up to Face Industry in Modem America," Smithsonian 17 (Nov. 1986): 156-67. 
19. Dos Passos, "Humble Protest," 119, and many other places. 
20. Hyatt Howe Waggoner, The Heel of Elohim: Science and Values in Modem American 
Poetry (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1950), 190. The standard biography of Crane is 
John Unterecker's Voyager: A Ufe of Hart Crane (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1969). 
21. Derek Savage, "The Americanism of Hart Crane," in Trachtenberg, Crane 
Collection, 48; this collection offers a wide s~mpling of criticism. 
22. Crane, "Modem Poetry," in Complete Poems, 260. 
23. Jean-Paul Sartre, "American Novelists in French Eyes," Atlantic Monthly 178 
(Aug. 1946): 117. The most recent book on Dos Passos, though one that scarcely considers 
his interest in science, is Linda Welshimer Wagner's Dos Passos: Artist as American (Austin: 
Univ. ofT exas Press, 1979). Interesting is Robert C. Rosen's John Dos Passos: Politics and the 
Writer (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1981 ). John D. Brantley's The Fiction of John Dos 
Passos (The Hague: Mouton, 1968) deals with machine imagery in the fiction. 
24. Dos Passos, "Writer as Technician," 81. 
25. Dos Passos, "Whither the American Writer? A Questionaire," Modem Quarterly 
6 (Summer 1932): 11-12. 
26. John Dos Passos, "Edison and Steinmetz: Medicine Men," New Republic 61 (Dec. 
18, 1929): 105. 
27. See Frederick J. Hoffman, "Science and the 'Precious Object,'" The Twenties: 
American Writing in the Postwar Decade, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1965), 275-78. 
28. Edith Wharton, A Backward Glance (New York: Appleton-Century 1934), 94. 
192 American literature and Science 
29. Crane, Letters, 322; see also 235, where he says he is reading Science and the 
Modem World (New York: Macmillan, 1925). 
30. The interview is reprinted in Occasions and Protests, 145-52. 
31. John Dos Passos, "The Harvard Afterglow," in Occasions and Protests, 1 7. 
32. John Dos Passos, The Best of Times (New York: Signet, 1966), 102. 
33. For more on the developments in American chemistry, see Dean Stanley Tarbell 
and Ann Tracy Tarbell, Essays on the History of Organic Chemistry in the United States, 
I875-I955 (Nashville: Folio, 1986). 
34. Nor would any American writer make significant use of chemistry until Thomas 
Pynchon, in Gravity's Rainbow. 
35. Hart Crane to Solomon Grunberg, Jan. 10, 1931, in Letters, 363. 
36. Even today this image persists. The memorial statue to Einstein in Washington 
depicts him in the attitude of Lewis Carroll. Children clamber on the form much as they 
swarm over the Alice in Wonderland sculpture in New York's Central Park. 
37. Hart Crane to Samuel Lovemen, Apr. 12, 1931, in Letters, 368. 
38. Hart Crane, "From Haunts of Proserpine," in Complete Poems, 264-66. 
39. A list of Spencer's principal works illustrates the degree to which fledgling 
sciences were shaped by these notions: The Principles of Psychology ( 1855), First Principles 
(1862), The Principles of Biology (1864), The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. (1876-1896), The 
Principles of Etltics, 2 vols. (1892, 1893). 
40. Ronald Martin, American Literature and the Universe of Force (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke Univ. Press, 1981). 
41. For a historical review of German biology, which casts some light on American 
developments, see Lynn Nyhart, "The Disciplinary Breakdown of German Morphology, 
1870-1900," Isis 78 (Sept. 1987): 365-89. 
42. lain Colley, Dos Passos and the Fiction of Despair (Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 1978), 49. 
43. Dos Passos enjoyed a kind of insider's knowledge passed on by his father 
(1844-1917) of the workings of American capitalism; see the elder man's analysis in John 
Randolph Dos Passos, Commercial Trusts: The Growth and Rights of Aggregated Capital, An 
Argument Delivered Before the Industrial Commission at Washington, D. C. , December I 2, I 899 
(New York: Putnam's Sons, 1901). 
44. Herbert Marshall McLuhan, "John Dos Passos: Technique Versus Sensibility," in 
Harold C. Gardiner, S.J., ed., Fifty Years of the American Novel: A Christian Appraisal (New 
York: Scribner's, 1951), 157,154. ThecrackaboutDosPassosandCapraisonp.164. The 
essay is a by-product of McLuhan's most Catholic phase. 
45. Ibid., 157. 
46. See, for example, John Dos Passos, Manhattan Transfer (1925; rpt., New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 195. An excellent study of the influence of journalism on Dos 
Passos's fiction is included in Shelley Fisher Fishkin, From Fact to Fiction: Journalism and 
Imaginative Writing in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985). 
4 7. See Steinman, Made in America. She mentions essays by Williams on "The Poem 
as a Field of Activity" and digressions on the role of the variable foot in verse as suggested by 
the radium experiments of the Curies. 
48. Hart Crane to Otto Kahn, Dec. 3, 1925, in Letters, 223. 
49. Hart Crane to Otto Kahn, Mar. 18, 1926, in Letters, 241. 
Hart Crane and john Dos Passos 193 
50. Hart Crane, "General Aims and Theories," in Complete Poems, 222-23. 
51. See K.G. Pontus Hulten, The Machine As Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age 
(New York: Museum of Modem Art, 1968). 
52. Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality (New York: New 
American Library, 1969), 75. 
53. Waggoner, Heel of Elohim, 168-70. 
54. Frederick}. Hoffman, "The Technological Fallacy in Contemporary Poetry: Hart 
Crane and MacKnight Black," American Literature 21 (1949): 94-107; and his Twenties, 
257-74. 
55. John A. Kouwenhoven, The Arts in Modem American Civilization (New York: 
Norton, 1967), 13-42. 
56. John Dos Passos, The 42nd Parallel (New York: Signet, 1969), xx. Subsequent 
references to this edition are cited in my text. 
57. John Dos Passos, "The Workman and His Tools" (1936), in Occasions and Pro-
tests, 8. 
58. See Tichi, Shifting Gears, 194-216. 
59. See Steinman's discussion of Williams in Made in America. 
60. Dos Passos, "Edison and Steinmetz," 104. 
61. For a discussion of the commercialization of literature and art, which began in 
earnest during the thirties, see Alice Goldfarb Marquis, Hopes and Ashes: The Birth of 
Modem Times (New York: Free Press, 1986), and Charles Newman, The Post-Modem Aura: 
The Act of Fiction in an Age of Inflation (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1985 ). 
62. Hart Crane to Harriet Monroe (1926), in Complete Poems, 239. 
11 
Fields of Spacetime and 
the "I" in Charles Olson's 
The Maxim us Poems 
STEVEN CARTER 
Or you can take an attitude, the creative vantage .... It involves a 
first act of physics. You can observe POTENTIAL and VELOCITY 
separately, have to, to measure THE THING. You get approximate 
results. They are usable enough if you include the Uncertainty 
Principle, Heisenberg's law that you learn the speed at the cost of 
exact knowledge of the energy and the energy at the loss of exact 
knowledge of the speed. 
-Charles Olson, Call Me Ishmael 
The notorious eclecticism of Charles Olson's reading and scholarship owes 
a great deal to his interest in scientific texts. Unlike Robert Frost, who 
discovered after having written certain poems that he had intuitively 
embroidered into them concepts of quantum physics, I Olson was appar-
ently directly influenced as a thinker and a poet by the work of a select 
group of scientists and mathematicians, including Bernard Riemann and 
Norbert Wiener. Thomas F. Merrill has pointed out that, in his important 
1957 essay, "Equal, That Is, To the Real Itself," Olson relied heavily on 
Hermann Weyl's The Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. It is 
Weyl's influence, Merrill suggests, that contributes to the scientific bias of 
Olson's argument, wherein "Olson spells out in remarkable detail, al-
though in the confusing technical jargon of space-age physics, how he 
regards projective writing as an inevitable consequence of the same non-
Euclidean 'redefinition of the Real' . . . that gave birth to relativity theory, 
quantum physics, and the whole conception of a continuous, as opposed to 
a classically discrete, universe." Merrill concludes his discussion of "Equal, 
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That Is, to the Real Itself," with an interesting observation: "An apt 
metaphor for such a continuous reality is the electromagnetic field in 
which interrelated transformations of energy points take place. In such a 
field discrete formulations, such as subject,object, cause,effect, and even 
mind,body, give way to the notion of flexible interplay between 'things 
among things.'" 2 
As we shall see, however, for the Charles Olson of The Maximus 
Poems, the quantum field heuristic represents less of a mere metaphor than 
it does a new poetics, or rhetoric of verse. At the conclusion of "Equal, 
That Is, to the Real Itself," Olson celebrates the flexibility of "the inertial 
field": 
Which it is [i.e., flexible], Einstein established, by the phenomena of 
gravitation, and the dependence of the field of inertia on matter. I take care 
to be inclusive, to enforce the point made at the start, that matter offers perils 
wider than man if he doesn't do what still today seems the hardest thing for 
him to do, outside of some art and science: to believe that things, and present 
ones, are the absolute conditions; but that they are so because the structures 
of the real are flexible, quanta do dissolve into vibrations, all does flow, and 
yet is there, to be made permanent, if the means are equal. 
For Olson, "the structures of the real" may carry over from the physical 
universe, the worlds of matter, to what he calls in the title of another essay 
the "Human Universe," or the worlds of consciousness. The two systems of 
matter and mind are inextricably bound up with each other. Olson's 
inspiration for such a holistic view of nature and man is Alfred North 
Whitehead, whose theory of "eternal objects" as physical qualities Olson 
applied to the mind itself: 
. . . Whitehead's important corollary: that no event is not 
penetrated, in intersection or collision with, an eternal 
event 
The poetics of such a situation 
are yet to be found out. 4 
Among other things, The Maximus Poems represents Olson's attempt to 
"find out" the poetics of a cross,pollination of scientific epistemologies and 
the language of verse. 
Thomas F. Merrill is not alone in borrowing from the language of 
quantum field theory to describe the aesthetics of contemporary poets. A 
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decade ago Joseph N. Riddell provided a thumbnail sketch of one variety 
of postmodem poem. For him it is "a field located within known things, 
like the periodic table of elements, which composes a space housing an 
unknown disturbance, a dissonance, an undiscovered element that indi, 
cates the dynamics of the field." 5 It is likely that Riddell had in mind 
Charles Olson's earlier prolegomenon to the poetics of open form, the 
familiar "Projective Verse," in which Olson too defines poetry in terms of 
"Composition by field, as opposed to inherited line, stanza, over,all form, 
what is the 'old' base of the non,projective." What Riddell called "dynam, 
ics" Olson called "the kinetics of the thing. A poem is energy transferred 
from where the poet got it (he will have some several causations), by way of 
the poem itself to, all the way over to, the reader. . . . From the moment 
he ventures into Field Composition-puts himself in the open-he can go 
by no track other than the one the poem under hand declares, for itself." 6 
Olson's use of the word "kinetics" suggests that as early as 1950, when 
"Projective Verse" was written, he had a specific discipline in mind as a 
model for his theory of field, or open form. The discipline was, of course, 
physics, or, more accurately, post,Einsteinian physics. In a letter to his 
friend and publisher, Cid Corman, Olson insists that "the kinetics of 
contemporary physics [is] more healthful than" 7 the rigidities of either/or, 
man and world, psyche and cosmos, those separate categories inherited 
from the Greeks. The scientist Neils Bohr recalls the crucial distinction 
Olson is making when he suggests that for the contemporary quantum 
physicist as well, language markers inherited from the Greeks (cause and 
effect words like "because" and "therefore," for instance, which assume a 
priori a cause,and,effect cosmos) are inappropriate. For Bohr, "When it 
comes to atoms, the language that must be used is the language of poetry." 8 
Both postmodem poetry and quantum physics, it would seem, have much 
to learn from each other. 
Perhaps the most fertile epistemological common ground shared by the 
two disciplines is "the field concept," which, according to the scientist 
Donna Jean Haraway, "defined developments in dynamic instead of geo, 
graphical terms. Every aspect of ontogeny had to be viewed in a double 
light, as the result of'interactions between the material whole with its field 
properties on the one hand, and the material parts on the other.'" 9 The 
essence of Haraway's definition is to be found in the phrase "a double 
light." It is the doubleness of field which creates difficulty in understand, 
ing its ambiguities. As the physicist B.K. Ridley has observed, "The total 
energy of a moving particle, rest, mass plus kinetic, is • . • nothing but the 
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total energy of its own electromagnetic field." 10 To say that a particle is 
both a particle and the field that it "inhabits" makes no sense in classical 
physics, which, as Charles Olson suggests, is epistemologically l~ss 
"healthful" for the postmodem poet than quantum physics. 
Projectivist verse is a poetry of relationships. As Karl Malkoff has 
written, "the domain of the Projectivist poem is the point of intersection 
between inner and outer realities." 11 The Maximus Poems, for example, is 
not a series of discrete, watertight expressions of Charles Olson's visions of 
Gloucester, Massachusetts, past and present; it expresses its meanings only 
in a focus of relationships among the poems. These foci, or "interactions," 
include the voice(s) of Maximus, who moves freely in space and time 
throughout the· sequences of poems; the town and people of Gloucester, 
Massachusetts; and the historical personages who appear and disappear in 
the shimmering spacetime field of Maximus. 
The epistemology which Malkoff uses to describe Projectivist verse is 
also used by physicists to define field. A subatomic particle is nothing but a 
focus of relationships between fields. As far as Maximus is concerned, the 
key feature of field poetics is the classical quantum paradox, or the non, 
Aristotelian habit of mind that suggests that reality can be two or more 
different things at the same time. The physicist Gary Zukav points out that 
"Quantum field theory is, of course, an outrageous contradiction in tenns. 
A quantum is an indivisible whole. It is a small piece of something, while a 
field is a whole area of something. A 'quantum field' is the juxtaposition of 
two irreconcilable concepts. In other words, it is a paradox. It defies our 
categorical imperative that something be either this or that. "12 
Three fields of action in Maximus create this paradox, defying Aristo, 
telian logic and linearity by interacting with each other "instantaneously 
and at one single point in space instantaneously and locally." 13 The fields 
of Maximus may be defined as time, space, and the "I" of the sequence; The 
Maximus Poems represents the interactions of these three fields. Each of 
the three poems I will discuss exhibits all three fields of action: "Letter 15," 
however, emphasizes the field of time, whereas "On First Looking out 
through Juan de la Cosa's Eyes" emphasizes the field of space. In "The 
Twist," fields of spacetime coalesce around the "I," or the speaker (Max, 
imus), who emerges as a fully articulated consciousness. Although three 
poems represent a necessarily small sampling of the considerable riches of 
Maximus, each poem included here fully expresses at least one of the three 
central themes of the work: the rapaciousness and waste that Olson 
assoociates with twentieth,century American capitalism; the close per, 
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sonal and mythical identification of the speaker with the fishing town of 
Gloucester; and Maximus' wider identification with the past, wherein 
Gloucester becomes not simply a city, or polis, to be discovered, but a 
means of discovery of what it means to be Maximus, or man. 
"Letter 15" from Maximus begins with a remembrance of things past, as 
the speaker corrects the historical record concerning the fate of a ship 
called the Putnam. The narrative dramatizes the difficulty of keeping the 
truth alive through time: "The whole tale, as we have had it, from his son, 
goes by the board. The son seems to have got it thirty,five years after the 
event from a sailor who was with the father on that voyage (to Sumatra, 
and Ile de France, cargo: shoes). This .;ailor apparently (he was twenty 
years older than the captain) was the one who said, that night they did get 
in, 'Our old man goes ahead as if it was noonday.' He must have been 85 
when he added the rest of the tale." 14 The theme of the mutability of 
memory-and therefore of history-is reinforced elsewhere in Maximus 
when the speaker declares, "History is the memory of time" (Maximus, 
116). This theme in the opening section of "Letter 15" also prefigures the 
technique of many of the poems to come. Even as memory is slippery-an 
old man's reminiscences of a ship in Gloucester-so time itself is slippery. 
Indeed, it is Olson's treatment of time as a narrative technique that 
makes many of the poems in Maximus difficult. Sherman Paul elaborates: 
Maximus tells us that his poem will not make us comfortable because it does 
not follow a linear track to a foreseen destination. In addressing his method, 
he reminds us of his weaving and of the indivisibility of his concerns-and of 
his materials, since everything, as with the bird, everything (immediate 
observation, document, recollection, dream, myth) is the common real 
material of his poem. In the field there are no boundaries . . . the field he 
enters is not a subject but the reality he fronts, the place ofhis attentions. . . . 
His subject, if he may be said to have one, is man-within,the,field. 15 
In "Letter 15," what Paul refers to as the "indivisibility of [Maximus's] 
concerns" is dramatized, not in, but as, a field of time. The adventure of 
the Putnam cannot be described as a singularity in space or time, cannot be 
reduced to an "event" that "happened." Instead, Olson distributes author, 
ity for the "truth" of the ship's fate among several narrators and au, 
diences-Maximus himself, the "we" of the passage, the son, the sailor, 
and the distant father. It is a technique that recalls the radical narrative 
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strategies of Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness and William Faulkner in 
The Sound and the Fury. For these writers, as for Olson, what used to be 
called "the heart of the matter" may not exist at all. 
Significantly, Olson's technique in "Letter 15" recalls Einstein's defini, 
tion of fields of energy: "Matter which we perceive is merely nothing but a 
great concentration of energy in very small regions. We may therefore 
regard matter as being constituted by the regions of space in which the field 
is extremely intense. . . . There is no place in this new kind of physics both 
for the field and matter for the field is the only reality." 16 For Olson the 
rhetorician of verse, Einstein's physical field represents more than a 
phenomenon that is restricted to the physical cosmos. Nor is field for 
Olson just a metaphor for postmodern poetics. Rather, in Olson's view, 
human consciousness itself is a field, whether it is expressed in a scientific 
or a poetical view of things: "At root (or stump) what is, is no longer 
THINGS but what happens BETWEEN things, these are the terms of the 
reality contemporary to us-and the terms of what we are." 17 
But if field as Einstein defines it here denotes a unity in space, it also 
denotes for Olson in "Letter 15" a unity in time. Olson's attempt to 
orchestrate a unity between time present and time past in the human 
cosmos of Gloucester becomes clearer if we examine a quantum model that 
theoretical physicist David Bohm uses to describe the "implicate order" of 
the physical cosmos: "each local clock of a given level exists in a certain 
region of space and time [i.e., the field] which is made up of still smaller 
regions, and so on without limit. We shall see that we can obtain the 
universality of the quantum of action, h, at all levels, if we assume that 
each of the above sub,regions contains an effective clock of a similar kind, 
related to the other effective clocks of its level in a similar way, and that 
this effective clock structure continues indefinitely with the analysis of 
space and time into subregions." 18 Bohm's thought,experiment with ideal 
clocks is meant to suggest the universality of the quantum of action: that is, 
a "truth" about space and time that exists in both micro, and macroscopic 
physical reality. I am arguing that Charles Olson's use of time in "Letter 15" 
and elsewhere in Maximus represents an attempt to devise a quantum of 
action in language. Olson's quantum of action will serve the same epis, 
temological function of"reading" the experiences of generations of people 
in the region and sub, regions of Gloucester as Bohm's quantum of action, 
the physicist's rosetta stone for "reading" patterns of wholeness in regions 
and sub,regions of energy. Olson achieves his quantum of action ("h" in 
the physical cosmos) by searching out in Maximus-in the lives of men 
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and women who populate the poems-what is common to all times and 
places, dividing time as he does so into conventional sub,regions (the 
seventeenth and twentieth centuries, say), and then using these universal 
human constants ("h" might well stand for "human") to erase the bound, 
aries of the sub,regions, of time altogether, creating a sense of what in the 
physical cosmos Bohm simply calls "wholeness." 
In Part II of"Letter 15," for example, Maximus leaps from the histor, 
ical account of the Putnam to a conversation in the present with poet Paul 
Blackburn, who has accused Maxim us/Olson of "twisting" the poem, i.e., 
beating around the bush, leaving the subject for bizarre tangents. Olson/ 
Maximus agrees with Blackburn, and then replies cryptically, "I sd., 
Rhapsodia. . . " (Maximus, 72 ). Olson knew that the word "rhapsodist" 
comes from rhaptein, which, as Don Byrd points out, means "to sew, to 
stitch together, and aidein, to sing. The poet is a stitcher of songs." 19 The 
songs of Maximus in part comprise the "tangents" of the poem that 
Blackburn objects to; and yet the tangents are the poem also; it is Maximus 
who is singing them, even if they are written by someone else: John Smith, 
for example. Smith, as a historical personage, is part of the field of 
Maximus. Maximus, the "I" of the poem where intersecting fields of time 
and space meet, is also the field. That is to say, Maximus subsumes John 
Smith: 
The winters cold, the Summers heat 
alternatively beat 
Upon my bruised sides, that rue 
because too true 
That no releefe can ever come 
But why should I despaire 
being promised so faire 
That there shall be a day of Dome [Maximus, 74] 
Smith's poem is a testament of self, but it is also another voice in the 
Greek chorus that is the testament of Maximus. Thus, historical time for 
Olson is an illusion; "Letter 15" ends in a sudden, bitter shift to the present 
age, a wrinkle in the intersecting fields of the poem, thanks to one word. 
"ADVERTISEMENTS" forms part of the title of a book by John Smith. In 
present,day American culture, ADVERTISEMENTS leads to this: 
o Republic, o 
Tell,A,Vision, the best 
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is soap. The true troubadors 
are CBS. Melopoeia 
IV 
is for Cokes by Cokes out of 
Pause 
( o Po-ets, you 
should getta 
job [Maximus, 75] 
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In "Letter 15," linear time is subsumed by the "universality" of the temporal 
quantum of action: in this case, greed. In Section II of the poem, Maximus 
points out that John Smith was rejected for the job of navigator by the 
pilgrims in favor of Miles Standish. For Maximus, Smith is a man of 
integrity, and yet, even in his time, the seeds of American corporate 
venality can be detected; the decision to appoint Standish as navigator was 
made "to save charges," as Smith himself wrote bitterly. zo 
Maximus is quick to dramatize equivalent examples of self-interest and 
shortsightedness in the above references to both contemporary advertising 
and pragmatic American attitudes toward "lazy" poets. From the point of 
view of a crassly materialistic capitalist society, linear time, therefore, has 
made little difference between Smith's day and our own. In other words, to 
borrow Einstein's terminology above, greed appears in "Letter 15" as a 
"region" of Maximus' consciousness where the field of time becomes 
"extremely intense"; more than three centuries of chronological time melt 
away in favor of a "concentration," not of physical, but of human psychic 
energy, whose localized manifestations in the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries appear with an American twist, and are similarly perverse. Thus 
a precise correspondence exists between the manner in which physicists 
(Einstein and Bohm) perceive energy fields, and the manner in which a 
poet (Olson) perceives the intricate orders of the human psyche, whose 
representations in Maximus are interwoven with the tissues and textures of 
post-Einsteinian spacetime. 
In the poem, "On first Looking out through Juan de la Cosa's Eyes," 
the explorer la Cosa emerges as a hero of Maximus because, like Maximus 
himself, he presents for the reader a "mythological present." But the true 
value ofla Cosa's voyages in Maximus is spatial: his "centrality" as a human 
being is expressed by the poet in terms of literal fields of space. Literal, 
because it is Juan de la Cosa's map of the world which makes of the world a 
whole for the first time in history. La Cosa captained the Niiia in 1492, but 
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is better known as "Chief Chart Maker" for Christopher Columbus. Eight 
years after the voyage to the New World, la Cosa produced his "mappen, 
munde" of the Old and New Worlds, inscribed "Juan de la cosa la fizo en el 
puerto de s:mja en ano de 1500." 21 For Charles Olson, la Cosa's map is a 
mythological model for wholeness as well, for in it all men share the same 
space; the map is a spatial metaphor for human brotherhood in the poem. 
It is also a model for Maximus, the "I" who transcends space in "la Cosa's 
Eyes" in the same fashion as the "I" of "Letter 15" who transcends time. 
Maximus says ecstatically, 
. . . before la Cosa, nobody 
could have 
a mappenmunde [Maximus, 81] 
Later in Maximus the "I" takes his place as a "settler" in la Cosa's mappen, 
munde, when he declares, "I am making a mappenmunde. It is to include 
my being" (Maximus, 201). The physical space of la Cosa's world thus 
dovetails with the spirituality of Maximus's being; in space now, as he does 
in time in "Letter 15," Maxim us becomes the field and the man,within, 
the,field. As Olson says elsewhere, "The littlest [man,within,the,field of 
history] is the same as the very big [the field of history], if you look at it."22 
Put another way, the lineaments of physical space dwell within the psyche 
of each man who is "contained by" space, because physical space is also 
"contained" (i.e., perceived by) each man. La Cosa's mappenmunde is 
thus psychic and physical, a sort of Mercator's projection of inner and 
outer spaces that coexist as a simultaneous field. 
In "la Cosa's Eyes," as always in Maximus, the fields of space, time, and 
the speaker's "I" overlap; as Don Byrd correctly observes, "Space and 
history [in] the post,Einsteinian cosmos of [Maximus] are only different 
manifestations of the same order." 23 For Einstein, of course, space and 
time are not separate quantities: they are both linked phenomena in a 
universal continuum called spacetime. For Maximus/la Cosa, the world is 
no longer flat, for the mappenmunde remakes the frightening world "out 
there," a world of "mermaids and monsters" (Maximus, 82), into curved 
space, a terrestial precursor of universal curved space: 
Respecting the earth, he sd, 
it is a pear, or, 
like a round ball upon a part of which there is a prominence 
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like a woman's nipple, this protrusion 
is the highest & nearest to 
the sky (Maximus, 83] 
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La Cosa's space is a psychidfeminine discovery, therefore, for "My New, 
foundlanders/My Portuguese," and the people of Gloucester. 
It is in "On first Looking out throughJuan de la Cosa's Eyes" that a 
reader may understand, perhaps for the first time in Maximus, the literal 
uses of space on the page. Like a sculptor-Henry Moore, for instance-
Olson uses blank (negative) space to create as much meaning as words 
create-or, as in Moore's case, bronze creates. There are entire pages of 
Maximus that Olson leaves purposefully blank. It is as if pure spacetime, 
pure becoming, takes over where words suddenly fail Maximus. The spaces 
between words create as much meaning as the words themselves: if the 
poem is a process, then the not,yet,there, or "future" space that words on 
the next page will embroider on, is just as much a part of the poem as the 
"present" words are. Thus, as the holes in Henry Moore's sculptures are 
meant by the artist to be seen, or as the silences in John Cage's musical 
compositions are meant by the composer to be heard, so the white spaces 
on the pages of Maximus are meant by the poet to be read. Put another way, 
Olson's white spaces represent future time which, like the past, is encysted 
by the Bergsonian perpetual now of Maximus. 
Olson's syntax in Maximus also depends for its meaning upon the open 
spaces in the poems. It is a fractured syntax, a fractured typography, 
floating like jetsam in the sea off Gloucester, the sea of spacetime Olson 
observes through Maximus's colossal memory, which he defines as "the 
history of time" (Maximus, 256): 
No worms. Storms, 
Ladies & 
to the bottom of the, 
husbands, & wives, 
little children lost their (Maximus, 84] 
Here, Maximus's syntax is perpetually in the process of becoming a 
sentence, i.e., a complete thought. Similarly, Olson's characterization of 
Maximus himself represents a process of becoming a sentient whole. Of 
course it is this process of becoming, of succeeding generations lost and 
found at sea off Gloucester, that is the subject of the passage. The 
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"becorrfingness" of the syntax is the subject as much as what the words 
"floating" in the syntax say. 
The subject of"On first Looking out through Juan de la Cosa's Eyes" is 
therefore continuity: the continuity of the curved space of la Cosa's 
"mappenmunde" which, in Gloucester's flower ceremony in August, trans-
lates thematically into the continuity between living and dead: 
. . . each summer, at the August full, 
they throw flowers, which, from the current there, at the Cut, 
reach the harbor channel, and go 
these bouquets (there are few, Gloucester, who can afford florists' prices) 
float out 
you can watch them go out into, 
the Atlantic [Maximus, 84] 
The field of the dead and the living in Maximus is meshed by the flower 
ceremony, which, in "Letter 36" as well, exists to create continuity: 
the flowers 
tum 
the character of the sea The sea jumps 
the fate of the flower The drowned men are undrowned 
in the eddies 
of the eyes 
of the flowers 
opening 
the sea's eyes [Maximus, 157] 
The syntactical mixing of flowers, eyes of the people, and the drowned 
men of Gloucester, represents a direct attack in language on the illusion 
of spatial and temporal separateness in the world. Indeed, the very concept 
of field denies a reality of bits and pieces altogether. By embracing 
Gloucester, the Cut, Dogtown, the sea, the drowned men, and flowers 
tossed into the waves by huddled women and children stitching the field of 
spacetime together with remembrance, la Cosa's mappenmunde ultimately 
meshes the temporal field of "Letter 15" with the spatial field of "On first 
looking out through Juan de la Cosa's Eyes." 
"The Twist," the third major poem in the fields of Maximus, is also one 
of the most personal poems. In it the "I" of Maximus, the "being" in la 
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Cosa's mappenmunde, takes his place in the spacetime field of "Letter 15" 
and "On first Looking out through Juan de la Cosa's Eyes." "The Twist" 
bears a striking contrast, however, to "la Cosa's Eyes" because it represents 
la Cosa's mappenmunde turned inside out: now we have Maximus' naked 
being, the "personal" Maximus, the man~in~the~field. In fact, as Don Byrd 
has pointed out, Olson's flipover of world to man~in~the~world makes "The 
Twist" resemble a kind of moebius strip of words24 and reminds us again 
that the Einsteinian space of Maximus is not linear but curves back on 
itsel£ Thus la Cosa's stormy coast becomes, in "The Twist," 
. . . my inland waters 
(Tatnuck Sq. and the walk 
from the end of the line 
to Paxton, for May~flowers 
or by the old road to Holden 
after English walnuts [Maximus, 86] 
If a man departs from Gloucester in a straight line, following la Cosa's map, 
he will curve his way backward to the "inland waters" where he began. The 
discovery of a new world therefore becomes a discovery of self, of Maximus' 
"being" which is suddenly incarnated among the May~flowers and walnut 
trees of Gloucester. As we saw in the poem dedicated to him, the fact that 
la Cosa, who saw these same May~flowers centuries ago, is dead, is 
immaterial. For both time and space are dissolved in "The Twist," and 
Maximus-who is an echo of la Cosa himself-is the locus of the two, the 
intersection of the fields. "The Twist" is subjective: everywhere in the 
poem, the "I" is fluid, not as one identity separate from the field of objects, 
memories, and reflections, but as a kind of chorus: 
I went home 
as fast as I could, 
the whole Cut 
was a paper village my Aunt Vandla 
had given me, who gave me, 
each Christmas, 
such toys 
As dreams are, when the day 
encompasses. They tear down 
the Third Ave El. Mine stays, 
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as Boston does, inches up. 
I run my trains 
on a monorail, I am seized 
-not so many nights ago-
by the site of the river 
exactly there at the Bridge 
where it goes out & in 
I recognize 
the country . . . (Maximus, 89] 
The concept of "in" and "out" in "The Twist," both as the physiog, 
nomy of the moebius strip, and also as a metaphor for Einsteinian curved 
space, is fundamentally important for an understanding of Maximus as a 
whole. The meandering of the river exists in time as well as space: "-not 
so many nights ago-" unites the boy Maximus and the man Maximus 
remembering, and suddenly spills into the spatial "out & in" of the river. In 
Einsteinian space, the concept of "inness" as opposed to the concept of 
"outness" makes no sense; like the surfaces of the moebius strip, both "in" 
and "out" are made of what the particle physicist Fritjof Capra calls 
"inseparable energy patterns." 25 For Olson as for the contemporary phys, 
icist, there can be no isolation of events in the universe of space and time. 
Olson demonstrates this Einstein,inspired truism in both "la Cosa's Eyes" 
and "The Twist." La Cosa's mappenmunde is the "out" of "The Twist," 
whose "in" is the map of Gloucester retraced in the personal memory of 
Maximus. "La Cosa's Eyes" ends with the lines, 
On ne doit aux morts nothing 
else than 
la verite [Maximus, 85] 
which translate, "We owe the dead nothing else than the truth." 
"The Twist" ends with the lines, 
the whole of it 
coming, 
to this pin,point 
to tum 
in this day's sun, 
in this veracity 
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there, the waters of several of them the roads 
here, a blackberry blossom [Maximus, 90] 
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"There/here": the historical veracity we owe to the memory of the dead, to 
la Cosa, structurally twists on the moebius strip of "The Twist" to become 
the "veracity" of personal observation and discovery, exemplified by the 
care with which the poem names Maximus's memories of flowers. 
It is chimerical to ask of any epic narrative that it attain perfect unity; 
indeed, the concept of unity itself is anathema to postmodemism. As 
many critics have noticed, there are real differences between The Maximus 
Poems of 1960 and Maximus IV, V, VI, published in 1968. 26 Nonetheless, if 
seeing The Maximus Poems 1-VI as all of a piece is a matter of infinite hope, 
unity may be perceived in certain elegant clusters of poems within the 
larger work. The "quantum poetics" of field offers a skeleton key to the 
interrelationships among the lyrics of at least one such cluster in Maximus. 
For in "The Twist," that little masterpiece of open form, the field of space, 
time, and the "I" of Maximus is complete; the passion of historical 
memory in "Letter 15" embraces the floating flowers of grieving women in 
"la Cosa's Eyes" and harmonizes in the moebius strip of "The Twist" with 
Maximus' sympathies for la Cosa, for Gloucester's own sailors, and for the 
"waters" of his own past in a village by the sea. 
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"Unfurrowing the Mind's 
Plowshare": Fiction 
in a Cybernetic Age 
DAVID PORUSH 
One of the most pervasive themes in postmodern culture is an urgent 
concern with an old philosophical question, the mechanism,vitalism 
problem: Are humans merely machines whose every experience and ex, 
pression can be described by a formal mechanics? In contemporary terms 
we call this question a cybernetic one, and concern with it is so ubiquitous 
and fundamental that it is fair to characterize our era as a cybernetic age. 
In the sciences, the answer to this question is not simple, but the 
general drift is toward the mechanical: human behaviors, including com, 
munication in language and thinking, can be expressed in formal, al, 
gorithmic, mechanical terms. In the arts, especially in contemporary 
fiction, the answer is also not simple or unalloyed, but the general 
tendency is toward the mechanical: there is some quality in humanity that 
resists mechanical modeling and simulation. As this chapter shows, con, 
temporary literature confronts the cybernetic question not only by drama, 
tizing the problem of humans as machines but also as a matter of style and 
form; that is, as a matter that can be confronted in the intimate choices of a 
writer expressing his or her imagination in words. Of course, such self, 
reflexive concerns are typically postmodern, but in discussing cybernetics 
they take on particular poignancy for reasons I will explain. 
In the exemplary case of Thomas Pynchon's work, which this essay 
treats, the problem is encapsulated in the question of metaphor. Is meta, 
phor mechanical, can it be parsed in strict formal terms? Or is there some 
elusive and mysterious quality of intelligence that is uniquely expressed in 
rich metaphors that help humanity slip out from under the domineering 
control of the cybernetic project? While the natural response of the 
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humanist would be an urgent affirmative, Pynchon's answer even to this 
question is ambiguous, for control, system, pattern, organization, mechanism 
are robust and attractive paradigms for the artist as well as for the cyber-
neticist, and especially for Pynchon, whose imagination seems particularly 
drawn to considering the systematic aspects of coded communication. 
Cybernetics in the Sciences 
Because it is fundamental in contemporary culture, the cybernetic ques-
tion is addressed both in the postmodem sciences and arts. Though it is 
certainly not unique to American culture (the Japanese appear to be 
equally obsessed with robots, androids, computers, and cyborgs), it re-
ceives in America its most intense, varied, and sustained discussion. In-
deed, there is a whole complex of new sciences that have evolved in the last 
half of this century to attack aspects of the mechanism-vitalism problem: 
artificial intelligence, cognitive science, neurobiology and neuroscience, 
information science, decision science and game theory, systems science, 
behaviorism, general systems dynamics, computational linguistics, crypt· 
analysis, and all forms of computer modeling. 1 Cybernetics has given us 
our modem understanding of such terms as positive and negative feedback, 
entropy, information, noise, sender-receiver, organization, and redundancy. 
And of course, cybernetics is the single greatest impulse behind the 
computer and communications revolution of the postwar era, which has 
had an enormous and growing influence on how we work, play, communi-
cate, and express ourselves. It has also had impact on other sciences and 
technologies that are busy giving birth to the "posthuman," fueling the 
drift in biology to biological engineering and such programs as mapping 
the gene (The Human Genome Project) and the movement in medicine to 
organ transplants, prostheses and artificial replacement parts for ever more 
complex organs, for cybernetics shares with these other sciences not only 
certain techniques of feedback analysis of control mechanisms but also a 
fundamental commitment to the idea that humans are essentially ma-
chines.2 
The science of cybernetics itself began as an interdisciplinary venture 
in the 1940s in response to the failure of positivism. 3 The movement in 
science to prove that a totally deterministic portrait of the universe was 
possible was most popularly expressed by Bertrand Russell and Alfred 
North Whitehead's set theory. However, this project received two death 
blows within four short years from the advent of quantum mechanics in 
192 7 and Godel's theorem in 1931.4 The four major figures who were most 
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influential in the evolution of the computer and cybernetics all emerged 
from strong commitments to determinism-Norbert Wiener, John von 
Neumann, Claude Shannon, and Alan Turing-although the term cyber, 
netics is credited to Norbert Wiener. 5 However, the collective work of 
Wiener, Neumann, Shannon, and Turing contributed to the cybernetic 
paradigm. Stated most simply, cybernetics suggests that everything in the 
knowable universe can be modeled in a logico,mathematical (formal) system of 
quantifiable information, from the phase shifts of subatomic particles to the 
poet's selection of a word in a poem, to the rent in the fabric of spacetime 
created by a black hole, to the evanescent images flickering through the 
brain of a preverbal infant. Norbert Wiener defined cybernetics as the 
science of control and communication in living beings and machines. 6 But 
of course, the most riveting consequences of the paradigm are its implica, 
tions for the human mind. 
The consequences of this simple ambition are profound. At the heart 
of cybernetics is a vision (reflected in the stories we tell ourselves) that our 
culture evidently finds both deeply threatening and broadly promising. 
Stated simply, one basic cybernetic assumption is that the richness and 
spontaneity of the way humans "process information" is specifiable in 
mechanical terms, and therefore our thought processes can be imitated by, 
coded in, linked to, or even surpassed or replaced by cybernetic mecha, 
nisms. More recently, cybernetics has become receptive to questions 
regarding the precise status of consciousness or awareness under its defini, 
tions. Cybemeticists today note that the problem of self,consciousness in 
the human mind (and how to design machines that have it) is shorthand 
for a whole slew of problems about the distinction between how machines 
use information and how humans make meaning, between natural Ian, 
guages and artificial codes, between text and context. Clearly, the latter 
elements of these pairs are not amenable to simple modeling by the former, 
and many of the inflated claims by AI experts in the 1960s (that self, 
conscious learning computers were just around the comer), particularly by 
Marvin Minsky of MIT, have wrecked upon the tricky shoals of self, 
awareness. Nonetheless, the paradigm grows increasingly strong, fueled by 
its success in designing computers and implementing them in numerous 
human domains as "expert systems" and "AI" programs. 
Cybernetics in Recent literature 
Our popular culture powerfully registers the still,growing impact of this 
cybernetic paradigm. The last decade especially has seen an explosion of 
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computerization and the proliferation of robots both in fact and in imag· 
inative works, encouraging even as it reflects this deeply rooted cybernetic 
drift in our culture. Cyborgs, androids, robots, and superhuman computers 
like HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) or Rachel, the "replicant" in 
Blade Runner (1983), are eloquent manifestations of this drift. Gobots, 
Transformers, George Lucas's Star Wars "droids,'; dozens of varieties of 
cartoon serials, and science fiction movies and novels have been imag· 
inatively preparing our children for the coming roboticization of mankind 
for decades. Indeed, cybernetic science fiction forms one of the most 
consistently dominant currents in that growingly influential genre. 7 From 
Isaac Asimov's I, Robot through such recent works of "cyberpunk" as 
William Gibson's Neuromancer (1984 ), Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa 
Overdrive (1989), Philip K. Dick's "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep" 
(made into the movie Blade Runner,) and Bruce Sterling's The Artificial Kid 
(1980), we see this elaboration of the cybernetic metaphor taken for 
granted as the shape of our collective future. In fact, some of the most 
speculative science fiction has trouble keeping up with actual develop· 
ments in computer and robotics research. For instance, Gibson's 1984 
portrait of "cyberspace" in Neuromancer-a vast, collective sensory repre-
sentation of data that the human mind accesses directly and experiences in 
place of normal sensory reality-is already being researched in rudimen· 
tary form by several private ventures, even though Gibson places his vision 
late in the twenty-first century. 8 
This is not to say that images of automated or artificial people are new. 
Such imaginings have haunted us since the Greek myths of Talus and 
Galatea. The eighteenth century was fascinated with automata such as 
Vaucanson's duck and Swiss clockworks. In Book Three of Gulliver's 
Travels, Jonathan Swift's bitter attack on the attempts by the Royal Society 
to mechanize language precedes our own fears of automation (quintessen· 
tially expressed by Charlie Chaplin in Modem Times [1935]) by a good two 
centuries. What has changed for us, and what has made the dialogue so 
urgent, is that cybernetics has upped the ante. Now machines imitate not 
only our muscular actions but the very actions of our minds. Cybernetics 
challenges us in that soaring dome where we live, in our heads, using 
weapons essential to our sense of ourselves, our acts of communication, our 
words. 
For these reasons, in the last three decades a powerful counter state· 
ment to the advent of cybernetics and its attendant technologies has 
emerged in American fiction. The rise of cybernetics paralleled and 
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influenced the emergence of a literature that called into doubt its very 
ability to express anything for certain, a literature that became extremely 
self-conscious of its own systems of communication. In the 1960s this 
distrust and dubiety were mistaken for literary "exhaustion," and the 
hallmarks of postmodernism-its black humor; its ironic undermining of 
themes, stories and plots; its satirical bent; its distrust of language; its 
playful love of systems, which it sets about dismantling even as it constructs 
them; its self-consciousness and embrace of silence-all were mistaken for 
a perverse failure of imagination, as if authors had used up the things they 
had to say and were left only with silence. 9 
"It is paradoxical, really," writes Philip Roth in his now classic essay 
"Writing American Fiction," "that the very prose style which, I take it, is 
supposed to jolt and surprise us ... turns back upon itself and the real 
world is in fact veiled from us by this elaborate, self-conscious language-
making. . . . The news I wish to bear is . . . a loss of subject; or if not a loss, 
. . . then let me say a voluntary withdrawal of interest by the writer of 
fiction from some of the grander social and political phenomena of our 
times. 1° From Roth's early suggestion through the reign of deconstruction 
in literary criticism through the 1980s, the accusation that postmodernism 
is indifferent to reality or expressed the fundamental epistemological 
ineffectuality of the text has been the standard in postmodern theory. 
However, though in my view postmodernism is persistently concerned 
with-one might say anxious about-its own epistemological effectuality, 
its conclusion about the matter is far from clear. Indeed, postmodern 
fiction cannot help but affirm its own power to describe reality. Even if it 
does abdicate its authority to describe nature or provide systematic mean-
ingfulness, at least it then describes with superior authority the human 
experience in the face of lost meaning or unworkable systems of explana-
tion. How else to explain the ongoing attempt in postmodern fiction to 
record the deeper truth of recent history (even if those truths take the form 
of elaborate and sometimes fantastic fictions like Robert Coover's The 
Public Burning or Pynchon's recent Vineland (1990))? How else can we 
explain the urge to provide a countervailing view to science's version of 
how the universe and humanity is organized, to register the effects of 
technological change, to delve into human psychology and motivation? 
Clearly, writers of fiction continue to feel that fiction is an effective 
epistemological force. Though-or perhaps because-it lacks the con-
clusive systematic authority of science, literary expression represents an 
equally valid alternative route to describing our experience of reality. 
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An advocate of science might demur that the word "experience" 
introduces an entire realm of subjectivity that is precisely unepistemolog, 
ical. However, science itself has been forced to face its own inability to 
banish the observer from the scene of, and calculations about, observation. 
That was the original attack on determinism that provoked the cybernetic 
response by Norbert Wiener. As Herbert Simon, a noted artificial intel, 
ligence theorist, has said, "All correct reasoning is a grand system of 
tautologies, but only God can make use of that fact. The rest of us must 
painstakingly and fallibly tease out the consequences of our assump, 
tions." 11 Hence, from a postmodern view, all narratives, even scientific 
ones, contain their own refutation. Stephen Toulmin suggests in The 
Return to Cosmology that contemporary science in general is growing more 
and more postmodern because it calls for a new epistemology that reinserts 
the human perspective into the model of nature.lZ 
In this context, cybernetics earns fiction's special attention because it 
entails a model for communication. Cybernetic fiction is an expression of 
literature's need to contest cybernetics' claims for an ultimate description 
of human communication and thought. In one sense, then, cybernetics 
and cybernetic fiction can be seen as vying for epistemological superiority: 
who does the better job of describing how humans think and communi, 
cate? In another sense, the two enterprises can be seen as accomplices or 
collaborators in a larger postmodern mission: defining from opposite sides 
that gap where humanity remains inexpressible in mechanical terms. 
The body of cybernetic fiction, then, includes Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s 
earlier novels, particularly Player Piano ( 19 52); William Burroughs's fiction 
of the 1950s and 1960s, especially The Soft Machine and The Ticket That 
Exploded; some of Donald Barthelme's short stories, but especially "The 
Explanation" (in City Life, 1970); several works by John Barth, especially 
Giles Goat Boy (1966) and Letters (1979); some works by Robert Coover, 
. but especially "Morris in Chains," (in Pricksongs and Descants, 1973); all 
the novels by Joseph McElroy, but more prominently Lookout Cartridge 
(1974) and Plus (1976); Marianne Hauser's The Talking Room (1977); and 
more recently, Don DeLillo's White Noise (1985). The exemplary author of 
this class of fiction is Thomas Pynchon, whose dialogue with various 
sciences in his novels V. (1963 ), The Crying of Lot 49 (1967), and Gravity's 
Rainbow (1973) is almost certainly more responsible than any others for 
leading American literary critics into an engagement with contemporary 
scientific ideas.n 
In short, some of the most commonly studied contemporary authors of 
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American fiction have written cybernetic fiction, and several have done so 
repeatedly. These overwise arcane texts become most trenchant when we 
read them as part of a dialogue with a contemporary science. Together they 
move that far from having exhausted its possibilities, cybernetic fiction, as 
representative of postmodemism generally, is a robust genre. At the very 
least, the earlier works of cybernetic fiction seem prophetic because they 
focused on computers, cybernetics, communication, and information, 
predicting the direction our technological culture would take in subse, 
quent decades. 
Yet, what sets cybernetic fiction apart from every other genre of 
literature is that it actuaUy applies cybernetic principles to the construction of the 
literary text14 so that these fictions become "soft machines." This tactic is 
of course made possible only by the advent of a science, which first 
proposed principles for such communication. So cybernetic fiction is 
thereby tangled in-one might say it revels in-a cybernetic loop that is at 
the same time a typically postmodem conundrum: in its attempt to provide 
a portrait of human communication and mentation epistemologically 
superior to that offered by cybernetics, cybernetic fiction finds itself 
employing cybernetic models and techniques, even if only ironically, in 
order to expose the limitations of those very models and techniques. 
Pynchon and Cybernetics 
Understanding the central role played by cybernetics in our contemporary 
culture, we can then understand the urgency of several of our best 
postmodem authors to formulate responses to its theories. We can also 
appreciate postmodem literature's robustness, since it is virtually the only 
narrative genre that attempts to engage cybernetics on its own ground.15 It 
actually applies cybernetic principles to the construction of the text, but 
perhaps as a sort of inoculation against cybernetic determinism. Thomas 
Pynchon's work is exemplary of this postmodem tum. 
At the root of all of Pynchon's work is a deep skepticism about and 
mistrust of official systems, a trait in American fiction that we can trace 
back to James Fenimore Cooper and Herman Melville. It is perhaps the 
quintessential American characteristic, explaining not only American 
literary motifs, but political themes such as the tension among govemmen, 
tal branches mandated by the Constitution or the addition of the Bill of 
Rights, which is appended distrustfully to that Constitution. In Democracy 
in America (1835) De Tocqueville commented on the distrust of systems as 
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a ubiquitous American trait (along with the contrary trait that each 
American seems to have his own system), and it lies at the heart of our 
politics and national psychology. For Pynchon, any system carries with it 
the threat of organization, and organization imperializes and controls at 
the expense of human individuality. In particular, Pynchon compulsively 
rehearses the drama of individual freedom threatened by some outside-
and by definition hostile-agency. Almost always, the tools of that agency 
are technological. Even apparently neutral and objective (the two terms 
should not be confused) systems-physics, say, or literary criticism, or the 
innocent ad hoc systems of individuals searching for meaning in their 
lives-can be turned into techniques for control and manipulation. 
Pynchon's worldview is forged out of the tension between individuals 
struggling to preserve their freedom and the overlapping systems, grids, 
patterns, organizations, and technologies that confine them. Ironically, 
sometimes the patterns and lines of control come from some inner, 
personal need, including the need to imagine on the part of other individ-
uals. So Pynchon's characters tend to project order onto the world or 
penetrate the labyrinths of order that others have erected. Mystery and 
conflicts in Pynchon's stories arise from clashes in teleologies. Control 
comes from those who have the means to impose their telos on others. 
Cybernetics gives these forces special techniques to challenge even peo-
ple's freedom of will and autonomy of expression. 
Oedipa Maas of Pynchon's second novel, The Crying of Lot 49 (1967), 
is the avatar of this theme. She's a young woman in the middle of a life 
crisis who becomes the executrix of a wealthy hoaxer's will. Following 
clues in Pierce lnverarity's will leads her to The Tristero, a subterranean 
postal society-a communications conspiracy, if you will. Tristero's power 
seems to grow as she investigates it, even as she has trouble determining its 
reality. She likens herself to "the dark machine in the center of the 
planetarium" striving to bring "the Estate into pulsing, stelliferous Mean-
ing all in a soaring dome around her." In other words, Pynchon caricatures 
through Oedipa the human enterprise of knowledge-seeking. However, 
the novel offers no resolution: at the end, we await with Oedipa the call of 
an auctioneer about to "cry lot 49," in which she hopes to find another 
clue. Like every other clue in the short novel, we know this one will 
teasingly promise to offer some final insight but will be bound by the laws 
of Pynchon's universe to engender only further mystery and frustration but 
with the hint of revelation lying just beyond our event horizon. 
Pynchon's primary characters share Oedipa's innocence, her belief in 
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ultimate resolutions, her doubts about her own sanity, her compulsiveness 
in searching for the truth, her scholarly resourcefulness, and her paranoia. 
Herbert Stencil of V. sees twentieth,century history as nothing more than 
a web of intrigue hinting at the identity of V., who is either a spy 
inexorably turning into an automaton or the code name of a secret rocket 
developed by the Nazis or one of several other possibilities. Through his 
eyes, the world becomes Stencilled, stamped with the hero's peculiar and 
pathological vision of the interconnectedness of everything in the crux of 
the letter V. In Pynchon's masterpiece, Gravity's Rainbow, British intel, 
ligence during World War II discovers that an American named Slothrop 
stationed in London has kept a map of the city with brightly colored pins 
marking the sites of his amorous conquests. His erotic cartography would 
be nothing more than a boast, except for the curious fact that each of his 
affairs corresponds exactly to a site where a Nazi V2 rocket will later 
explode. 
British Intelligence, and eventually Slothrop himself, explore all sorts 
of systems, from Pavlovian behaviorism to ESP, from statistical mechanics 
to tarot, from Freudian psychology to physics, in an attempt to establish 
the remarkable connection between Slothrop's anatomical divining rod 
and the guidance system in the nose cone of the rocket. Of course, the 
latter device is the paradigmatic cybernetic mechanism; the Germans call 
it the schwarzgerat-"the dark thing" or "the black box" (i.e., the inex, 
plicable or unnameable). 
It seems clear that Pynchon's fundamental interest lies in the relative 
potency of different epistemologies, different sciences, different narratives 
of reality, including highly idiosyncratic and personal ones. And somehow, 
for Pynchon, the laws governing how information is organized into sys, 
terns-that is, cybernetics-hold the key to it all. 16 
The signs of a deep involvement with cybernetics proliferate across 
Pynchon's work. First of all, throughout his work we see mechanical 
organs and parts grafted onto human characters. In V. , several characters 
have prosthetic limbs and organs, and the mysterious, elusive V(ictoria 
Meroving) herself acquires a growing number of artificial replacements for 
lost parts until, still barely living, she is gleefully dismantled by urchins of 
Malta while she lies helplessly pinned beneath a collapsed building. 
Another character, Bongo,Shaftesbury, calls himself a "clockwork doll." 
A third character, Fergus, plugs himself directly into a TV set through 
electrodes on his arm forming a servo,mechanicalloop. Pig Bodine gets a 
job working on SHROUD and SHOCK-two "synthetic human" proj, 
• 
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ects. Shoenmaker, the plastic surgeon who performs a nose job on Benny 
Profane's girlfriend, feels "himself no more animate than the spanners and 
screwdrivers he handled." 
Pynchon compulsively resorts to cybernetic images and metaphors for 
human activities and structures. Oedipa looks down on San Narciso Valley 
and imagines that she has just opened up the back of a transistor radio (a 
prophesy, perhaps, of Silicon Valley?). Later, her confusion over which 
version of reality to believe is compared to the feeling of being "trapped 
between the zeros and ones of a giant computer." What exists in the 
excluded middle between the zeros and ones of a computer? Pynchon has 
warned us about "excluded middles": they are "to be avoided at all costs.'! 
The titular metaphor of Gravity's Rainbow itself refers to the parabolic arc 
described by the flight of the V2 rocket, whose ascent we witness in the 
first passage of the novel, and whose descent we still await at its end, some 
seven hundred pages later. 
Finally, it is clear that Pynchon applies cybernetic principles to the 
construction of his images and themes with more rigor and consistency 
than any other author. For instance, Abraham Moles, in his landmark 
book Information Theory and Esthetic Perception, shows that from the mathe, 
matical point of view of the message itself, there is no distinction between 
noise and signal. Rather, what constitutes noise and what constitutes part 
of the intended message or code is determined by what system you are 
using. 18 In terms of human communication, then, it is as if a spy uses 
encoded marginalia scribbled over a sonnet by Shakespeare to communi, 
cate information to his agent in the field. If that text were to fall into the 
hands of a literature scholar, the marginalia would seem to be distracting 
marks, just so much noise. But if the intended receiver, the spy, reads it, 
the sonnet is simply the ground, the background noise, of the "real" 
message. So what seems like nonsense for one receiver may, in the proper 
context, be deciphered as highly meaningful information by another. In 
short, one man's scrabble is another's code. It depends on your point of view 
or context. 
A striking passage in one of Pynchon's works illustrates this neatly. In 
V. a young German engineer, Kurt Mondaugen, monitors the random 
electrical noises that are everywhere in the atmosphere and that translate 
into static on his radio. Placed in psychologically distressing circum, 
stances, Mondaugen returns to his post. Eventually he begins to see in 
these random noises an emergent pattern. The more he looks at these 
whistles, bleeps, clicks, risers, etc. , the more he seems to discern a message 
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embedded there. Finally, he translates the code into letters, which at first 
seem like a mere jumble: 
DIGEWOELDTIMSTEALALENSWTASNDEURFUALRISKT 
He shows it to his superior officer, who immedately sees that if you extract 
every third letter you uncover a surprising double code. The extracted 
letters produce 
GODMEANTNUURK 
which is an anagram of"KURT MONDAUGEN." The remaining letters 
form a famous quotation from Wittgenstein (in German, of course) 
DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIST 
["The world is all that is the case."] This fundamental axiom of Wittgen-
stein's philosophy of language in tum seems to comment (favorably or 
unfavorably, it's hard to tell) on the very project Mondaugen is engaged in. 
Either the world is to be taken for granted, and such decoding is a means of 
falsifying the world, or the world is everything we can make a case for it 
being. 
In either case, this is typical Pynchonesque maneuvering. The very 
uncertainty of the status of the code incarnates in the reader a desire to 
pursue further decodings and interpretations. Is it real or a projection by a 
troubled mind? Is Wittgenstein correct, in Pynchon's view? What does 
Pynchon mean by having Wittgenstein's passage appear to Mondaugen, 
back there in South Africa during the Boer War, before Wittgenstein even 
penned it (in the 1930s)? In short, we are provoked into reading our own 
significance into this passage and into the code, with no real hope of 
coming to any conclusive answers. One thing, however, is certain: we are 
all Mondaugens when faced with rich uncertainty. For uncertainty creates a 
gap where fools and angels alike rush in. 
Of all the literary techniques for creating this dance between uncer-
tainty and interpretation, none is more powerful or enriching than meta-
phor. 
The Cybernetics of Metaphor 
Pynchon calls attention to the special status of metaphor throughout his 
work. Even in one of his earliest stories, "Entropy" (1957), the too-orderly 
Callisto finds that the informational and thermodynamic entropy in his life 
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creates "a metaphor" that is slowly demolishing his carefully constructed 
world. In V. Pynchon tells us quite blankly that "metaphor is a device, an 
artifice," that cloaks the literal truth of the world from humans who are 
taken in by it. Some view "the laws of physics as legislation," but by 
contrast, poets, who traffic in metaphor, are alone "with the task of living 
in a universe of things which simply are, and cloaking that innate mind, 
lessness with comfortable and pious metaphor." In The Crying of Lot 49, we 
are told that "the act of metaphor was a thrust at the truth and a lie, 
depending upon where you were: inside, safe or outside, lost." 
It is clear why Pynchon has focused on metaphor as the best weapon in 
his literary arsenal against cybernetic determinism. A real good robust 
metaphor-what Max Black calls "a strong metaphor-both resonant and 
emphatic" -explodes under scrutiny.18 The more we look, the more we 
see in it. In contrast to most other verbal techniques, the strong metaphor 
actually aims at introducing uncertainty, at destabilizing the system of 
signification, at eluding identification or reduction to an algebra of infor, 
mation. In the right context, a strong metaphor is inexhaustible. It can 
initiate a process of increasing energy or oscillation-positive feedback-
that leads the interpreter to the brink of revelation. One character in The 
Crying of Lot 49, Jesus Arrabal, describes it as "a miracle ... another 
world's intrusion into this one." One of Pynchon's favorite metaphors for 
metaphors is the epileptic seizure, a neuropathic event that several cyber, 
neticists have attributed to positive feedback in the cortex. 
Interestingly enough, there have been cybernetic attempts to codify 
metaphor. The most fascinating of these, because it begins with a most 
enriched version of metaphor, is Earl MacCormac's A Cognitive Theory of 
Metaphor. MacCormac provides a superb scholarly analysis of various 
theories of metaphor and concludes that "finding an algorithmic descrip, 
tion of the creative cognitive process by which metaphors are generated 
seems unlikely" and that "one cannot fully explain metaphor with formal 
abstractions alone." 19 Nonetheless, and surprisingly, "the major assump, 
tion of [his] study ... [is] the presumption that metaphor itself can best be 
explained by viewing the human mind as a computational device." 20 And 
so he proceeds to offer a computational model for metaphor, a complex 
formaVlogical model involving fuzzy sets and many valued logics, and 
"hierarchical networks in n,dimensional space." 21 
Strong metaphors can give rise to conflicting interpretations and 
therefore further uncertainty, the occasion for further interpretation. 
Look at the number of interpretations provoked by Emily Dickinson's 
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elusive poetry, for instance, or the continuing academic unraveling of 
metaphors in John Donne's "Aire and Angels." Around these precipitating 
irritants, these motes in the oyster or these nodes of uncertainty, the 
human reader is compelled to form pearls of meaning, or what Wiener 
would call "local enclaves of organization." These temporary organiza-
tions, however, these new interpretations, in turn alter the context for 
reading, which in turn invites new interpretation, a spiraling loop of 
positive feedback in an apparently inexhaustible cycle. Furthermore, as 
Pynchon often indicates, this process is initiated by a fundamentally 
mysterious quality in metaphors, which seems to lie at the heart of the 
human condition of endless uncertainty, endless questing, endless organi-
zation and connection-making. Metaphors are good metaphors for how we 
make meaning in the world. 
We encounter one of the best crafted of Pynchon's cybernetic meta-
phors in a side alley. Oedipa detours (her entire search can be viewed as a 
digression) into a cul-de-sac of the city streets, where she recognizes an old 
acquaintance, a drunken sailor. She holds the impression that he might 
harbor a crucial clue. However, she finds him in the act of unwittingly 
immolating himself, having lit a cigarette after spilling booze on his 
mattress. This horrible vision pushes Oedipa over the edge into one of her 
interpretive seizures. 
To her, the sailor's death represents "the massive destruction of infor-
mation." Pynchon holds us by the hand and takes us through the mental 
process of someone confronted by a strong metaphor; simultaneously, he 
induces us to undergo a parallel process: 
It was as if she had just discovered the irreversible process [time]. It astonished 
her to think that so much could be lost. . . . She knew . . . that he suffered 
DT's. Behind the initials was a metaphor, a delirium tremens, a trembling 
unfurrowing of the mind's plowshare. The saint whose water can light lamps, 
the clairvoyant whose lapse in recall is the breath of God, the true paranoid 
for whom all is organized in spheres joyful or threatening about the central 
pulse of himself, the dreamer whose puns probe ancient fetid shafts and 
tunnels of truth all act in the same special relevance to the word, or whatever 
it is the word [the] is there, buffering, to protect us from. . . . [She recalled] 
freshman calculus; 'dt', God help this old tattooed man, meant also a time 
differential, a vanishingly small instant in which change had to be confronted 
at last for what it was, where it could no longer disguise itself as something 
innocuous like an average rate; where velocity dwelled in the projectile 
though the projectile be frozen in midflight, where death dwelled in the cell 
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though the cell be looked in on at its most quick. She knew that the sailor had 
seen worlds no other man had seen if only because there was that high magic 
to low puns, because DT's must give access to dt's of spectra beyond the known 
sun, music made purely of Antarctic loneliness and fright. But nothing she 
knew of would preserve them, or him. [95-96] 
Oedipa and the reader are together sent into a seizure of dt's, an 
outward-spiraling unraveling of associations that look something like this: 
DT stands for delirium tremens. Pynchon in the next paragraph interprets 
the experience as "a trembling unfurrowing of the mind's plowshare," 
which at first glance seems like a poetic gloss but in fact is more a literal 
interpretation of dt's, for delire in Latin means, literally, "to go off the 
furrow." (Today we would say to have "one wheel on the shoulder" or "one 
paddle in the water.") Tremens means to tremble. Someone who acts 
strangely has let his plow go off the furrow and left the straight and narrow. 
But to unfurrow the mind might also allude to smoothing out those 
wrinkles that comparative anatomists tell us are literal signs of intellect. Or 
it could also mean to harvest the mind's plowshare of associations, since in 
harvesting one also tends to un-furrow a plowed field. Does exposure to 
metaphors hiding in anagrams like DT create the DT s that unfurrow/ 
harvest the mind's plowshare? 
We're not done worrying this bone. The term dt plays a special role in 
Pynchon's calculus. It resonates forward in his work to Gravity's Rainbow, 
where the vanishingly small instant of time represents the rocket frozen in 
midair that comes screaming across the sky at the beginning of the novel 
and that is about to land at its end. This in turn shuttles us back to V., a 
novel and that similarly takes it name (in part) from the German rocket. 
But through "the high magic to low puns," Pynchon jumps to the more 
relevant meaning of"dt" as the dimension used in the calculus of informa-
tion flow, thus opening the door to information theory, which in turn loops 
us back to the guidance system of the rocket's schwarzgerat (Wiener began 
his cybernetic investigations in trying to refine the guidance systems in 
antiaircraft gunnery) and to the other rich mines of cybernetic associations 
throughout Pynchon's fiction. In the vanishingly small interval of time, 
life is frozen into a caricature of death, the rocket is frozen in midflight, 
and the cybernetics system ceases to communicate, reduced to the solitary 
bit. The zeros and ones of a computer that Pynchon alludes to later in this 
novel represent bits. The term is an invention of Claude Shannon, who 
suggested that a mechanism represents information proportionately to its 
Fiction in a Cybernetic Age 223 
potential to generate alternatives like "on" (1) or "off" (0). Bit, therefore, 
designates an irreducible amount of information. Gregory Bateson whim~ 
sically called it "the difference which makes a difference." Here, Oedipa 
finds that each bit of information is the difference that makes, as Derrida 
would say, a "differance." Rather than helping to achieve resolution, the 
information she receives from metaphors like this one serves to defer 
meaning to some other place, outside the system she is in. That is where, I 
believe, Pynchon wants us to be as well: outside the system we are in. His 
metaphors are a vehicle for getting us there. 
There are many more threads of this elaborated metaphor that we 
could pursue. We could pick up on other tantalizing phrases and hidden 
metaphors that wire and connect and echo back and forth not only 
internally but also to other passages in this text, other texts by Pynchon, 
other texts generally, and to ideas held out here in the culture at large. But 
the quantity of information we could generate would not alter the con~ 
elusion we come to: the point of such activity is its inconclusiveness. Yet 
this point should not be confused for a confession of epistemological 
impotence. Rather, Pynchon offers an alternative version of knowing in 
which certitude is suspended in favor of ongoing interpretation and a 
continuous feeding of an inexhaustible desire for new knowledge. 
Pynchon doesn't merely portray the techniques and effects of such 
manipulations, he actually uses them on us, the readers, and tells us as he 
does so. In order to interpret the phrase "the trembling unfurrowing of the 
mind's plowshare," we have to experience the unfurrowing of our own 
mental resources. And so in the grips of this metaphor, the epistemological 
and the ontological, knowing and being, merge and convert into each 
other like mass and energy at the speed of light. In essence, Pynchon has 
deployed the cybernetics of metaphor to reshape the reader's attention into 
an element in a servo~mechanical positive feedback loop. Such reading in 
this servo~mechanicalloop is a self~engendering activity; the reader exper~ 
iences postmodern vertigo, trembling on the edge of a revelation of this 
truth at once frustrating and visionary: "There are no revelations possible 
as long as you remain within the system of your reading." We are moved 
away from the vanishingly small instant of time, reduction to single bits 
that is the object of a well~designed cybernetic system (the negative 
feedback loop), for such reduction is a form of death, Pynchon tells us. 
Instead, we are motivated to engage an ever~enlarging orbit of meaning, a 
spiral up and out of system, toward openness. Though everywhere else in 
his work Pynchon describes the application of techniques to humans as a 
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form of necrophilia, somehow he works the technique of metaphor to 
preserve our humanness and enliven the territory. 
In coming to this happy conclusion, I don't mean to wave my hands 
over Pynchon's apocalyptic pessimism nor to wipe away the dark predic-
tions in his satire. Yet, it is clear to me that Pynchon along with other 
authors of cybernetic fiction sees the value of taking a stand though his art, 
of expressing a means of temporarily eluding cybernetic determinism, even 
if it requires using a cybernetic countertechnique of his own and even if it is 
only temporary. After all, we see many of his characters take just such a 
stand, and have a good bit of fun along the way, and his novels elaborate 
that intense and mysterious space defined by the contest between personal 
freedom and those systems that attempt to construct our reality for us. 
Conclusion 
Cybernetics was partially born from the desire to answer the uncertainties 
imported into science by quantum mechanics, to reclaim certainty by 
showing that how the human mind itself perceives an event and communi-
cates its observations could be described deterministically as a cybernetic 
mechanism or form of computer. If everything is treated as information, 
and if information is figured in an equation, and if those equations can be 
manipulated systematically, then science, it was hoped, will have resub-
sumed a demonic instrument that has imported uncertainty into the 
center of scientific realism-the human mind-under a system of positive 
mathematics. The success of the project has given us computers, expert 
systems, fascinating new models of the mind and the brain, and a powerful 
post-Cartesian metaphor: that the human mind in the behaviors it holds 
most dear-speaking, thinking, observing-is a machine. Naturally, a 
perspective so challenging to liberal and spiritual views of humanity has 
been registered and challenged in turn by contemporary fiction. Yet, the 
posture of postmodern fictions that have directly addressed the question of 
cybernetics is complex. They tend to exploit and succumb to the seduc-
tions of systems of communication and ordering. Yet, at the same time, 
they pose subtle counterstatements: If you are going to claim that you can 
describe the human mind and human communication in deterministic 
forms, you must discount-or, better yet, account for-curiously human 
features that so far have resisted such determinisms. In what way is self-
consciousness mechanical? What are the algorithms for the tendency to 
make things up, to lie, to use irony, to make metaphors, and to fashion 
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fictions? What are the formal laws governing our infinite capacity to 
imagine impossible worlds? Precisely unlike artificial intelligence comput~ 
ers or cybernetic devices, we humans have this slippery way of generating 
our own countersystems, to resist even as we adopt systems of explanation 
and ordering. 
Pynchon uses the machinery of metaphor to activate machinery in the 
human mind, a link that paradoxically makes us aware of just how we slip 
out beyond mere mechanism. From one point of view, Pynchon is engaged 
in a dialogue with science, part of a larger collaborative epistemological 
project that transcends distinctions between sdence and literature and 
absorbs enormous amounts of our cultural-and indeed global-re~ 
sources. The purpose of this project is nothing less than to create a positive 
model of the human mind. In participating in this project as a skeptic, or 
perhaps even as a member of the guerrilla resistance, Pynchon has none~ 
theless defined that gap where mechanism does not yet work. As an 
artificial intelligence researcher might note, he has succeeded in creating 
an enticing map of future projects. Still, in doing so, Pynchon has also 
succeeded, along with other authors of cybernetic fiction, in that enduring 
goal of American literature: to use the word as a weapon against system, 
"or whatever it is the word is there, buffering, to protect us from." At this 
stage in our cultural evolution, in this point in our cybernetic age, the 
success of their project testifies to the continuing potency of literature. 
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Turbulence in literature and 
Science: Questions of Influence 
N. KATHERINE HAYLES 
When influence is discussed in literature and science, it nearly always 
turns out to be the influence of science on literature. If one inquires about 
the influence of literature on science, one is greeted with such anecdotes as 
Murray Gell-Man having taken the word "quarks" from Finnegan's Wake. 
Compared with the acknowledged influence of science on literature, these 
instances are so trivial as to border on the frivolous. Contrast them, for 
example, with studies discussing the influence of Newton on Blake; 
Darwin on George Eliot; thermodynamics on Henry Adams. Why is there 
no comparable list of studies demonstrating the influence of literature on 
scientists? The answers to this question have important implications for 
the study of literature and science'. 
Consider how influence studies in literature and science have tradi-
tionally proceeded. Frequently the critic assumes that the scientific theory 
has discovered the way reality actually is, and that the writer is adapting or 
interpreting this truth for her own ends. If, as sometimes happens, the 
writer's version of that truth differs considerably from the scientific source, 
the critic may take the writer to task for having gotten it wrong. 1 From this 
standpoint it seems clear why the lines of influence between literature and 
science are one-way streets. If science is the source of truth to which 
literature responds, then of course it will influence literature much more 
than literature will influence it, for it is in direct contact with reality, 
whereas for literature reality is meditated by science. 
This kind of approach ignores at its peril the growing body of work 
demonstrating that scientific theories are themselves social constructions. 
For example, in Donna Jean Haraway's analysis of Clarence Ray Car-
penter's classic studies of male dominance in primates, she shows how 
cultural assumptions are transported into the theory through experimental 
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design, theoretical focus, and modes of argumentation. 2 Once it has been 
scientifically "proven" that male dominance is the governing social princi, 
ple of primate groups, the theory feeds back into the culture to reinforce 
the very assumptions that determined it to be a good theory. When 
scientific theories can be shown to be culturally determined, their priv, 
ileged position cannot be adequately explained by assuming they map one, 
to,one correspondences between theoretical constructs and reality. 
Rather, the privileging of science becomes a social construction to be 
understood in its own right. 3 
How would the question(s) of influence look from this standpoint? 
Since it is no longer self,evident why science should influence literature 
much more than literature influences science, questions addressing this 
imbalance would need to be asked. What forces within the culture author, 
ize science as the source of truth? How are their interests served by this 
authorization? How is the ideology of scientific truth propagated and 
reinforced? What can replications and dissonances between a scientific 
theory and literary text tell us about the cultural mechanisms at work 
between the two? What can they tell us about influence studies that 
attribute dissonance to artistic error and replication to scientific influence? 
Why do some literary texts and scientific theories accede to the reinscrip, 
tion of cultural assumptions, and other texts and theories resist them? 
What accounts for whether these reinscriptions and resistances succeed or 
fail? Asking these questions shifts the focus from influence as such to the 
social conditions that determine how influence is constituted and repli, 
cated in academic discourse. In this view, influence is a construction to be 
explored rather than a premise to be embraced. 
Consider, for example, how this shift in focus would affect how one 
thought about the correspondence between Gibbs's phase change rule and 
Henry Adams's theories of historical change. 4 Gibbs demonstrated that 
phase changes such as the transition of ice to water and water to steam are 
functions of pressure and temperature. At the critical point where a phase 
change occurs, the substance continues to absorb (or give off) energy, but 
no temperature rise (or fall) is observed because the energy is being used to 
reorganize the substance's molecular structure. At this point different 
phases exist in equilibrium (for example, ice cubes in a glass of water) until 
the reorganization is complete and all of the substance exists in the new 
phase. Gibbs's phase diagrams mapped these transitions and showed where 
equilibrium areas between different phases occurred. Adams appropriated 
Gibbs's results to explain changes in social organization. 5 In his view, 
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humankind's ability to tap increasingly powerful energy sources resulted in 
periodic reorganizations so dramatic that they could aptly be called phase 
changes. One such phase, the Mechanical, occurred from 1600 to 1900 
A. D. Following that was the Electrical, to be succeeded in the twentieth 
century by the Ethereal, all at exponentially increasing rates of change. In 
importing the phase change rule into history, Adams did more than recast 
its terminology. He also altered its underlying meaning, for he sensed that 
the energy dissipation that nineteenth,century thermodynamicists inter, 
preted to mean the universe was running down had somehow to be 
reconciled with the increasing complexity so evident in human social 
organization. The accelerating rate of change was for Adams one expres, 
sian of this complexity; so were the awesome new energy sources that 
scientists were discovering, from steam power to x,rays to atomic energy. 
Considering the phase change rule and Adams's text as cultural ar, 
tifacts, one could inquire into their interactions with their culture as well 
as with each other. One might wonder why the phase change rule became 
an important concept within thermodynamics while Adams's metaphoric 
reconstruction of it as a principle of social change was dismissed as wild, 
eyed conjecture. From a cultural perspective, it could plausibly be argued 
that the phase change rule was successful because it extended rather 
than challenged the reigning ideology within thermodynamics, whereas 
Adams's rule for social change was dismissed because it was incompatible 
with the accepted view that the world was constantly running down. If 
Adams had been taken seriously-and there was little chance he would, 
given the lack of experimental evidence and mathematical rigor in his 
presentation-the scenario scientists constructed for the universe from 
the first and second laws of thermodynamics would have to have been 
drastically revised. 
In assessing the play of power between the phase change rule and 
Adams's rule of acceleration, one quickly becomes aware of how inade, 
quate it would be to argue that the phase change rule succeeded because it 
was correct, whereas Adams's acceleration rule failed because it was wrong. 
In fact a revision similar to Adams's formulation eventually took place 
within science, although when it came, it had nothing to do with The 
Education. A watershed date for the new paradigm is 1968, when it was 
recognized that phase changes were bound up with the more general 
phenomena of irreversible processes and the challenge they posed to 
thinking the world was running down. In 1977, Ilya Prigogine won the 
Nobel Prize in chemistry for his work showing how dissipative systems with 
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large entropy production can spontaneously reorganize themselves at 
higher levels of complexity. 6 What was there about Adams's situation that 
made it possible for him to envision this kind of change for societies 
seventy years earlier? And after he had written about it, what was there 
about the situation of his text in the culture that made it fail to become an 
important focal point for social and scientific change? 
My choice of Adams as an example through which to pose these 
questions is not coincidental. More than most writers and scientists of his 
time, he understood that questions of influence are themselves social 
constructions with ideological implications. When he equated the Virgin 
with the Dynamo in The Education of Henry Adams, he was not merely 
indulging a writer's quaint belief in the power of metaphor. Rather he was 
recognizing the powerful way that these constructs reinscribed important 
beliefs for their cultures; he was identifying them as nodes through which 
the cultural fields resonated. To reduce this profound vision to science's 
"influence" on Adams is to misread The Education. It is also to misunder-
stand how influence is constituted through and by the culture and how it 
can be used to interrogate the cultural matrix that bestows upon it its 
apparent one-way directionality. 
The Scandal of Fluid Mechanics 
In This Sex Which Is Not One, Luce Irigaray speculates in a chapter called 
"The 'Mechanics' of Fluids" on why there has been a "historical lag in 
elaborating a 'theory' of fluids." 7 Briefly put, her answer posits a "complicity of 
long standing between rationality and a mechanics of solids" (107, emphasis in 
original). The privileging of solid over fluid mechanics, and indeed the 
inability of science to deal with turbulent flow at all, she attributes to the 
association of fluidity with femininity. Whereas men have sex organs that 
protrude and become rigid, women have openings that leak menstrual 
blood and vaginal fluids. Although men too flow on occasion-when 
semen is emitted, for example-this aspect of their sexuality is suppressed; 
it is the rigidity of the organ that is emphasized, not its complicity in fluid 
flow. These idealizations are reinscribed in fluid mechanics, which con-
ceives of fluids as laminated planes or other modified solid forms. In the 
same way that women are erased within masculine conceptions and 
language, existing only as not-men, so fluids have been erased from 
science, existing only as not-solids. From this perspective it is no wonder 
that science has not been able to solve the problem of turbulent flow. 
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Turbulent flow cannot be solved because the conceptions of fluids (and of 
women) have been formulated in such a way as necessarily to leave 
unarticulated remainders. 
What do you suppose a fluid dynamicist would make of this argument? 
From his point of view it could scarcely be anything but scandalous. Not 
only does it ignore virtually all of the specific formalisms that comprise the 
mathematics of fluid mechanics, it also implies that these formalisms arose 
from gender considerations rather than from experimentally informed 
decisions about the best way to model reality. He would, I suspect, quickly 
come to the conclusion that lrigaray did not know the first thing about his 
discipline, and that she is talking through her hat or worse. 
There is evidence to support this view. In a footnote to the first page of 
her chapter, lrigaray airily advises the reader "to consult some texts on solid 
and fluid mechanics" without bothering to mention any (106). The lack of 
mathematical detail in her argument forces one to wonder whether she has 
followed this advice hersel£ Also conspicuous is the lack of historical 
detail. Nowhere does she mention a name or date that would enable one to 
connect her argument with a specific theory of fluids, much less to trace 
debates between opposing theories. In short, lrigaray's text would seem to 
be a stellar example of why literature and literary theory do not influence 
science-at least by the usual rules that govern such games. 
But the rules of the game are precisely what is at issue. In her essay "Is 
the Subject of Science Sexed?", lrigaray makes her challenge to these rules 
explicit. 8 She begins by musing on how and where one can stand to span 
different universes of discourse, asking by "what right can one assume a 
stance outside?" (73). Rejecting objectivity, she seeks to locate her scien-
tific audience as subjects, saying that if "I were to meet each and every one 
of you individually, it seems as though I would find a way to say you, I, we" 
(75). This move foreshadows her argument, for she intends to show how 
the scientific method depends upon intuition, and how intuition is in tum 
constituted by the reinscription of the male imaginary into scientific 
models. Her analysis of scientific investigation is thus akin to Haraway's 
analysis of primatology, in that it aims to unveil a circular dialectic that 
connects scientific theory with subjects not usually considered to be joined 
to it. 
How does this dialectic work, according to lrigaray? First by con-
stituting the universe as something other than the self, something "in front 
of oneself" (78); next by imposing a model taken from the self (blindly? 
lrigaray asks) onto the world, while disavowing any connection between 
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self and model; then by providing the model's universality by consensus 
between subjects who agree it is so because they are similarly constituted 
(this move ignores the complicity of subjects in the construction of 
objects, choosing instead to posit a separation between subject and object, 
so that the subject touches the world only through the "meditation of the 
instrument" [78, original emphasis]); and finally of avowing that the 
model's universality constitutes progress (thus authorizing the "schize" 
between subject and object, discourse and self, that the dialectic both 
assumes and recreates [78] ). 
The parentheses that make this last paragraph difficult to read are 
meant to convey a sense of the elliptical style in which lrigaray writes. In 
this respect her discourse is quite different from the rational mode of 
argumentation that Donna Haraway employs in her critique of primatol, 
ogy. The stylistic dissonance between lrigaray's and Haraway's analyses 
points to an important difference in the assumptions of these two the, 
orists. In keeping with her socialist feminist perspective, Haraway is less 
interested in the constitution of subjects than she is in the institutional and 
disciplinary contexts that reinscribe themselves in scientific theories. Her 
kind of argument challenges scientific objectivity from within the rules of 
the game. Haraway documents her case using evidence that other scholars 
can verify; she confines her argument to assertions of influence made 
plausible by her reconstitution of the appropriate contexts; and she ana, 
lyzes the theories conceptually to reveal their underlying premises. Thus 
Haraway's analysis accepts the same criteria for judgment as were applied 
by the scientists in constructing their theories. It differs from normal 
scientific assessments in broadening the context for judgment to include 
social and institutional networks. I do not wish to minimize the impor, 
tance of a broadened context, for it is sufficient to place Haraway at the 
periphery rather than at the center of normal scientific discourse. Position, 
ing oneself at the periphery is not the same, however, as leaving the game 
altogether. 
Leaving the game is the move that lrigaray makes when she runs the 
circular dialectic through the self rather than through the culture. It is 
difficult to articulate her discourse together with that of a fluid dynamicist 
because they play by different rules. lrigaray takes as given that the 
constitution of the subject replicates itself in scientific discourse. If this is 
so, then to play by the rules of that discourse is to lose the game before she 
starts, for all that one can do within those rules is to reproduce the 
invisibility of the (male) subject. To render the (male) subject visible to 
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itself, lrigaray posits herself (and women in generat) as other than it-fluid 
where it is solid, interior where it is exterior, silent where it speaks, 
unwritten where it inscribes, disruptive where it is continuous. Her dis, 
course is fractured, elliptical, nonlinear because it strives to create a space 
that cannot easily be appropriated into the volumes of male science. In this 
sense the outrage of our imagined scientist does not signify that lrigaray has 
failed in her project. For he could comprehend and agree with her 
argument only if he accedes to opening the space of (his) objectivity to an 
awareness of (his) interiority. Ifhe insists on maintaining the solidity ofhis 
objective position, the fluidity of her subjective one can be processed only 
as a scandal. 
A New Paradigm in Fluid Mechanics 
I should like now to undertake what lrigaray declines to do-make the 
argument for a connection between gender and fluid mechanics from 
within the rules of scientific discourse, or at least from its periphery. My 
conclusions will be somewhat different than those lrigaray espouses. Al, 
though I think it can be demonstrated that deep cultural assumptions are 
replicated in the structures of scientific theories, I do not agree that fluids, 
particularly turbulent fluids, have simple or unified gender identifications. 
Rather, I take turbulence to be a construction that can be interpreted in 
different ways under different paradigms. When it moves from one para, 
digm to another, it undergoes a significant transformation in cultural 
encoding. I envision turbulence as a highly fissured site within contempo, 
rary literary and scientific discourses in which older cultural encodings are 
overlaid by new ones to create highly complex patterns. Before exploring 
the dynamics of this transformation, I will need to explain why until very 
recently turbulence was one of the great unsolved problems of classical 
mechanics and how the new paradigm circumvents this difficulty. 
Often microscopic fluctuations within a flowing liquid cancel each 
other out, for example when a river flows smoothly within its banks. In this 
case each water molecule follows much the same path as the one before it, 
so that water molecules starting close together continue to be close. 
Sometimes, however, microscopic fluctuations persist and are magnified 
up to macrosopic level, causing eddies and backwaters to form. Then 
molecules that began close together quickly separate, and those that were 
far apart come close together. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult to 
calculate how the flow will evolve. Kenneth Wilson, who won the 1982 
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Nobel Prize in physics for his work on modeling turbulence, explains that 
theorists "have difficulties with these problems because they involve very 
many coupled degrees of freedom. It takes many variables to characterize a 
turbulent flow or the state of a fluid near the critical point." 9 The 
mathematics of turbulence is so complex that even the new supercom~ 
puters are inadequate to deal with it. Computation times become unrea~ 
sonably long after only three or four variables are considered, whereas 
dozens are necessary to create a model that can simulate turbulence ac~ 
curately. 
Wilson's breakthrough was finding a way to arrive at an analytical (as 
opposed to an empirical) solution for turbulence. The essence of his 
approach is to shift the focus from following individual molecules to 
looking for symmetries between different length scales. Recursive symme~ 
tries are characteristic of turbulent flow; large swirls of water have smaller 
swirls within which are smaller swirls. To model these symmetries, Wilson 
used renormalization groups. Renormalization had first emerged as a tech~ 
nique in quantum mechanics, where physicists used it to get rid of infinite 
quantities when they appeared in the equations. Originally the only justifi~ 
cation for the procedure was that it made the answers come out right. If you 
think this sounds suspiciously arbitrary, you are not alone. For years vir~ 
tually all mathematicians and some physicists regarded renormalization as 
no more than hand~waving. But Wilson saw its deeper implications. 
He knew that in renormalization certain quantities regarded as fixed-
for example, particle mass-are treated as if they are variable. He realized 
that there is a sense in which this is a profound truth rather than an 
arbitrary procedure. For example, we tend to think of a golf ball as a 
smooth sphere. But to a mosquito it would appear as a pocked, irregular 
surface, and to a bacterium, as the Wilson Alps. Renormalization implied 
that the choice of rule used to measure physical properties affected the 
answer. At the same time, it revealed that there was something else-
something not normally considered-that remained constant over many 
measurement scales. This was the scaling factor. By combining the renor~ 
malization process with the idea of a mathematical group, Wilson arrived 
at a method whereby this factor could be defined and calculated. 
A group, as it is used in mathematics, denotes a set of objects that 
under certain mathematical operations produce other elements in the 
same set. One kind of operations that members of a group can undergo is 
symmetry operations. For example, a cube rotated ninety degrees in any 
direction appears unchanged in its spatial orientation; it is therefore said to 
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be invariant under right angle rotation and when so rotated produces 
another element of the same group, that is, another cube. Tetrahedrons 
are in the same mathematical group as cubes because they also have this 
property. The purpose of finding a renormalization group is to look for 
symmetries that are invariant for different measurement scales. 
As an illustration of one of these symmetries, consider the classic 
"middle third" set, first proposed by Cantor in the nineteenth century. 
Imagine that we draw a line from 0 to 1, as in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Cantor's "Middle Third" Set 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
o ________________________________________ 1 
0 1 
0 1 
Now we erase the middle third of line 1. Each of the smaller lines of 2 has 
the same form as line 1, and multiplying one of these line segments by three 
gives the original line back again. If we erase the middle third of the small 
lines of 2, we create the even smaller lines in 3. Each of the two broken 
lines of 3 has the same form as the entire interval of 2, and multiplying 
either segment by three gives line 2 back again. If we keep erasing middle 
thirds, each time the symmetry of the resulting small part mirrors the larger 
part of the step before, and each time the larger part can be obtained by 
multiplying the smaller part by three. Sets that have this kind of symmetry 
are said to possess fixed points. The purpose of defining a renormalization 
group is to discover the operations and variables that allow fixed point 
symmetry to emerge. 
Groups that display fixed points have physical significance because the 
symmetry allows coupling to take place between different length levels. 
When a system possesses fixed points, perturbations on the smallest scale 
are quickly transmitted throughout the system, affecting even the largest 
macroscopic level. Imagine a bullwhip moving at just the right frequency 
so that a small twitch of the handle is transmitted into larger and larger 
waves all the way to the end, causing the whip to emit a loud and satisfying 
"CRACK." This kind of transmission and magnification is possible be~ 
cause a system possesses the appropriate kind of symmetry. When fixed 
point symmetry is present, systems "crack" because the symmetry permits 
microscopic changes to translate into coordinated movements all through 
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the system. Turbulent flow occurs because the system is configured so as to 
magnify microscopic deviations into macroscopic chaos. The implicit 
order that makes an analytical solution sometimes possible derives from 
the symmetrical couplings between different length scales and the predic, 
table ways in which the onset of chaos occurs. 
The generality of Wilson's approach can be appreciated by looking at 
the range of behavior to which it applies. As we have seen, one area is 
turbulent flow; another is phase change behavior, as when water turns to 
steam. The transition from water to steam illustrates how fluctuations at a 
microscopic level can be translated into dramatic macroscopic changes. 
Water and steam appear very different; one is liquid, the other gas. But this 
change in macroscopic properties originates in microscopic changes. At 
the point where the phase change takes place, the system is characterized 
by "bubbles of steam and drops of water intermixed at all size scales from 
macroscopic, visible sizes down to atomic scales." 10 At this critical point, 
and only at this point, the system undergoes a phase change because it 
possesses the fixed point symmetry that allows changes at the smallest level 
to be transmitted all the way up to the largest level. Thus turbulent flow 
and phase change behavior, different as they are, can both be understood 
in terms of the scaling symmetries. Additional applications are in quantum 
field theory, where coupling mechanisms between particles are important. 
Implications of the New Paradigms 
Implicit in Wilson's approach are new assumptions about how one models a 
system. To understand what these assumptions are, compare them with 
the paradigms of classical physics (under which rubric I include Newton, 
ian mechanics and differential and integral calculus). In classical physics 
the focus is on the autonomy of the individual unit and its behavior 
through time. For example, in a classical analysis of a hurtling cannonball, 
the cannonball's parabolic arc is broken into arbitrarily small line seg, 
ments, each of which occupies a small unit of time. The change across 
these units is expressed through a differential equation. Adding together 
the incremental units (or more accurately, taking the limit as the time 
increments get infinitely small) gives the path as a whole. In its fundamen, 
tal assumptions, this method closely follows the commonsense intuitions 
we rely on in figuring out when a running pedestrian will get to the other 
side of the street. We perceive the figure as a unit (although his hat may be 
flying off in one direction, his scarf in another), and we project when he 
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will make it to the curb by assuming that he will continue more or less in 
the same direction he is going. 
These assumptions work well for cannonballs. They do not work well 
for turbulent flow, because turbulence has an extremely complex internal 
structure. When one concentrates on the paths of individual molecules 
and tries to express how these paths change over time, the mathematics 
quickly becomes intractable because each path is changing in an unpredic-
table way, and in a different way than neighboring paths. Only when the 
molecules stay in their lanes, so to speak, can the problem of flow be solved 
in the classical paradigm. Thus classical paradigms can solve laminar flow 
but not chaotic turbulence. The new paradigm is more successful in 
modeling turbulence because it does not try to follow individual paths. 
Instead it concentrates on recursive symmetries between different length 
levels. 
These assumptions have found practical application in fractal geome-
try. Fractal geometry uses computer technology to create forms that possess 
recursive symmetries across many length levels. 11 Fractal forms are created 
by iterating nonlinear differential equations-that is, by using the output 
of one calculation as input for the next in a cyclic process that allows the 
forms to move through time. Because the recursive symmetries between 
different lengths allow small changes to propagate rapidly through the 
system, very small changes in the iterative formulae can result in very large 
changes in macroscopic behavior. Hence one can model complex forms 
and movements through many fewer bits of information than would be 
required if each change had to be described individually. Fractal geometry 
shares with Wilson's renormalization groups a focus on recursive symme-
tries between levels rather than an emphasis on the individual unit. In 
both models, anthropomorphic time is replaced by computer iteration of 
mathematical equations. 
The change in perspective implicit in these paradigms signals not just 
the arrival' of new scientific theories but a change in the ground of 
representation itself. The same kind of shift is apparent in many other 
disciplines besides physics and mathematics. It is so wide-ranging, in fact, 
that in my view the only adequate explanation for it is to assume that it has 
been authorized by reconfigurations in the cultural matrix. Compare the 
assumptions of the new scientific paradigms, for example, to Foucault's 
archeological analyses of culture. 12 In contrast to older paradigms such as 
Adam Smith's economies or Hobbes's theory of politics, Foucault is not 
interested in the behavior of the individual unit; Instead he looks for 
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coupling mechanisms that allow changes at one level or site to be rapidly 
transmitted through the system as a whole. In his view, individuals do not 
constitute culture; culture constitutes individuals. Or compare it to Lacan's 
rewriting of Freudian psychology, in which it is not the "self" so dear to 
Western thought that matters but coupling mechanisms that control the 
ruptures and continuities between different stages. 
lrigaray is not entirely wrong, then, in conjecturing that fluid mechan-
ics has not developed nearly as quickly as solid mechanics because scien-
tific constructions of flow are gender encoded. Obvious connections do 
exist between gender constructions and the assumptions that have been 
encoded into the classical models of Western science, from Newtonian 
mechanics and calculus to politics and economics. The individual auton-
omy that is central to these models has its corollary in the hypostatized 
male of Western culture. Among his identifying characteristics are auton-
omy, insulation from his environment, and ability to act as a team player. 13 
These qualities are reinscribed in the descriptions of fluid mechanics, for 
they are exactly the characteristics that make laminar flow amenable to 
classical analyses. 
By contrast, turbulent flow cannot be analyzed in the classical model 
because these assumptions do not hold true. In turbulent flow, the liquid is 
exquisitely sensitive to tiny fluctuations or uncertainties, which are 
quickly magnified to macroscopic expression; individual units are decid-
edly not team players, diverging from each other in unpredictable ways; 
individual molecules act chaotically because they are coupled to each 
other by complex symmetry relations. It is not difficult to translate these 
characteristics of turbulence into gender constructions. One thinks, for 
example, of the stereotype of the hysterical woman; her sensitivity to her 
environment; her tendency to let little things quickly build into major 
disturbances; her misunderstanding of the ethics of team play; and her 
unpredictable alliances with others of her sex. 
Equally important from the point of view of cultural encoding is the 
disproportionality between cause and effect that turbulence implies. In 
classical mechanics and in Euclidean geometry, nature is considered "con-
formable to itself." What holds true on one level is assumed to hold true on 
every level; if this assumption proves false, then the system is regarded as 
aberrant or anomalous. As a corollary, small causes are expected to lead to 
small results. Classical paradigms are thus scale-invariant. By contrast, 
paradigms in the science of chaos (which includes research in fractal 
geometry, nonlinear dynamics, meteorology, epidemiology, and irreversi-
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ble thermodynamics, to mention only a few of the areas contributing to 
this interdisciplinary field) are scale~dependent. These paradigms recognize 
that what holds true for one level may not hold true for another. And they 
emphasize that tiny causes can lead to dramatic and irreversible systemic 
changes. 
This shift in assumptions implies a new vision of how the world is 
structured. One contribution of chaos theory has been to make visible the 
amnesia at the center of classical science, the forgetfulness that made it 
consider ordered systems as the rule from which everything else was a 
deviation. 14 In fact chaotic systems are everywhere in nature, from cream 
swirling through coffee to global weather patterns. By foregrounding how 
prevalent chaotic systems are, the science of chaos has delivered a death 
blow to Laplacian determinism more fatal than that delivered by quantum 
mechanics. In practice quantum uncertainties cancel each other out so 
that macroscopic systems remain stable despite quantum fluctuations. By 
contrast, chaos theory shows that a very large range of deterministic systems 
exhibit chaotic behavior. Linking determinism with unpredictability un~ 
dercuts the very foundation of an ordered view of the universe, for it 
implies that chaos can be anywhere, even in the swinging pendulum that 
Newtonian mechanics took as emblematic of universal order. 15 
With this kind of change in the air, it is no wonder that a theorist like 
lrigaray is interested in a rapproachment with the new science. So, for 
example, in "Is the Subject of Science Sexed?" she appropriates the 
dissipative structures of entropy~producing systems as models for female 
sexuality. Just as Freud had seen in classical thermodynamics authorization 
for his view of (male) sexuality as essentially conservative, so lrigaray sees 
in the new science authorization for her view that female sexuality operates 
according to radically different principles. As is well known, Freud's 
writing is shot through with hydraulic imagery, virtually always used in a 
conservative sense: that which engorges an organ and makes it rigid is 
unavailable for sublimation elsewhere (sublimation in its scientific sense 
denotes the transformation of a solid into a gas, without becoming a 
liquid). By contrast, in the fluid realm of female sexuality, turbulence leads 
not to decay but to jouissance, with its connotation of synergistic release 
that builds on itself to achieve ever more complex expression. It is not 
difficult to see why the new paradigms seem to be more closely aligned with 
female sexuality than classical science, for they directly challenge scale-
invariance and conservation principles. 
How valid are these associations between the feminine and the science 
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of chaos? Do they imply that the new science has inserted the feminine 
into the dominant male culture, into the hegemony of (masculinist) 
science itself? I believe that the relation between the science of chaos and 
the feminine is more complex than this simple one-to-one correspondence 
would suggest. The displacement of classical assumptions by the new 
paradigms is not an either/or proposition. Rather, the emergence of new 
paradigms produces extremely complex configurations in which traces of 
old attitudes are embedded within new models, creating turbulent vortices 
that follow no simple dynamics and that vary widely from site to site. 
A recent account of the new science will help us explore how the 
tensions between old attitudes and new models work to shape narratives. 
In looking at a popular account of scientific research as well as at the 
research itself, I hope to open passages between literature, science, and 
culture in which the flow of influence is construed as a turbulent complex-
ity, not a one-way street. 
Why Are There Only Men in a Female World? 
The emergence of chaos as an interdisciplinary research front is chron-
icled in James Gleick's Chaos: Making a New Science. 16 Gleick, a science 
writer for the New York Times, is interested primarily in the new concepts 
that chaos theory entails, but he also leavens his account with personal 
anecdotes and observations drawn from the hundreds of personal inter-
views he conducted with scientists in his research. He describes his book as 
a narrative history. He rightly sees it as telling a story, and, like any 
storyteller, he has shaped his material in ways both obvious and subtle. It is 
this shaping that I want to explore, for it reveals a complex interplay 
between cultural attitudes and scientific concepts. 
The interplay is most apparent in the curious absence of women in 
Gleick's text. Hundreds of men are mentioned by name; some dozen are 
depicted in enough detail so that we almost feel as if we know them. But no 
women, or virtually none. What are we to make of this absence, this lack? 
It is possible to argue that Gleick's text simply reflects the prevailing 
situation within science. Even more than most sciences, chaos theory is 
heavily dominated by men, especially in America. But the absence of 
women goes beyond the acknowledged scarcity of distinguished women 
scientists. It pervades the entire depicted world. 
Because the personal realm is where we would expect women to be in 
the male-dominated world Gleick writes about, their absence is most 
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striking in the personal vignettes that punctuate Gleick's account of the 
scientific research. These vignettes show what the living quarters of this or 
that scientist are like; they reveal where one scientist goes for walks, what 
another likes to eat. But in all this rich detail, women never appear. On 
one of the few occasions when the anonymous "wives" of the male 
scientists are mentioned, Gleick implies that their presence signaled the 
kind of occasion in which it would be impossible for the men to have a 
serious scientific conversation (141). The impression is that none of these 
men has a relationship with a woman that is important in his intellectual 
life; none works with a female collaborator who is an important contrib, 
utor; and none spends much time with women. The settings in which the 
male scientists appear reinforce the impression that serious science is a 
solitary (as well as a masculine) endeavor. Feigenbaum, one of the super, 
stars of chaos, is shown walking away from a group so that he can observe a 
waterfall; on another occasion, he has a crucial insight when he walks away 
from a group outdoors and notices that their talk is reduced to babble by 
the distance. Another scientist likes to take long walks in the desert, 
sometimes leaving his family behind for weeks at a time. When living 
quarters are discussed, they are depicted as eccentric or antidomestic. 
Feigenbaum has no furniture; a group of Santa Cruz graduate students who 
became important researchers in the field live in a house littered with bean 
bag chairs. Food is equally rudimentary or odd. 
No doubt these details are accurate. But by mentioning them and not 
others, the text creates an ambiance for the scientific discoveries it de, 
scribes. As it is shown here, the world of science is first of all genderless-
genderless because there is only one gender. It is also solitary, with chance 
connections made between individuals who discover, often quite by acci, 
dent, that someone else somewhere in the world is working on the same 
problem they are. And it is marked by a flow of narrative time in which 
certain moments are retrospectively identified as decisive, even though 
they may have seemed ordinary enough when they occurred. Treating time 
in this way is effective in creating the kind of suspense that keeps readers 
turning pages; but it also makes time into a series of agons marking the 
junctures at which fate took a different turn. All of these components work 
together to substantiate Gleick's claim that "no committee of scientists" 
brought about the new paradigms, only "a handful of individuals" (182). 
This view of the scientific enterprise exists in a curiously paradoxical 
relationship to the larger view of chaos that Gleick presents. For many of 
the scientists whose words he records, chaos is more than just another 
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theory. It represents an opening of the self to the messiness of life, to all 
the chaotic unpredictable phenomena that linear science had taught them 
to screen out. Once roused, they remember that the messiness had always 
been there and they are able to see it in a new light, perceiving it as central 
rather than marginal, beautiful rather than aberrant. But these are just the 
aspects oflife that have traditionally been associated with woman. Indeed, 
chaos itself has often been depicted as female. In the English Renaissance, 
for example, the male seed was commonly represented as contributing 
form. The female was thought to contribute raw unshaped materia, matter 
devoid of form or structure. In validating chaos as a scientific concept, 
Gleick seems to have found it necessary to expunge the female from his 
world. Why? 
I can of course only speculate about the psychological and cultural 
dynamics underlying this exclusion. Nevertheless, certain aspects are 
sufficiently clear as to be almost obvious. In the Western tradition, chaos 
has played the role of the other-the unrepresented, the unarticulated, 
the unformed, the unthought. In identifying with chaos, the scientists 
that Gleick writes about open themselves to this otherness, and they 
perceive their intercourse with it as immensely fructifying, both for their 
work and disciplines, and for them personally. But otherness is also always 
a threat, arousing the desire to control it, or even more extremely, to 
subsume it within the known boundaries of the self, thus annihilating the 
very foreignness that makes it dangerously attractive. 
Both of these impulses are evident in Gleick's text, and probably are at 
work within chaos theory as well. The desire to control chaos is evident in 
the search for ways to rationalize it. By finding within it the structures of 
order, these scientists have in effect subsumed chaos in the familiar. But if 
this incorporation were entirely successfuly, chaos could no longer func· 
tion in its liberating role as a representation of the other. Perhaps this is 
why Benoit Mandelbrot, the inventor of fractal geometry, goes out of his 
way to emphasize that the rationalization of chaos in fractal geometry can 
never be entirely successful. 17 For Mandelbrot, some residue of the un· 
tamable and nonrational should always remain. Thus he urges that the 
simulation of complex natural forms such as coastlines and landscapes by 
fractal forms should be achieved not by complete rationalization of the 
computer algorithm, but by periodic injections of chance. It is worth 
noting that Mandelbrot has been roundly criticized on this score by 
Michael Barnsley, who argues that the commercial value of fractal geome· 
try is greatly increased by algorithms that allow for complete control of 
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how the simulated forms will evolve. 18 Already available are fractal T-
shirts, fractal calendars, fractal art prints, and fractal coffee table books, as 
well as fractal coffee mugs. Given the rapid commodification that fractal 
geometry is undergoing, it is clear which side will win in the argument over 
how far chaos should remain uncontrolled. The co-optation of fractal 
geometry into the commodity economy of late capitalism shows how 
problematic it is to equate the new scientific paradigms with feminist 
agendas for social change. 
A similar problematic between control and chaos is encoded into 
Gleick's text, especially in his divided response toward the feminine. 
Representations of actual women and of activities closely associated with 
them are rigorously excluded from the depicted world. But the feminine 
principle of chaos is celebrated as having put male scientists into touch 
with the mysterious otherness of the world and of their own selves. By 
admitting the feminine as an abstract principle but excluding actual 
women, Gleick attains control over the polysemy of chaos. Although he 
does not put it this way, he re-presents chaos as a repository of the 
Lacanian real at the same time that he strips it of its more dangerous and 
engendered aspects. As a result, chaos is admitted within the boundaries 
of scientific discourse, but science itself remains as monolithically mas-
culine as ever. 
In achieving this accommodation, Gleick's text engenders a series of 
paradoxes. It depicts chaos theory as the achievement of extraordinary 
individuals who stepped out of the mainstream, but this scenario of the 
solitary man who opens up a frontier is itself deeply a part of the American 
mainstream. It shows science as an exclusively male domain, but it is the 
peculiar project of this domain to have intercourse with a female principle. 
It intimates that scientific discovery is an activity men engage in when they 
separate themselves from their families and from the larger culture, but the 
theories these men formulate imply that the individual unit is not impor-
tant. It represents time as a continuous stream interrupted by fateful 
moments, but the new paradigms substitute computer input for anthropo-
morphic time. The complex play among gender, individuality, and scien-
tific theory in Gleick's text indicates that chaos theory is a deeply fissured 
site within the culture, in which lingering assumptions from older para-
digms are embedded within the emerging paradigms of the new science. 
When there is this kind of complex interplay between science and culture, 
science cannot be separated from the cultural matrix. Like literature, 
science is always already cultural and cannot be otherwise. 
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Opening the Interior: This Volume Which Is Not One 
In a provocative essay on the origins of geometry, Michel Serres imagines 
Thales standing in the Egyptian desert before one pyramid. 19 Two others 
loom in the distance, different and yet somehow the same. The mathe-
matical concept of similarity, Serres suggests, is already encoded into the 
scene. Thales stands in the domain of implicit knowledge; all he need do is 
make it explicit. Yet the movement from tacit to explicit knowledge is not 
trivial. It requires that the particularity of the pyramid's shadow, with all of 
its irregularities and local variations, be negated in favor of the ideal form. 
When that transformation occurs, Thales will be able to use the length of 
the shadow to measure the height of the pyramid, and geometry will have 
begun. 
For Serres this is a momentous juncture in the history of Western 
culture, for it signifies the privileging of order over chaos, information over 
noise, that will reign unchallenged in science until the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. Serres argues that once the rule of order is established, 
the pyramid is rendered transparent to the sun of reason. No longer is its 
interior mysteriously inaccessible to the omniscient view of transcendent 
knowledge. Instead, the pyramid, and every other geometrical form, is 
conceived as a solid that has no interiority. Similarly, shadows are ban-
ished or are represented only as reflections of solid forms. From this point 
on, similitudes enter the realm of rigorous correspondence and operate 
according to the binary logic of same/different. In Euclidean geometry all 
volumes are accessible; all volumes are one in their negation of interiority. 
For lrigaray, a crucial difference between man and woman is the 
interiority of a woman's body space, a vagina and uterus that is not up front 
but inside. 20 She frequently alludes to cultural practices that are designed 
to give men control over this interior space-from the suturing shut of the 
vagina still practiced in developing countries to the episiotomies still 
favored by American obstetricians. One might add to her observations the 
fact that "civilized" countries are rarely thought of as having interiors. 
Countries like France and the United States have heartlands or midlands, 
but they have no interiors because everything is known and accessible. "To 
open the interior" or "to penetrate the interior" are phrases reserved for 
countries and spaces thought to be available for colonization. 
For this masculinist way of thought, turbulent fluids were not just 
unsolvable problems but threatening configurations, for they implied the 
existence of an interiority so complex that it could not be processed within 
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classical paradigms. Turbulence signified a shadowy interior that remained 
inaccessible and unknown, a site that could not be assimilated into the 
space of similitude. Now that is changing. A new geometry has emerged 
that validates highly irregular and fragmented surfaces, and a new science 
of nonlinear dynamics has come forth that sees complex systems and 
turbulent flows as more prevalent-and more beautiful-than ordered 
structures. In a sense, the science of chaos restores the interiority that 
Serres believes was negated with the invention of geometry. It recognizes 
that volumes have interiors, and it valorizes the fact that these interiors are 
multiple and complex rather than one and the same. 
How far these new ideas will affect the underlying attitudes that 
characterize a masculinist science is both a complex and an open question. 
It is likely that the cultural changes that made the women's movement 
possible also made chaos a thinkable thought. To this extent, I see feminist 
theory as aligned with the new science. And yet at each of these sites 
complex internal dynamics operate, as Gleick's representation of the new 
science demonstrates and as attacks from within the feminist community 
on lrigaray's essentialism confirm. Change is not unitary or simple any 
more than the flow of influence between the cultural matrix, the new 
science, and feminist theory is simple or unidirectional. Flows in these in-
stances are always complex and multidirectional-that is to say, turbulent. 
Especially problematic within the new paradigms is the emphasis on 
recursive symmetries. Since this emphasis replaces the classical focus on 
individuality, it is possible to see it as a liberating release from the 
assumptions of individual autonomy that made it easy to think of disci-
plines as isolated entities analogous to self-determined individuals who 
existed apart from and above their culture. Yet the symmetrical recur-
siveness of the new paradigms bears a disturbing resemblance to what 
Baudrillard has called the precession of simulacra, 2l and what lrigaray 
criticizes as the repetition of the same. 22 To note the resemblance is not 
necessarily to conclude that the new paradigms will be as repressive as or 
more repressive than the old. 
Scientific concepts, in and of themselves, are underdetermined in 
relation to social meaning and value. Only when they are embedded in a 
particular site and appropriated for specific purposes is it possible to say 
what they mean for the culture. This implies, of course, that they will 
mean different things in different contexts. In my view, the flows from the 
new scientific theories to the culture are still too nascent to say with 
certainty what they will mean to whom and for what reasons. For example, 
248 American literature and Science 
they mean something to Irigaray; but even though she seems to be influ, 
enced by the new science, it is difficult to be sure of how much she knows 
about it and of whether her knowledge is an implicit valorization of all 
science or applies more specifically to the new paradigms. 23 Equally 
problematic is how much the new science was authorized by cultural 
changes that Irigaray, along with many others, has helped to initiate. 
However we choose to answer these questions, it is clear that these 
complexities cannot be adequately represented as simple one,way flows of 
influence from science to literature. 
It remains to say what space I see my essay as occupying within the 
volume that contains it. Given the current state of the field, a book 
entitled American Uterature and Science could be predicted to speak of how 
literature has been influenced by science. My essay speaks in a different 
voice, urging us to consider science and literature as two sites within a 
complex cultural field. Yet even as I write these lines, I recognize that my 
essay will be read differently because it is inside this volume. Indeed, even 
if I were not inclined to do so, my argument would compel me to admit 
that the lines of influence between my essay and others in this book will be 
multidirectional. I hope that you will read the others differently because of 
what I have written; I acknowledge you will read me differently because of 
what the others have written. To recognize the complexity of influence as a 
social construction is necessarily to acknowledge the limits of authority 
and the polysemy of meaning. Neither I nor any other writer within this 
volume can control this turbulence. "In this volume which is not one," I 
am content if my essay has set up an inner turbulence that reinscribes the 
complex dynamics characteristic of the interplay between literature, sci, 
ence, and culture. 
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